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Abstract:
A shared history is crucial to the formation of a national imagined community. Many post-ethnic
conflict societies, such as Tito's Yugoslavia and Kagame's Rwanda, have attempted or are
attempting to build new national imagined communities in order to overcome genocide.
Building this community requires a new understanding of the past that is able to co-opt divisive
elements of history that helped to fuel identjty based violence. History education provides a
mechanism for states to construct this new history amongst the next generation, ideally creating
a new supra-ethnic identity in the process.
Using the theoretical framework of hegemony, and drawing lessons from 'Yugoslavism', this
thesis evaluates the potential of Kagame's 'Rwandanism' project as a means of post-conflict
reconciliation. Methods of disseminating narratives of the past such as gaCGCG, genocide
memorialisation, ingando, and the public school system are discussed, highlighting the
differences between official and local accounts of Rwanda's history.
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Chapter One: Introduction
The 1994 Rwandan genocide is widely perceived as one of humanity's great failures.
Between 800 000 and one million Tutsis and Hutu opposed to the Hutu Power movement were
murdered, predominantly within a 100 day period. Much has been written attempting to both
understand the origins and dynamics of the genocide itself (of which Des Forges' Leave none to
tell the stary remains the seminal text), as well as the reconciliation process currently underway
in Rwanda. One of the most important aspects to both of these bodies of literature is the role
that education has had in both constructing ethnic stereotypes inRwanda,.andthecurrent
program of pursuing a universal civic Rwandan identity. It has been well established that the
Rwandan education system helped to instill negative stereotypes and fear of the Tutsi minority
in Rwanda in the years prior to the genocide (Des Forges 1999; Mamdani 2001). As such, the
present state and conduct of the Rwandan education system has been seen as crucially
important to the reconciliation process.
There is currently a significant gap in the research being performed on history education
in Rwanda. While there has been limitedscholarshipfocusingonthetrainingofhistoryteachers
(see Freedman et al. 2011), as well as Rwandan's own views of history (see Buckley-Zistel 2006a,
2006b; Fujii 2009), the resources used in Rwanda's classrooms have received scant attention.
The most obvious reason for this is a lack of explicit historical teaching materials to study. The
moratoriumonhistoryteachinghasonlyrecentlybeenlifted,andtodatethereisyettobean
approved set of curricular materials. This has tended to limit analysis of history teaching in
Rwanda, to the aforementioned study of teachers, as well as open-ended interviews with
Rwandan children (Hilker 2011).
Omitted from the current work being done on history teaching in Rwanda is the role of
the mandatory social studies curriculum for disseminating history and ethnic identity to
Rwandan youth. In the absence of an official history curriculum, it is the social sciencesthat
have been responsible for education Rwandan youth on the years prior to, as well as, the civil
war and 1994 genocide. As such, the social studies curriculum is of crucial importance if we are
to understand how history and ethnicity is taught to a newgeneration of Rwandans, a
generationthatwillberesponsibleforongoingpeaceandreconciliationinRwanda. Thisthesis
will utilize primary social studies curricula texts from the first sixyearsofelementaryschoolin
order to examine the role of education in creating a new civic Rwandan identity in the aftermath
of genocide. This new research will form part of the evidence used to address the question: Is
the creation of a new, civic Rwandan identity, a viable means of post-conflict reconciliation in
present day Rwanda?
Central to the new Rwandan education system is the promotion of a Rwandan identity
intended to replace the previously divisive identities of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa. While there has
been limited scholarship examining the implications and effectiveness of this program (see
Buckley-Zistel 200Ga, 200Gb), current research has lacked a comparative framework in which to
contextualizetheRwandancase. Theuseofa new,pan-nationalidentityconstructhasbeen
attemptedinotherpostethnicconflictsocieties,mostnotablyYugoslaviaaftertheSecond
World War, in which 'Brotherhood and Unity' officially replaced, in many respects, Serb, Croat,
andSloveneidentities.1 UsingtheYugoslavcaseasa comparative baseline, this thesis wi II argue
that the pan-Rwandan identity currently being promoted by the Kagame regime will likely be
unable to dislodge exclusionary ethnic identities asthe most salient aspect of group identity.
lThis was later expanded to include Bosnian, Montenegrin, and Macedonianidentities.
This is primarily due to a dissonance between public and privateconceptionsofthepast,
preventing the formation of an imagined community as per Anderson (1983).
In order to address the viability ofa pan-Rwandan identityasaneffective means of post-
conflict reconciliation, this thesis will compare current efforts in Rwanda with those of the
formerYugoslaviaunderJosip'Broz'Tito. In both Yugoslavia and Rwanda these efforts towards
creating new identities had to overcome the intense inter-ethn icconflictsthat preceded state
formation through revolutionary struggle. Of particular interest to this study is how accounts of
thepasthavebeenusedintheformationofthisnewidentity,asacollectivehistoryisintegralto
Anderson's conception of the nation as an imagined community. This thesis will compare the
dissemination (and manipulation) of history in both Yugoslavia and Rwanda by examining the
memorialisation of the past and the teaching of history in both these societies. In the case of
Yugoslavia this will involve the review of secondary literature on both education and
memorialisation. The examination of history teaching in Rwanda is done through a mix of
primary research and secondary literature. Existing scholarship on the teaching of history
through the judicial process, memorialisation, and inganda will be reviewed, and combined with
primary research focused on the elementary social studies curricu lartextbooks. Using a critical
theoretical lens of hegemony, this thesis contributes to the discussionofpost-conflicteducation
by assessing the viability of new identity constructionsasa meansofreconciliationafterviolent
inter-ethnic conflict.
The collapse of the Soviet Union, followed shortly thereafter by the bloody dissolution of
Yugoslavia and genocide in Rwanda, has prompted increased scholarlyinterest in ethnic conflict;
both its dynamics and its reconciliation. Crucial to the study of both these aspects of "ethnic"
conflict is the study over ethnic identity itself,asthesetypesofconflictcan be seen as being
waged over identity itself (see Moshman 2007). To date, there has been little examination over
the role of identity and identity constructs in the reconciliation process after ethnic conflict. No
doubt a major reason for this is the tendency to treat ethnic groups as static, assuming that
these exclusionary ethnic identities remain unchanging, thus necessitatingvarious forms of
power sharing amongst ethnic groups (Lijphart 1977 being the most prominent).
Approaching ethnic conflict resolution through assumptions ofstaticethnicidentities
ignores both large bodies of literature pertaining to identity construction, including social
psychological approaches such as Social Identity Theory (see Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner and
TajfeI1982); as well as critical theoretical conceptualizations, such as Benedict Anderson's oft
cited imagined communities (1983). There is an implicit assumption in works such as Lijphart, as
well as more recent approaches such as participation in larger organ izational structures such as
the EU (see Jesse and Williams 200S), that cooperation at the elite level will lead to a reduction
of tension at the local level.
Rather than presenting ethnic or national groups as static, this work assumes a more
fluid conceptualization of group identity,onethatcan be altered overtime and differ in salience
depending on circumstance. At the same time, certain aspects of group identity often become
dominant, and are taken as a common sense measure of group belonging: In order to
adequately theorize these dominant (but still possible to change) aspects of group identity, luse
the concept of hegemony to examine modes of group identity in mixed societies that have
experienced ethnic conflict. Using more recent conceptualizations of hegemony, as proposed by
Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau, and Slavoj Zizek (2000), in which hegemony is maintained by co-
opting local narratives of dissent, I argue that a supra-national identity can be created that
would overcome the exclusionary ethnic identities that become prevalent during periods of
conflict.
In practice, this co-option of local levels of dissent mustoccuratthestatelevel,asitis
thestatethathasthegreatestinfluenceoverthe'official'narrativeofthepastthatis
instrumental in the formation of a national imagined community.2 In particular, it is the state
that has the unique potential to provide a collective history through standardized education;
indeed,thestateistheonlyentitythatcanrealisticallydisseminate a single version of events to
its population. At the same time, it is impossible for eventhe most totalitarian state to
completely monopolize narratives of the past, particularly when the past is rife with contentious
inter-group conflict. It is for this reason that incorporating these dissenting, often ethno-centric
narrativesratherthanattemptingtoutterlysuppressthem,isabsolutelyessential to the
formation of stable, supranational identity. As will be demonstrated in the case of the former
Yugoslavia, a failure to successfully co-opt challenges from ethno-centric narratives of the past
can lead to these same narratives being a potent source of propaganda and conflict when there
is a shock to the state system. It is here that hegemony is a particularly useful framework for
analysis, as this co-option of local dissent bya public meta-narrativeprovidesameansinwhich
'WhileAnderson (1983) points to the convergence of capitalist exchange and the printing press as the
origins of an expanded imaged community, leading to the formation of modern nations, this does not
adequatelv reflect the nature of state control and censorship inbothVugoslaviaandRwanda. It is also
worth noting that Anderson's thesis does not account for modern, standardized education practices that
servetoindoctrinatevouthintoanidealizednationalcommunitV.
to theorize why certain propaganda can successfullychallengetheofficialtruthnarrativeofthe
state.'
Theconstructionofanew,pan-ethnicidentityhasalreadyimplicitlybeen used inthe
former Yugoslavia after the Second World War, in which a greater Yugoslavism under the
framework of 'Brotherhood and Unity' was promoted by the central government under Tito as a
means of inter-ethnic reconciliation. This effort, however, was made impossible due to a lack of
a nuanced official account of the Second World War experience, in which genocide was
committed against Serbs in the Independent State of Croatia, while Serbian Chetniks terrorized
populations of Croats and Muslims simultaneously. Narratives of these events were repressed
under the framework of Brotherhood and Unity, only to re-emerge as a potent propaganda tool
for nationalist leaders such as Serbian PresidentSlobodan MilosevicandCroatian President
FranjoTudjman. TheinabilityofYugoslavismtoaddresstheselocal,dissentingaccountsof
history were key to preventing Yugoslavism from becoming a hegemonic expression of group
identity. Instead, local memories of the Second World War were much better expressed by
exclusionary ethnic nationalism and their inherent security dilemmas, culminating in the bloody
breakup of Yugoslavia and ethnic cleansing inthe Balkans.
The program of Rwandanism being pursued by the Kagame administration risks the
same outcome as Yugoslavia before it. Rather than constructing a version of history that reflects
the local memories of Rwanda's recent history (a key aspect of Anderson's imagined
community),Kagame has appealed to Rwanda's pre-colonial past: onethat reflects neither local
memories nor present experiences. One of the key dissonances between this official and living
'Whilemanypointtotheimpactofpropagandainprecipitatingethnicconflict(see Milosevic 2000),the
actual link astowhy propaganda would be believed is under-theorized in the current literature (Brubaker
andlaitin1998)
memoryisthe role of the civil warand corresponding genocide on the lives of Rwandans.
Officially, there is only what Susanne Buckley-Zistel hasdubbedthe "RPF healing truth" (2006a),
while dissenting accounts of the past are marginalized or persecuted. Rather than attempting to
co-opt these dissenting narratives, the Kagame administration has tried to obliterate them; an
i'nitiativethat is unlikely to be successful. This obliteration is done not only by the
aforementioned persecution and marginalization, but by omitting large aspects of the past from
public memory spaces such as memorials and justice proceedings such as Gacaca. Even more
importantly, there remains scarce official discussion of the genocide amongst Rwandan youth, as
the genocide receives scant attention inthe Rwandan school curriculum.
This thesis is divided into six chapters. The first outlines the current state of the
literature pertaining to both ethnic conflict resolution, and the construction of group identity
more generally. This chapter will argue that the deliberate construction of group identitiesis
best conceptualized through a critical theoretical lensofhegemony,inwhichacertainidentity
will become dominant only when it is reflected in both the private and public sphere. Chapter
three will examine the process of identity construction in the former Yugoslavia. This chapter
will demonstrate the crucial importance of having the official memory reflect the local one,
highlighting the nature of these differences and how this history was able to be manipulated to
create ethnic security dilemmas. In terms of identity construction this chapter focuses primarily
on memorialisation and education.
Chapters four and five provide an in-depth examination of identity construction in
Rwanda. Chapter four provides a brief overview of Rwandan identity in a historical perspective,
as well as the civil war and genocide of the mid 1990s. More importantly, chapter four examines
the role of identity in relation commemorating the genocide through memorialisation, as well as
the role of identity ingacacacourt proceedings. After reviewing secondary sources on
Rwandan's own view of the genocide, chapter four concludes that there remains a serious
dissonance between official and living memories in Rwanda.
Chapter five examines current practices of disseminating identity to Rwandan youth
through both the standardized education system and ingando (re)-education camps. While the
moratorium on history teaching in Rwanda has recently been lifted, to date there remains no
standardized set of textbooks or a coherent history curriculum (Freedman et al. 2011). In order
to overcome this lack of history resources, this thesis examines the social studies texts for
Rwandan primary schooling. In particular, this chapter will focus on accounts of both history and
identity as they appear in the social sciences. This includes obvious discussionsofethnicity (of
which there are few), but also accounts of both pre and post-colonial Rwandan history, including
the 1991 civil war and the genocide of 1994. Also included in this chapter is an examination of
how contemporary problems of unity and reconciliation (both recurringtopicsinthecurriculum)
are presented to a new generation of Rwandan youth. These primary texts provide the closest
thingtoa history curriculum currently being taught to Rwandanyouth,andassuch,fillan
important gap in contemporary studies of Rwandan education and its effects on reconciliation.
In addition, this section reviews secondary literature on igando camps, which serve to both
reintegrate former enemy combatants, and to further indoctrinate the next generation of
Rwandan elites. This chapter argues that, particularly within the school curriculum, the current
education program shifts discussion of identity away from the public sphere and into that of the
private. Combined with the dissonance between public and private narrativediscussedin
chapterfour,thisimpliesanincreasedlikelihoodofprivatenarratives of history becoming more
prominent than those promoted by the Kagame administration.
Chapter six provides a comparative analysis of the two cases, highlighting the potential
ofa gapinthe official historical record to be exploited in Rwanda,muchasitwasinYugoslavia
prior the wars of Yugoslav disintegration. In addition to this historical gap, this chapter also
highlights the roleofa strong, revolutionary leader to the peace process of both states; arguing
that Kagame is similar to Tito, in that both are seenasthe Iynchpin of their political system. Itis
possible that the removal of Kagame from power may invite a re-examination of the past, and as
wasthecaseinYugoslavia,perhapspromotethere-appearanceofexclusionary ethnic narratives
of the past in public discourse. This chapter concludes that much like Tito's Yugoslavism,
Rwandanism is unlikely to become a hegemonic expression of group identity in Rwanda.
Chapter Two: Literature Review and Theoretical Considerations
Drawing lessons from Titoist Yugoslavia, this thesis seeks to answer if creating a supra-
national, hegemonic identity is a viable means of reducing inter-ethnic conflict, and if so, what
the likelihood is of this being an effective.strategy in post-genocide Rwanda. This chapter will
examine current approaches to peacebuilding and identity formation. Part one focuses on
institutional and societal approaches to peacebuilding, drawinguponliteraturefromavarietyof
disciplines including political science and social psychology. There isa particular focus hereon
the use of truth telling, be it through criminal proceedings or truth commissions, in order to
review how creating truth frameworks is present in the existing literature. Part two focuses on
processesofidentityformationacrosspoliticalscience,socialpsychology, and critical
philosophy; as well as examining how identity based conflict occurs within this body of
literature. This will be followed by a brief research methodology. It should also be noted that
thischapterdoesnotaddresstheliteraturethatdealsspecificalIywith the cases of the former
Yugoslavia or Rwanda. This literature will instead be reviewed, where appropriate, in chapters
three,fourandfiveinordertodevelopthecasestudiesusedinthis comparison.
Part I: Peacebuilding
Increased focus on intra-state conflict has naturally led to a heightened interest in post-
conflict reconstruction within divided societies. The body of literature on this topic is vast, and
contains more traditional political science approaches, along with contributions from both
sociology and social psychology. This section is subdivided into literature that have a more
formal approach, often characterized by a focus on institutions, retributive justice, economic
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development, and foreign investment; and those who examine more social aspects, such as
restorative justice, truth telling, reconciliation, gender relations, and moral development.
Institutional Approaches
There isa substantial body of literature that links peacebuilding to institutions, both at
the state and global level. Generally, this can be further broken down in to those who study
justice and judicial institutions (Aptel 2011; Hamber 2005; Cobban 2007), and those who focus
on governing structures and distribution of state powers (lijphart 1977; Jesse and Williams
2005). Reviewing studies on justice, I will explore arguments pertaining to the International
Criminal Court and Truth and Reconciliation Commissions. These can be problematic as there is
often a lack of universal framework for understanding the past andneedsforjusticethatarise
from it. In terms of governing institutions, I will primarily be reviewing power sharing
arrangements such as consociationalism (lijphart 1977), arguing that these tend to focus on
accommodation at the elite level and fail to account for the local dynamics of inter-ethnic
conflict.
Formal justice, in which perpetrators are held accountable foratrocitiescommitted
duringconflict,isoftenseenasacrucialsteptowardseventualreconciliation (Staub 2011). In
the aftermath of Yugoslav disintegration, the international community set up the ad hoc
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTV), followed by a similar International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to prosecute war crimes and crimes against humanity. As this is one
of the few directly comparable (and ongoing) mechanisms of dispensing formal, judicial-oriented
justice in post-conflictsocieties,thereisconsiderablescholarlydebateastowhetherthese
tribunals (and later the ICC) enable or inhibit reconciliation. Those in favour point to relative
representative (ona societal level) character of tribunal prosecution, noting that in post-conflict
societies"... lawenforcementinstitutions,inciudingthepeace,prosecutors,andcourts,are
often themselves marked by identity-based tensions or divides" (Aptel 2011: 149). To rephrase,
proponents of the ICC see it as an objective mechanism to prosecute crimes against humanity,
with retributive justice being essential to reconciliation.
Critics of the ICC and its tribunals suggest that this objectivity is largely a myth. The
arrest of fugitives to stand trial is often a highly politicized issue, as isthe definition of the
conflict in question." The ICC also only typically targets top-level offenders, with the implicit
assumption that" ... impunity rests in the hands of a few and is not socially rooted" (Hamber
200S: 210). An additional criticism is that local populations are often ignorant of ICC
proceedings,withlittlefundingprovidedtomaketheprocesstransparentatthe local level
(Aptel 2011: 169). There have also been sensitivity issues raised towards the ICC, with victim's
accusing that " ... the judges listening most likely didn't understand what genocide is." (Cobban
2007: 2). An additional criticism (Clark 2008) is that there is little to suggest retributive justice
actually promotes reconciliation. Shearguesthatarestorativeapproachthatreachesbeyond
the simple need to see perpetrators punished is a more effective means of peacebuilding. This
reinforces Hamber (2005), which argues that the responsibility for genocide is socially rooted,
rather than simply the acts of a few. Thus, the ICC does not have the ability to reduce the
saliency of ethnic identities that were in conflict, only the powerto prosecute the highest level
4 The Rwandan genocide, for example, isdefinedasa "genocideagainsttheTutsis" (Aptel 2011: 176j,
effectively separating the moderate Hutu who were killed from the justice proceedings. The scope of the
ICTR also would have eliminated many cases of atrocities committed by the Kagame regime, as they did
not fit within the definition of race or stricttimeframe set out for the proceedings (Cobban 2007).
offenders. It should also be noted that as the ICC is separate from the post-conflict state, it does
not have the advantage of visibly promoting justice within the dividedsociety.
The ICC also has the potential to reinforce, rather than reduce, exclusionary ethnic
identities. Not only is there the issue of narrowly defining the complex series of events that
encompassthecasesofgenocideandethniccleansing,butifthese identity terms are the base
oftheproceedings,thananycourtargumentsmustbecenteredaroundidentityassuch. As
Hannah Arendt wrote on her experiences in Germany "If one is attacked as a Jew, one must
defend oneself as a Jew." (2003: 12). This polarization of identities within the ICC stands in
opposition to a desalienization of exclusionary ethnic identities. As such, the ICC is not an
effective institution to promote a universal civic identity that can bridge the divide between
ethnic identities that were previously in conflict.
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) are another institutional mechanism to
promote justice and healing for past atrocities. Originally created as a means of coping with the
apartheid experience in South Africa, TRCs are intended to form a "social space where all
experiences can be shared and validated." (Dal Secco 2008). Proponents of TRCs (Dal Secco
2008; Llewellyn 2006) argue thatTRCs can lead toa redesigningofsocial relations, asthe focus is
on the victim, rather than perpetrator. This can include issues such as gender relations, which
often form a particularly brutal aspect during times of inter-group conflict (see Kaufmann and
Williams 2004; Weitsman 2008; de Brouwer and Ka Hon Chu 2009).
Hamber (2005) is highly critical of TRCs as a tool for reconciliation, arguing that there is a
lack of understanding on the part of policy-makers on group trauma onsuchamassivescale,and
that TRCs reinforce "artificial breaks" in history, rather than examining the evolving nature of the
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violence overtime (208). Thisapproach,heargues, devalues historical responsibility and the
complicityofbystanders(211),andthusfailstotakeapreventativeapproachforthefuture.
This failure to address the long standing tensions that gave rise to the legitimization of violence
based upon lines of identity leaves open the possibility fora return to that violence in the
future.s In short, if a long-term view of the past is not addressed, it can remain open for
nationalist manipulation in the future. WhileTRCscancertainly be an effective means of
promoting local truths and experiences during periods of conflict, their narrow scope does not
allow for the violence to be seen in the larger context that allowed the violence to occur. Thus if
truthtellingistobe used asa means of reconciling past violence, it must take a far broader view
than iscurrentlypracticed,and beUerincorporateahistoricaI framework so asto understand
the evolving grievances of the conflicting parties. The scope of such a process makes TRCs at
best an incomplete tool for using truth frameworks as a means of reconciliation.
Beyond the study of justice institutions, there isa substantial interest in examining
power sharing institutions as a means to promote reconciliation. Arend Lijphart (1977) is
perhaps the best known proponent of such power sharing arguments. Consociational
democracyrequires"...thatthepoliticalleadersofallsignificantsegementsofthe plural society
cooperate in a grand coalition to govern the country." (Lijphart 1977: 25). This is typically
achieved through a federal structure; creating a certain amount 0 fterritorialautonomy, with
each group having a veto over national affairs. Horowitz (1985) is also sympathetic to this
position, though he does acknowledge that political leaders to not always have to will to
5 Consider, for example, that Serbian propaganda highlighted atrocitiescommittedagainstserbsduring
the Second World War, forty years before the dissolution ofYugoslavia (Isakovich 2000).
promote reconciliation (568). There is considerable support for Lijphart amongst current conflict
resolution scholars (Noel 2005), though there are also some problems with this approach.
During ethnic conflict, ethnic identity becomes the most salient aspect of interpersonal
relations (Moshman 2007). Thus, in order to promote reconciliation there must be a
desalienization of ethnicity as a political cleavage. Consociation democracy promotes a static
conception of group identity, ensuring that political discourse is centered on ethnicity (Jesse and
Williams 2005: 11). Similar arguments have been made by Aitken (2007) in response to the
ethnicization of politics in Bosnia-Herzegovina under Dayton, which at this point is divided into
ethnic territories. Aitkenconvincinglyarguesthatthesetypesofpowersharingarrangements
reward, and thus promote, ethnic mobilization as a legitimate form of politics (2007: 248). This
ethnicization of politics makes cooperation and reintegration more difficult. Consociation
democracy also implies that an elite-level consensus will lead to a reduction of inter-group
hostility, though it is unclear as to why this would be the case. Consociation also suggests a
federation of relatively ethnically homogenous territories, while in practice this is- not often the
case,inRwandaforexample(Fujii2009).
Jesse and Williams (2005) recognize the need to desalienize ethnicity,arguingthatthisis
possible through membership in multilateral institutions such as the European Union. This
theory holds that other group membership will allow for other political cleavages to emerge that
will cut across multiple ethnicities, allowing for contact between ethnic groups and thus
promoting reconciliation. This is an innovative approach as it acknowledges both the
importance and fluidic nature of collective identity, however much like consociation democracy
it implies that elite cooperation will cause the same atthe local Ieve!.
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The study of formal institutions for peacebuilding efforts suffers from two major
weaknesses. The first weakness is the tendency to focus on elites, rather than 0 nsocietyasa
whole. Those in favour of the ICC fail to address the problem of only targeting 'top'
perpetrators, and fail to address the importance of bystanders and the often deep-rooted
societal issues that allowed for the violence to occur. The same can be said of both proponents
ofconsociationdemocracyand multi-lateral institution models of peacebuilding and
accommodation, as they assume that contact and cooperation of elites will lead to the same at
the local level. Consociation democracy in particular maintains static conceptions of group
identity, and thus legitimizes ethnicity asthe principlecleavageinpoliticalinteractioninpost-
conflict states. TRCs manage to avoid this elite focus, though they can fail to address societal
issues as they tend to focus on the period of violence itself, rather than the events and attitudes
that led to it.
The second weakness in this body of literature is a total lack of focus on the formation of
post-conflict identities. This seems to be based on an assumption that identities are static,
rather than fluid (as will be argued in the following section). This ensures that justice
proceedings and power sharing arrangements are conducted on 'ethnic' grounds. While there is
mention of the need to depoliticizeexclusionary ethnic identitieS,thereisscarcementionasto
how this is to be achieved, nor is there an examination of what these post-conflict identity
relations would look like. This lack of focus on identity makes it difficult to establish a truth
framework in which justice mechanisms do not simply reinforce past ethnic divides. The
following section addresses some of these issues, particularlythe need to establish a universal
truth framework as a means of understanding and coping with violence. This also includes
restorativejustice,whichfocusesonreconciliation,asopposedtopunishment.
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Social Approaches
Rather than focus on formal institutions, a great deal ofpeacebuildingliterature
examines more social aspects, such as truth telling (outside of the more formal TRCs),
restorativejustice(particularlyatthegrassroots),andimprovinggenderrelations. Much of this
literature seeks ways of dealing with massive trauma on a group scale, and promoting
reconciliation within communities to ensure peaceful conflict resolutioninthefuture.
There isa lively debate within social psychology as to the benefits of truth telling on
trauma reduction and reconciliation (Dal Secco 2008; Staub 2008; Moshman 2007; Cobban
2007). What must be realized beforesucha discussion can take place isthat reconciliation
"requires acknowledgement of suffering by both sides, even when substantially unequal" (Staub
2008:399)6, In cases of genocide this is especially difficult, as the victim group must
acknowledge the suffering of the perpetrator. This certainly undermines aspects of the more
formal TRCs, which are notoriously victim centered (Dal Secco 2008). In the context of the
victim, truth telling in a friendly environment can be an effective means of dealing with severe
trauma (Moshman 2007; Staub 2008, 2011). Moreover, some argue that hearing such stories
allow for easier empathy on the part of perpetrators, which can promote remorse and
forgiveness seeking (Staub 2008; NadlerandShnabeI2008).
6Thisis doneto acknowledge the (perceivedj factors that led to violence on behalf of perpetrator groups.
In Rwanda, for example, there was a real fear that there would be a return to a Tutsi dictatorship in which
Hutuwouldberelegatedtosecondclasscitizens. If the violence is to be understood (a necessity for
reconciliation) than these fears need to be understood and acknowledged.
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of truth telling isthe narrativesofperpetratorgroups.
From the psychological perspective of the perpetrator, it is extremely difficult to recognize the
immorality of one's actions (Moshman 2007; 2004). Individuals have a psychological need to
perceive themselves as moral agents (Moshman 1999, 2004). If truth telling is to contribute to
reconciliation there needs to be acknowledgement of the fears of perpetrators that led them to
commit acts of genocide. In Rwanda this is particularly important to understanding how
genocidal ideology becameaccepted,astherewasaveryrealfearofa foreign invader linked to
a domestic group that had held power during a period of brutal colonial rule (Fujii 2009; Hintjens
2001).
Truth telling on the part of perpetrators can also face harshoppositionfromdominant
narratives of past events. In the aftermath of genocide, ethnic identities are still extremeIy
salient, often with one group (the victor of the conflict) in a dominant position of power. This
can beseenasa disincentive for perpetrator groups to narrate their version of events, as they
can fear revenge from the dominant group (Cobban 2007). This also prevents reconciliation for
atrocitiesthatareinevitablycommittedbythevictors,suchasaseries of massacres against
former Rwandan soldiers in the Northern provinces (Waugh 2004), or Tito's massacre of Ustasha
soldiers following their surrender to Allied forces (Djokic 2003). Truth telling for perpetrators is
thus hampered byan internal psychological need to be perceived as a moral agent and byan
externalthreatofreprisalfromadominantgroupadvocatingadifferentnarrativeofthepast.
This isa huge barrier to reconciliation.
While typically seen as instrumental in coping with trauma, truth telling on the part of
victim groups is not without its own complications. As one would expect, there is often difficulty
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in sharing one's experience during periods of ethnic cleansing (de Brouwer and Ka HonChu
2009; Kaufmann and Williams 2004). Such trauma often causes intense feelings of shame on the
part of victims, with the mind rationalizing that there must be a (personal) reason for violence
committed against them and their group (Nadler and Shnabel 2008). This can be further
antagonized by having to interactwithtormentorsona daily basis, as many perpetrators remain
in their towns and villages. Potential benefits of truth telling are also highly dependent on the
collective views of the majority.
The question of listening would be less problematic were the speaker and the
listener to share a framework that is taken for granted by both parties. However, in
the case where such a framework is notshared,and one of the partiesisthe
majority and the other is in the minority, 'listening' to the other can be a mean to
oppress and exclude. Listening to the other in this sense means to position the
speaker in accordance with the audience's framework for seeing the world (Sadria
2008: 55).
This need for multiple parties to express grievances, along with the need to share a framework
demonstrates the importance of coming to a shared understanding of the conflict. Wit.hout this,
reconciliation would be impossible. There is currently a significant gap in this literature on how
this universal truth framework would be formed. The current literature either lacks concrete
examples of instances of positive intergroup contact (such as Moshman 2004, 2007; as well as
Sadria 2008; and Cobban 2007), or focuses on a single, small example (see Staub 2011f.
A final issue with truth telling can be a desire on behalf of a population to 'move on'
(Humphrey 2002; Staub 2008). This is typically accompanied by a kind of forced social amnesia
(Moshman 2004), with individuals being unwilling or unable to talk about the past. This is often
donetosparethenextgenerationfrominheritingtheconflictoftheparents. Such social
7 The case in question isa radio drama being produced in Rwanda. This will be further reviewed in chapter
4,asitfocusesspecificallyonRwanda.
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amnesia was certainly the prevailing means of coping for the World War Two genocide of Serbs
in the Independent State of Croatia (Karge 2009; Troch 2010). This lack of adequately coming to
terms with the pastwasa major factor contributing to the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia during the
1990s(Hopken 1999; Karge2009). There isa very real risk that this will occur in present
Rwanda, as there isa cultural tendency to not publicly discuss difficultissuesandnegative
feelings (Buckley-Zistel 200Ga, 200Gb). To overcome this, truth telling will be and is instrumental
to peacebuilding and reconciliation in Rwanda. This will inevitably include local discourses,
teaching and education about the past, and symbolic discourses through memorialisation,
monuments and public ceremonies.
Unlike focuses on court proceedings, trials, and punishments, restorative justice
attempts to enact social reforms that positively affect victims in their communities. In many
ways, restorative justice endeavours provide a means of reshaping the way in which society is
organized, ideally creating a social sphere that is less conductive to violent conflict.
Unfortunately, in the aftermath of violent conflict, particular those focused on identity,there
tends to bea focus on retributive justice, as one side inevitablyemergesasthe 'winner' (Field
2007). This tends to transform restorative justice into a means of perpetuating the dominance
of the regime in power. Such efforts have occurred in Rwanda with preferentialfundinggivento
Tutsi survivors of emigres, while Hutu victims of violence are not provided similar compensation
(Cobban 2007; Buckley-Zistel 2009). In order to speak of restorative justice it is first necessary to
lower the salience of exclusionary identities, as this will ensure a more balanced approach that
does not overly favour one particular group. Even ifone side has suffered disproportionately
(typically the case), there must bea fair distribution of wealth and opportunity so asnotto
foster future resentment.
20
In the aftermath of the widely publicized cases of rape and sexualtortureinboth
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia gender issues have commanded an increased focus in the
peacebuilding process. This has been most notable with the classification of rape as a crime
against humanity by the International Criminal Court (de Brouwer and Ka Hon Chu 2009). While
this has at least formally acknowledged the seriousness ofsexuaI violence, convictions by the
International Tribunals for both Rwanda and Yugoslavia have been found lacking,ashasthe
more recent Gacaca process in Rwanda (Field 2006). There is also a tendency for such issues to
remain unaddressed in truth telling processes, largely due to the negative stigma attached to
victims of sexual violence in many societies (de Brouwer and Ka Hon Chu 2009).8
This lack of openness about crimes and victims of sexual violencehasanegativeimpact
onthereconciliationprocess. Ashaspreviouslybeendiscussed,truthtellingcanreducetrauma
on the part of victims, and can arguably increase feelings ofremorseonbehalfofperpetrators.
Moreover,incasesofrapethepotentialoffspringmustbeconsideredinthereconciliation
process. It is often difficult for mothers to raise a child born of such an environment(de
Brouwer and Ka Hon Chu 2009). This further undermines societal relations at the local level, as
such children began to question their identity in a divided society (Moshman 2007; Staub 2008,
2011). The integration of victims of sexual violence is of critical importance, as they form
perhaps the most vulnerable section of society. In Rwanda, approximately seventy percent of
victims of sexual violence are HIV positive (de Brouwer and Ka Hon Chu 2009). This brings
further stigma, making it more difficult for them and their children to integrate back in to
society. While HIV education is a priority in the school system (Rwandan Ministry of Education
SWomen are not the only victims of sexual violence during intra-state conflict, though they are by far the
most commonly victimized. Little research has been done on male victims of sexual violence, who are
often reluctant to admit their stories due to societal stigma (deBrouwerandKaHonChu2009j.
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Curriculum 2011), it is an issue that people do not often discuss amongst themselves or within
Gacaca (de Brouwer and Ka Hon Chu 2009).
A consistent theme with this body of literature isthe focus on openness and justice. The
former is dominated by notions of truth telling, formal or informal, as well as court processes
which will uncover a sort of Platonic Truth of the past. Justice can be seen as both retributive
and restorative, though it can also be largely symbolic. Memorial sites and remembrance
ceremonies can provide a wide scale acknowledgement of personal suffering, serving to both
potentially decrease trauma in survivors and increase empathy in perpetrators. The state hasa
large role to play in the erection of such monuments, as well as providingsignageand
interpreters at such sites. The local population also plays a role in the impact of these sites,
filteringtheinformationthroughtheirownexperiencesandknowledgeofthepast.
Interpretation of such sites is heavily influenced by one's own identity as it relates to
past conflicts (Bevan 2006). ItisalsoidentitY,particularlyasitrelatestogroupmembership,
that provides a framework of understanding for the truth telling and reconciliation mechanisms
already discussed. At present there isa significant gap in the peacebuilding literatureaddressing
the role of identity in the peacebuilding process. While several social psychologists have
addressed the issue (Moshman2007;Staub20ll),thefocushas been almost exclusively on
reducingthesalienceofparticulargroupidentities,ratherthanthe construction of new ones.
While certainly an important aspect in conflict reduction, thisdoes not address the strategy that
was pursued by Tito in Yugoslavia and is currently being advancedin Rwanda under Kagame:the
constructionofa new, pan-national identity that would subsume the exclusionary identities that
led to conflict. The following section examines identity formation across a range of literatures.
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Part II: Identity Formation and Conflict
Of central importance inthe literature concerning ethnic conflict anditsresolutionisthe
concept of identity. As ethnic conflict can be considered in many ways to be a conflictover
identity itself (Moshman 2007), it is vital that we review the study of identity as it pertains to
inter-group violence. This section will examine the most common aspects of group identity
within political science literature on ethnic conflict: primordialism and elite manipulation. I will
also review conceptions of group identity in both social psychology and critical philosophy. Once
linkages are made between these disparate literatures, I will turn to a discussion of hegemony
and identity, followed by the impact of education on these processes.
Primordialism
Primordialism assumes that ethnicity is relatively static and enduring over time. By far
the most influential scholar with this view, and indeed one of the key early figures in ethnic
conflict literature, is Donald Horowitz, particularly his work Ethnic Groups in Conflict (1985).
Horowitz commonly likens ethnic identity to the identity of kinship, noting the similarities in
discourse when referring to in-group members9 (1985: 57). This, sometimes fictive, kinship
groupallowsfora connection to past; a means in which the group ca n be categorized asa static,
enduring entity, both as of a unit of study and within the minds of group members. At the same
time, Horowitz acknowledges that ethnic groups can amalgamate, incorporate, divide, and
9 The reference to in-group members as 'brothers', and distantly related groups 'cousins', for example.
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proliferate (1985: 65). Groups can also maintain multiple identities of different orders,though
this is primarily a territorially based (sub)-identity(66). It is unclear as to how various levels of
identity become more salient over others, while identification based on territory can be
problematic outside the Westphalian state system. The linkage of state, elites, and general
population is also unclear within this model.
This linkage of ethnic or national identity and' territory is a common theme within the
ethnic conflict literature (Hale 2008). This interpretation is centered primarily on the European
experience, using such cases as Castellan Spain and the Basques, Ireland,and French Canada
(Waldmann 1985, 1989). Yugoslavia is also commonly researched using the territorial link to
identity, though this becomes more difficult in the relatively heterogeneous Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Conflict within primordia list literature typically occurs in two ways. The first is the "ancient
hatreds" theory advanced by Robert Kaplan in Balkan Ghosts (1993). This posits that violent
conflict between groups is enduring; the metaphor is one of placing a lid over boiling water that
inevitably boils over. There are two main problems with this approach. The first is that it cannot
accountforthetimingandoutsetofinter-ethnicviolence;moretelling,itcannotexplainthe
periods of peace, which in his Balkan example far outweigh periods of conflict (Isakovic 2000;
Mojzes 1994). The ancient hatred argument also fails to account for ethnic relations outside the
Balkans: if applied universally one would predict consistent vio lent conflict amongst ethnic
groupsglobally.lO
A far more common approach to those who assume a relatively static conception of
group identity is driven by security dilemmas, particularly in newly emergent states (Woodward
'o Despite scholarly focus and substantial media coverage,eth nicconflict is far from a common
occurrence, and warrants attention "because it is appalling, not because it is ubiquitous" (Brubaker and
Laitin1998:424)
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1995; Deng 1995). National minorities feel threatened by a dominant national group achieving
sole power of the state, creating a crisis for the minority group. This in turn justifies violence on
behalf of the minority group, who feel that they will be absorbed by the new state (Horowitz
1985). Variants of this include Huntington's Clash of Civilizations, in which threats to identity will
drivefutureglobalconflicts(1993),aswellasmorerecentpublications by Robert Kaplan
focusing on ethnic groups struggle for dwindling resources (2000). There have also been limited
attempts to utilize game theory to understand ethnic conflict (Hale 2008). Such studies, which
normally characterize conflict as undesirable, posit that ethnic conflict is due to one group
fearing annihilation atthe hands of another. This makes violence the only option to proposed
extermination, as any non-violent resistance would not minimize the worst possible outcome
(Hale 2008). Peacebuilding amongst primordia lists tends to focus on institution building,
typically within democratic structures, in order to ensure ethnic cooperation (Horowitz 1985).
This, as mentioned previously, only serves to foster accommodation at the elite level; tacitly
assuming that either impunity rests only inthe hands of leaders,orthateliteswillbeableto
secure the compliance of their respective ethnic groups.
The clash of civilizations, while interestingasa meta-narrative, is largely ineffective for
explaining any particular case study. Itis unclear as to the homogeneity of the supra-civilizations
that Huntington proposes, and its predictive qualities remain low. Horowitz does allow for
multiple layers of identity, but does not elaborate as to exactly how one (sub)-national identity
can become more salient, nor does he effectively break identity from a territorial homeland.
The security dilemma does provide a reasonable account of ethnic conflict, allowing for
contextual factors and historical memory to shape possible outcomes. While these models tend
to treat national groups as states, they do provide insight in to the fear of the Other that
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normally accompanies ethnic conflict. This isa theme that also often appears in elite-driven
theories of national or ethnic identity.
Elites and Ethnosymbolism
Many studies of ethnic conflict (Lemarchand 1996; Gagnon 2002) highlight the roles of
elites for promoting ethnic or nationalist violence between groups. Implicit in these arguments
is the varying salience in which an exclusionary ethnic identity is present, and how this can be
changed by nationalist leaders through the deployment of what Anthony Smith terms "Symbolic
Resources" (2009). Symbolic resources are formal and informal means of reinforcing group
identities such as parades, display of flags, ceremonies, and t he erection of monuments (Smith
2009). Similar arguments are made by Murray Edelman (1988), who argues that these symbols
constitute and reaffirm much of what we know about politics. For those using an
ethnosymbolist approach to understanding group identity, ethnic belonging is enduring through
time, though the meaning of that identity can change overtime.
Ethnosymbolism thus attempts to strike a balance between the more monolithic modes
of identity espoused by those using pirmodialism, with the more highly contextual and layered
modes of identity that are commonly put forward by social psychologists (Moshman 2004, 2007;
Turner and Tajfel 1982). Ethnosymbolism allows for more fluidity than primordialism in the
sense that it allows for greater change within ethnic identities, yet atthe same time it does not
fully develop a theory as to why some narratives are especially more apttoactivateahigher
exclusionary ethnic identity compared to others. Research in this area tends to be richly
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contextual (Brubaker and Laitin 1998), yet few efforts have been made to compare multiple
cases through a lensofelitemanipulation.ll
Much like conflict theories derived from primordial ism, ethnosymbolists typically view
ethnic conflict as a security dilemma. Elites, often with control of mass media, attempt to create
afearofanethnicOtherinorderto redefine ethnicityastheprinciple cleavage in politics
(Gagnon 2002; Lemarchand 1996). This typically occurs during a shock to the current power
system, in which leaders attempt to maintain power. Out-groups are promoted as being
simultaneously threatening and inferior to the nationalist group. This is further reinforced by
what Vamik Volkan terms "hot places" (2006: 139), which are a unique symbolic resource; a
place in which past atrocities against a group are committed and inwhichthesiteservesasa
reminder and memorial to said atrocity. Some recent scholarship has argued the importance of
these sites, both as a means of healing and as a means of retraumatization (Bevan 2006).
The chief weakness in this approach isthe lack of research addressing how these ethnic
mobilization efforts are internalized bythegeneralpopulation(Brubakerand Laitin1998).
Despite claiming that the public interprets nationalist rhetoric and symbology, ethnosymbolism
and elite driven narratives do not show how these are able to suppress alternative visions of
national belonging. The closest to this is Malkki (1995), though this focuses on the views of
victims, rather than perpetrators, and thus does notsatisfactorilyaddresstheperceptionsofthe
victims from the perspective of perpetrators. The lack of comparative studies also makes it
difficulttopredictwhenapopulationmayseektomakenationalist-reinterpretations. There is
11 lemarchand (1996) may be the best in thisrespect,comparingethnicconflictinbothRwanadaand
Burundi. Gagnon (2002) does show similarities in elite discourse in both Serbia and Croatia prior to the
dissolutionofYugoslavia,thoughitcanbearguesthatthisisstill essentially a singlecase,astherhetoricof
both groups elites were in direct response to one another.
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an implication in several that this is during times of crises, eithernationalorinternational,
though this has not been sufficiently developed. There is also little research in this field asto
what rhetorical devices are more apt to change nationalist interpretations amongst the general
population,thoughrecentlysomescholarsareattemptingtointegrateaspectsofsocial
psychology to bridge this gap (Jesse and Williams 2005).
Identity and Social Psychology
There is a lively debate within social psychology both on the formation of identity and
the healing of trauma caused by ethnic violence. This section primarily addresses the former,
with the latter being dealt with in the discussion of peacebuild ingliterature. Within the
literature of identity formation, research tends to focus on either individual or collective identity
formation, with little overlap between these two areas of research (Owens et al. 2010).
According to Rosenberg (1979) there are four sources of identity characterizations:
individual identity, role-based identity, category-based identity, and group membership-based
identity. Individual identity is derived from a biography of self, constituted from one's own
experiences. Despite the fact that isan individual narrative it is "social and institutional in
origin" (Owens et al. 2010: 479). Despite its social construction, individual identity is used as a
means of differentiation from others, providing a framework for finding one's place in society.
Role identity originates from one's position in relation to others as individuals. These are usually
expressed as dichotomous reJationships, such asstudent-teacher (Rosenberg 1979). Many
psychologists (Serpe 1987; Thoits 2003) also suggest that one may have many role-identities,
and select whichever is most importantfora given situation.
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Of greater importance in ethnic conflict and peacebuilding is the Iiteraturefocusingon
category and group based identity. Within this body of literature Social Identity Theory (see
Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner and Tajfe11982) provides the most insightful theory of
categorical and collective identity. Much like role-identities, Social Identity Theory allows for
multiple levels of group identity with varying degrees of sa lienceo
In social Identity Theory, salience is conceptualized as the impact of the situation in
on self-categorizations. I might be an American in Paris, but at a Civil War re-
enactment, I am a Southerner, and in the American Sociological Association, I am a
professor and social psychologist. And in each of those venues, I might have a
different meaning for those categorical identities, depending on the salient out-
group at that time (Owens et al. 2010: 488- emphasis added).
Applying this to ethnic conflict scenarios, one can see how propaganda against an out group
could drastically increase the salience of an exciusionaryand hostile national identity
categorization, which could be further used to justify violence against the out group. This
emphasis on context also reaffirms much of what is purported by ethnosymbolists and others
who emphasize the role of elites in deploying symbolic resources to change attitudes towards
out groups. In this sense, social psychology also often favours the security dilemma as the most
likely cause of intergroup conflict, though there isa tendency to focus on dehumanization and
scapegoating, rather than conflicts over territory or resources (Staub 2011). This
dehumanization, according to David Moshman (2004), allows for individuals to maintain their
moral self-perceptions while either committing or witnessing atrocities to outgroups.
Of crucial importance, at least in terms of ethnic conflict and peacebuilding,isthe
degree to which an elite minority can alter the salience of multipIe identities. The highly
contextualizednatureofidentityformationhasledsometobelieve that states have a relatively
low influence on identity formation (Bishai 2004). This ignores the immense power of the state
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to control contextual factors within its borders; being capable of deploying far greater symbolic
resources than a group of individuals. Beyond the more obvious resources of monuments and
ceremony, the state often provides a standard education, providing a means in which to alter
the context in which individuals mature in a given society. The link between elite and local
narratives as it pertains to identity is perhaps best explained using the critical concept of
hegemony, as advanced by Butler, Laclau,andZizek(2000).
Critical Theory and Identity
Much like Social Identity Theory, many critical theorists emphasize the discursive nature
of national identity formation (Foucault 1982-3; Gramsci 1929-35). Benedict Anderson offers
perhaps the most cited and straightforward of these theories, positing that national and ethnic
groups are imagined communities, created by the mass production of a common printed
vernacular (1983). ForAnderson,nationalismisthusaproductofcapitalism,andarelatively
modern 'invention' in collective action. This theory applies well to the Westphalian model of the
nation state, as realized in Western Europe, in which national sub-languages were suppressed in
toanational meta-language (see Anderson 1983: chapter 5).12
Hostile nationalism, for Anderson, is a by-product of racial stereotypes built within
national meta-languages that promote inferior attitudes of out-groups (Anderson 1983: chapter
7). Ethnic violence is thus violent racism on a massive scale. This is also accompanied by a
heightened sense of worth on part of the in-group, what Adorno refers to as collective
12 This was also the root of the first theories ofa united Yugoslavia,asSerbsand Croats are near
linguistically identical (though they use different scripts) (Dragnich 1983).
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derivatives of narcissism (1967:95). SlavojZizek(1993, 2008) takes a different approach to
understandinginter-ethnicandnationalistviolence,outlininginsteadthefear,ratherthan
disdain, of the Other.
Primarily a Lacanianscholar, Zizek conceives the nation asa bondamongstindividualsto
the Nation-Thing, which produces the rituals that perpetuate the Nation-Thing itself (1993: 201).
This is somewhat similar to Smith's use of symbolic resources to reinforce national belonging,
though in Zizek's case the individual has an imagined relationship to this Nation-Thing which is in
turn the source of disavowed enjoyment-jouissance as per Lacanian psychoanalysis. This is
perhaps most c/early stated by Adam Finlayson:
Racism, prejudice, xenophobia, and nationalism revolve around access to and fear
of the dissolution of this Thing of enjoyment. What we fear in the Other is the
Other's mode of enjoyment and the threat that they might steal our enjoyment-
steal our Thing. The imaginingofa theft of enjoyment functions to conceal the fact
that we never had it in the first place. Instead, the Nation-Thing as enjoyment is
produced by the continual!ear o!its loss (1998:155 emphasis added)
This fear in turn gives rise to the "Sacred Cause of nationalism" (Zizek 2008: 135-6), in
which individuals may suppress their abhorrence of violence in defence of the Nation-Thing.
Essentially, this is a security dilemma of identity, in which groups with an attachment to their
particular-universal13 will justify the use of violence against the Others. This fear of losing
attachment to the source of enjoyment is especially important in the wake of inter-group
violence in which more than one group exists within a territory. Each group will seek to maintain
its particular-universal narrative in the face of alternatives. If there isto be peaceful relations
13Aparticularnarrativeofcollectiveidentitythatisheldtobeauniversal standard of belonging. Those
outside of this particular are viewed as the Other, both lesser andthreatening.
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between multiple nation groups, a new narrative that can incorporate multiple particulars must
be constructed.
Zizek's view is heavily influenced by Louis Althusser, though the latter is more explicit in
the formation of subject identity. AlthusserusestheexampleofChristianideology,ratherthan
ethnic or racial belonging, though the line of reasoning can certainly be applied to the latter.
..... therecan only be such a multitude of possible religious subjects on the condition thatthere is
a Unique, Absolute, Other subject ie: God" ([1971) 2000: 35). The subject identity is thus
dependent on the existence of the Subject itself. Returning to Christian ideology "God is thus
the Subject, and Moses and the innumerable subjectsofGod'speople,thesubjecfs
interlocutors-interpellates: his mirrors, his reflections." ([1971) 2000: 36). The subject acts
according to his need to be of the Subject itself, a form of coercion that Althusser calls the
ideological State Apparatus. Applying this to ethnic identity and belonging, the subject acts in
accordance with the norms associated from being within that group; a complex formation of
acceptable actions derived from a shared history and collective consciousnessthatissocially
instilled on the subject through relationships with family and society.14 Asubject's"belonging"
toa particular ethnic group is thus a product of societal influences both atthe elite and local
level that reinforces a code of behaviour, which is itselfderivedfrom the absolute Subject; the
ethnic group itself.
AsAlthusser is primarily concerned of class relationships, a theory of inter-group conflict
is not readily accessible in his works. Instead,lwouldliketoexplorethepossibilityofamore
universal subject formation that is possible through Althusser. The subject, for Althusser, is
14 Bourdieu uses the conceptof'habitus'forthis phenomenon, and will be discussed in greater detail
below.
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already born in to a category, be it religious, racial, family etc. IS If this category were to be
altered,newsubjectswouldbecategorizedintoanewsocialexistence, one that could ideally
include previously conflicting identity constructs.
Judith Butler provides a link between power and subjectformation,and though she is
primarily concerned with an individual,sexual identity,she provides insights that can be applied
to national identity categories. Butler, much like Althusser and Foucault, stresses the
socialization inherent in language on subject identity formation (1997: 20). Butler, however,
takes a less 'static' approach than theorists such as Gramsci, Althusser, and Horowitz, stressing
that "[the] social categorizations that establish the vulnerability of the subject are themselves
vulnerable to both psychic and historical change" (Butler 1997: 21). This historical contingency
allows for a more fluid conception of group membership based upon current socio-historical
conditions, with the subject being "derived from conditions of power that precede it, [... ] though
not mechanically or predictably, from prior social operations" (1997:21).
These social operations are most effective when they are repeated or ritualized,
becoming unconscious habit. For states attempting to normalize identity and behaviour "It is
preciselythepossibilityofa repetition which does not consolidate that dissociated unity,the
subject, but which proliferates effects that undermine the force of normalization" (Butler 1997:
93). Thus, if a state's goal is to create new identities, those identities must reflect the repetition
and ritual present within a society if it is to become the most salient mode of group belonging.
This will be discussed in greater detail under the concept ofhegemony.
15 This argument is based upon the Freudian analysisofsubJectformation based on the "name of the
Father."
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Linkages
These four diverse areas of identity literature have several common themes that should
be highlighted before pursuing further. First, it is important to emphasize the rather fluidic
nature of identity. Ethnosymbolism, Social Identity Theory, as well as Anderson, Zizek, and
Foucault, all point to the highly contextual nature of collective identity that is reinforced through
interaction both with other individuals and the symbolic order in which these interactions occur.
Even primordial ism, which promotes more static conceptions of identity than the other
reviewed theories, allows for multiple levels of group identity that can shift depending on
context. Violentinter-groupconflictoccurswhenthereisafearoftheOther encroaching upon
national identity, for Zizek this is a threat to national enjoyment, while Kaplan and Huntington
suggestthisisastrategicstruggleforresources.Regardless,there is reasonable consensus
amongst these Iiteratures-that conflict occurs through a security dilemma in which national
identity provides the limit between competing groups. If the goal is to reduce and eliminate
conflict between groups that must share space after inter-group conflictitisthusessentialto
redefine the boundaries of the nation in such a way so asto create a supra-national identity
between said groups.
How then, do we create a supra-national identity? Horowitz is unclear on this matter,
while authors such as Huntington tend to unite groups around commonalities such as religion.
This could be also expressed as using shared symbolic resources, if we are to use Smith's (2009)
term, which would be reinforced through elite discourse. This would include a shared mass
media (an expansion of Anderson's mass printed vernacular hypothesis) as well as creating
(supra)-nationalsitesofremembrance. What this does not address isthe interaction between
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local and elite narratives of belonging. While it is common, both amongst political theorists and
social psychologists, to speak of the reiteration of identity through social interactions, this body
of literature does not speak to it directly. This interaction is best explained through the concept
of hegemony.
Hegemony and Identity
The concept of hegemony has been central to intense debate amongst intellectuals in
recentyearsasastrategyofcriticalpoliticalengagement(see Laclauand Mouffe1985; Butler,
Laclau and Zizek 2000; Hill 2007). The term is credited to Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, who
developed an alternative set of language for discussing social domination. This language was
picked upinthe 1980s, principally by Robert Cox, asa conceptual framework for criticizing
contemporary political structures (Rupert 2009). While most commonly employed by critical
theorists on the 'left', the concept of hegemony has also gained ground in more conservative
circles as a means of changing more liberal ideology (Hill 2007).
Hegemony refers to the process in which dominant groups elicit "the consent of
dominated groups by articulating a political vision, an ideology, which claimed to speak for all
and which resonated with beliefs widely held in popular political culture" (Rupert 2009:177). In
order for this to become truly effective, the dominant (hegemonic) discourse must also absorb
and retransmit alternative discourses; incorporating them in to its own projection of political
and social life (Butler 2000). This absorption and rearticulation of alternatives maintain the
legitimacy of the hegemonic discourse (and dominant groups). It is through this rearticulation
that states such asthe United States have beenabletomaintainthe legitimacy of their system:
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eliteshavebeenextremelysuccessfulinrearticulatingchallengesmadebyboththewomen's
suffrage and civil rights movements, for example.
While hegemony is formulated by the interaction of the public and private,governments
have a vast array of tools in order to shape both of these spheres. Returning to the notion of
symbolic resources, the state has the ability to broadcast messages through mass media, to
erect monuments of past events, and to provide standardized educationforyouth(thelatter
two being instrumental for creating shared myths of origin). This allows the state to determine
the language used in public discourse, as well as influencing the language of the private; to form
the discursive surface on which hegemony occurs (Mouffe 1995). This can also be done using
the power of the repressive state apparatus, such as current Rwanda, in which language
referring to the Hutu/Tutsi dichotomy is discouraged, often alongside persecution of "inciting
ethnic hatred" (Buckley-Zistel 2009, Waugh 2004).
While government wields tremendous power in the public/private discourse, it does not
hold a monopoly over it. Local narratives playa large role in shaping and interpreting national
discourses (Moshman 2004, 2007; Lambert 2006), and there are often competing media outlets
providing alternativestostate-centricdiscourses.16 Reinforcing local narratives are history as
transmitted from parent and neighbour to children, and strongly reinforced by local memorials
suchasgravesites. Inthecaseofthesocietiesinquestion,massgraves,sitesofatrocity,and
their memorials can serve as testaments to the local experience and can differ greatly from
official representations (Bevan 2006; Ordev 2008; Field 2007). This leads to individuals having
multiple conceptions of self and group identification and in which individuals explanations of
16 A point of increasing importance, as social media has allowed fora proliferation of alternative
information outlets.
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reality are continually reproduced in social interactions. The key in post-ethnic conflict societies
is to ensure those exclusionary national identities do not become the most salient, marginalizing
"healthier' and more inclusive modes of identity (Moshman 2007). To phrase this is more
theoretical terms, there needs to bea remaking of the particular-universal,asexplainedinthe
critical theory and identitysubsection,intoa universalcapabIe of being constructed of many
particulars. This in turn provides a stable, hegemonic discourse of social relations in which the
exploration of alternative identities is possible.
Such an approach fits well with studies that focus on political elites manipulating public
discourse in pursuit of an exclusionary nationalist agenda. Appeals by nationalist leaders tend to
highlight elements of history justifying their grievances againstoutgroupS.17 Asupra-national
identity that isable to co-opt, rather than suppress or ignore, local narratives of history and
identity would be able to maintain legitimacy when confronted with an alternative account of
the past. Nationalist rhetoric, in the case of both Yugoslavia and Rwanda, was able to justify an
exclusionary nationalist agenda based upon historicalgrievances.lfthesegrievancesare
incorporated in to a larger hegemonic narrative, hostile nationalism would not be able to
provide a more compelling narrative of the past, and thus would be less likely to become the
most salient aspect of identity within a given population.
17 Examples include Milosevic's appeals to genocide againstserbsduringthesecondWorldWar
(Oberschall 2000), while in Rwanda the government sponsored radio station RTLM provoked fears that all
Tutsi were collaborators with the RPF invasion who were attempting to re-establish Tutsi dominance of
Rwanda (Semujanga 2003).
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Hegemonic Identity and Education
During his time in prison Gramsci devoted considerable thought to the role of education
and intellectuals. Much of this was in response to the failed socialist project in ItalY,and
Gramsci sought to understand the entrenchment of bourgeois culture. While I am focusing on
entrenched ethnic and national identities, rather than economic ones, Gramsci's conception of
building new identities applies well. For Gramsci:
The educational relationship should not be restricted to the field of strictly
"scholastic" relationships [...J. This form of relationship exists throughout society as
a whole and for every individual relative to other individuals. It exists between [... ]
rulersandruled,elitesandtheirfollowers, leaders and led [... ]. Every relationship
of "hegemony" is necessarily an educational relationship and 0 ccursnotonlywithin
anation,betweenthevariousforcesofwhichthenationiscomposed,butinthe
internationalandworld-widefield,betweencomplexesofnationalandcontinental
civilization (Prison Notebooks: 349-50).
Thus when we speak of education, it should not simply mean school curricula (though
thiswillremainastrongfocus),butalsoalternativemeansofcreatingthissharedidentity,such
as monuments and ceremonies of remembrance. The state's ability to influence this education
has already been noted,thoughtherearesomefactorsfrom the abovepassagethatdeserve
further attention. The first is to simply re-emphasize that there must be a common discourse
between rulers and ruled. For Gramsci this common bourgeois discourse was centered on
religion, though one could makea case for an alternative shared experience depending on
context. 1B
The second point to consider is the historically contingent complexities of the aggregate
nations which are to form a (new)supra-nationalidentityconstruct. In the case ofa post-ethnic
18 Colonialism or foreign occupation, for example, could provide a backdrop in which to frame national
discourses centered on Rwanda or Yugoslavia.
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conflict society in which multiple, formerly fighting, forces must coexist within the same state,
this is particularly important. In the case of state such as Yugoslavia, this would entail
recognizing the differences of experience between Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, Macedonians, and
Slovenes. Their experiences would have to be reflected in state discourse if a new (Yugoslav)
hegemony were to emerge.
A final point to consider is the education caused by interaction amongst individuals; that
aspect of identity reproduced through social interactions. Though this was not the case for
Yugoslavia,Rwandanshavetheabilityforamuchwiderscaleofindividualsocialinteraction
through the use of the internet. This makes the suppression of alternative discourses even more
difficult, ifnotimpossible, leaving the co-option of these narrativesasthe preferableoption.
Let us return now to formal education, the classroom, and school curricula. The
classroom isa particularly important place for the formation ofindividual and collective
identities, both because of the time invested inthatspaceandthe fact that the growth stage of
adolescence is where individuals first begin makingconcretedecisions of their own identity
(Moshman1999). It is also in the classroom that the state, through official curricula and
standardized texts, is able to foster collective civic knowledge. Classroom methodology itself
also hasan importantrbleto play, with classroom learningtypicallybeingapproachedinan
authoritarian manner. This in turn reinforces an authoritarian culture in which individualsare
unwillingtochallengeauthority;disencouragingactivebystandersthat are essential to challenge
scapegoatingand stereotypes (Staub 2011). Recent studies (Simpson and Daly 2005) suggest
that an education that involves extensive student debatel9 can foster "emancipatory knowledge,
19Amethod that serves to both breakdown role-identities (see socialpsychology)andfosterorganic
intellectuals that can articulate the needs of various social groups (as per Gramsci).
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andthedevelopmentofarationalperspectiveonthenatureandcomplexity of social and
political structures that represent an opportunity for the resolution of conflict" (85). This also
reinforces civic engagement and democratic norms, which are seen as integral in modern peace
processes (Horowitz 1985; Lijphart 1977). The remaking of an education system is difficult in
post-conflict societies, with many teachers inevitably being products of the old order that
fostered previous conflict (Staub 2011). Combined with an often devastated infrastructure, this
makes a new education system difficult, yet vital, to implement.
A final point to consider is the importance of reproducing identity through daily social
interactions; making identity "common sense" as Gramsci would claim. For Gramsci, this
common sense was a deliberate production of the dominant Bourgeois social order. Here I wish
to make a slight departure from 'classic' Gramsci and instead adopt the term "habitus" from
Bourdieu(1980). Habitusisthedeeplyheldsetofculturalandsocietalnormsandvaluesthat
are reinforced through history and persuade individualstoactina 'correct'manner(Levinson
2011). This ensures that the past is always present in the minds of group members;
Itensurestheactivepresenceofpastexperiences,which,deposited in each
organism in the form of schemes of perception, thought, and action, tend to
guarantee the 'correctness'ofpracticesand their consistency overtime,more
reliably than all formal rules and explicit norms (Bourdieu 1980: 55).
In order to create the hegemonic identity, it is crucial to changetheexistinghabitus
within formerly competing ethnic groups; creating a new system of 'correctness'. This in itself
should,theoretically,beabletochangeifgroupscancometoanewunderstandingoftheirown
history in such a way that itcan align with previouslyheld,andcontinuallyreproducing,social
experiences. For this education, in the Gramscian sense, is vital. As Butler, Laclau, and Zizek
(2000) have argued, state discourse must successfully co-opt local narratives to create
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hegemonic discourse. Habitusprovidesanidealtheoreticalconceptforexaminingtheselocal
narratives. As will be demonstrated in the following chapter, the case of Yugoslavia provides an
excellent example of competing official and local narratives of the nation, and how the inability
of official truth frameworks to reflect local experience can undermine the imagined community
that forms the basis of any (supra)-national identity.
Chapter Three: Identity in the former Yugoslavia
The dissolution ofthe former Yugoslavia has generated intensescholarly interest compared to
other violent conflicts in the post-Cold War era. Much of this interest is likelyduetothe
geographic location of the conflict, situated within Europe, but with a history far enough
removed from the Western European experience to be thought of as the Other; an untamed
region where barbarism simmers beneath the surface. This was certainly the view put forth by
Robert Kaplan in his book Balkan Ghosts (1993), as well as through western mainstream media
during the bloody cycle of atrocity in Bosnia. Such views find their intellectual justification in
David Horowitz (1985), who argues that nations are primordial and essentially unchanging. This
thesis proposes that nations are essentially extended kinship groups, noting that the in-group
language used to refer to members of the same nation issimilarto the language used to refer to
family members (1985: 57).
Horowitz's approach, underpinned by primordialism, fails to consider the long periods of
peaceful and relatively peaceful coexistence of the peoples of theBalkans.lndeed,thereisafar
greater history of cooperation than conflict, particularlyamongst Serbs and Croats (Mojzes 1994;
Isakovich 2000)20. Conflicts in the Balkans prior to the outbreak of the First World War were
typically caused by the expansion of regional powersthroughtheBalkanpeninsula,particularly
the Ottoman and Hapsburg Empires (Mojzes 1994; Isakovich 2000). Leading up to and during
the First World War, the Balkan nations fought for their independence from the great empires of
their time, eventually being consolidated into the KingdomofSerbs, Croats and Slovenes by the
victorious Triple Alliance. This arrangement favoured the Serbs, who in spite of an elected
20 A prime example of this is the mutual defence of the Krajina region, in present day Bosnia-Herzegovina,
against Ottoman expansion until the 16,hcentury(Mojzes 19~14).
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legislature, maintained control of the monarchy. This arrangement caused friction amongst the
Croat community, who aspired to independent statehood during the war (Cipek 2003).
Both King Alexander and Josip BrozTito21 pursued programs of national unity and supra-
national nation building, with varying degrees of success. Alexander pursued what was largely a
top-down, centralized nation building agenda; attempting to consolidate Croats, Serbs, and
Slovenes into a unitary nation using predominantly Serbian genesis myths (the Battle of Kosovo
Plain, for example). This legitimized suspicions of Serbian expansionist ambitions that emerged
in Croatia under Hapsburg rule. Tito's attempts at nation building better acknowledged local
narrativesacrossYugoslaviabyre-imaginingYugoslaviaasasupra-nationalidentitythatallowed
for the "flourishing of individual 'national cultures'" (Wachte11998: 131). This included
acknowledgingartisticandmilitarycontributionsfromtheconstituentYugoslav nations in both
education and in public memorials and monuments.
Unfortunately, Tito and the Communist Party were never able to successfully co-opt and
incorporate narratives of the Second World War in to the official Yugoslav narrative. This is most
striking within the history curriculum and at the former concentration camp at Jasenovac, where
theYugosla~statepointedlyavoidedaddressingthelegacyoftheconcentration camp operated
by the Ustasha during the Second World War. Myths of Yugoslav origin, such as Njegos's
Mountain WreathlZ could also be interpreted as a hostile nationalist, rather than supra-national,
piece of Yugoslav identity. The disconnect between the public truth narrative put forth by the
stateandthatoflocal,privatenarrativesofremembrancepreventedthesupra-national
21 Alexander ruled the Kingdom of Yugoslavia from 1929untilhisassassinationin1934,whileTitoruled
from 1945 until 1980, though in 1974 he was essentially reduced to a figurehead duetoconstitutional
changes empowering provinces over the central government (Mojzes1994).
22 This epic poem, written by Njegos, is widely considered the classic of Serbian and Montenegrin
literature.
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YugoslavidentityfrombecomingthehegemonicexpressionofgroupidentityontheBalkan
Peninsula. This contributed to the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 1990s,asthispublictruth
narrative could not effectively challenge the emerging exclusionarynationalistdiscourse
emerging from the Yugoslav provinces.
This chapter will review efforts to create a Yugoslav nation, examining both the interwar
and communist period. The latter is of particular importance, as it isthis period that hadto
reconcile ethnic identities that had previously been in violent conflict. This will provide a basis to
compare nation building efforts in present day Rwanda that will be examined in chapter four.
This chapter is divided chronologically, providing a brief summary of nation building efforts in
the first Yugoslavia, followed bya more in depth exploration ofnationbuildingunderTito.
Ultimately, this chapter concludes that new narratives of national identity in Yugoslavia were not
able to successfully co-opt the narratives of ethnic violence from the Second World War period,
due to a lack of acknowledgement of atrocities committed by Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian
nationalists against one another. This prevented the formation of a hegemonic23 narrative of
national Yugoslav identity, which in turn allowed for exclusionary ethnic narratives to
successfully challenge the Yugoslavism.
The First Yugoslavia: Three peoples or one?
During the interwar period the fledgling Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was a
state of many nations, with a cadre of elites attempting to fashion them into one. A major
intellectual reason for uniting these different national groups wasthe commonality of language,
23 Following the work of Butler, Laclau, and Zizek (2000) outlined in Chapter one.
with the vast majority of regional languages belonging to the Stokavian dialect with a 94%
linguistic similarity (Pupavac 2003). Such linguistic similarities could, if we are to use the
availability of common language literature as a crucial tool in nation building (Anderson 1983),
provideaneffectivemeansofcreatingaunifiedYugoslavnationaI identity." Indeed,language
was the one obvious and tangible unifyingfactor,astherewereotherwisedifferencesin
religion'S, education, alphabee6, and class structure (Dragnich 1983).
The "Yugoslav state embarked on the task of nation-building with one solid symbol of
state power- Prince Regent Alexander- all else was provisional" (Dragnich 1983: 14). One of his
first acts was to appoint an all-party cabinet headed byStojan Protic,aSerbian.radical, despite
all other political party recommending Nikola Pasic was the ideal candidate for the position
(Dragnich 1983). Alexander's appointment of a Serb radical despite over wishes of both Croat
and Slovene representatives reinforced long held suspicions of Serbia's desire to dominate the
region.
Prior to the First World War the Hapsburgs deliberately sowed seeds of mistrust
amongst northern Slavs towards the Serbs in the south (Dragnich 1983). As this mistrust was
still circulating in popular discourse amongst those inthe north,itwasreinforcedbyeventsat
24LeadinguptotheFirstWorldWar,ethnologistsconsideredlanguage to be a defining feature of national
groups (Dragnich 1983). As Serbs and Croats shared a common language, elites of both ethnic groups
argued that they were essentially one large national entity. This was later expanded by Bennedict
Anderson (1983), who argued that a mass print common language can provide a universal framework of
understanding culture and history.
25 Serbs typically considered themselves to be Orthodox ChristianS,with the Serbian Orthodox Church
having a long standing nationalist presence (Mojzes 1994). Croats and Slovenes are typically Roman
Catholic, while a number of Serbs and Croats converted to Islam during Ottoman occupation. This
population of Muslims (later termed 'Bosniaks') were considered either Serbs or Croats by members of
those groups respectively (Isakovich 2000)
2. Serbs and MacedoniansusetheCyrillicalphabet(a productofByzantineexpansion, along with
OrthodoxChristianitY),whileCroatsand Slovenes use the Latinscript. This undermines the unified print
of Anderson, as despite the similarities in the language itself;thereisnotaunifiedscriptinwhichtoprint.
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the top level of government. Returning to the position outlined by Butler, Laclau,andZizek
(2000), that hegemony requires the discourse emitted by those in power to reflect the discourse
at the local level, distrust of Serbs became a hegemonic ideal amongst many in the Croat
community. This certainly goes a long way in explaining the popular resistance to Serbian power
amongst members of the Croat peasant community, many of whom were largely ignorant to the
workings of power in the new Yugoslav state (Dragnich 1983). The leader of the Croatian
PeasantPartY,Stjepan Radic, was especially vocal inoppositiontotheconcentrationofpowerin
Belgrade (Mojzes 1994).
InJune 1928,withinan increasingly dysfunctional legislature,Radic,alongwithhis
brother and two deputies, was shot and killed bya Serbian radical within parliament. By 1929
the conflict within parliament had grown to such intensity that King Alexander declared the
country to be an absolute monarchy (Mojzes 1994), and dissolved the elected legislature. At the
same time, Alexander abolished the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and instead
changed the name to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. This action further reinforced Croat discourses
of Serbian dominance, and further increased aspirations for independence, orat the very least, a
decentralization of power (Djokic 2003). It is this desire for independence that provided what
Zizek has referred to as a "Sacred Cause" (2008: 135-6), a means in which individuals can
overcome their normal aversion to violence and atrocity in pursuit of radical change. It is
precisely this Sacred Cause that allowed the majority of the Croat populace to turn a blind eye to
the atrocities committed by the Ustasha regime during the Second World War.27
27 Of which the concentration camp at Jasenovac is the most obvious example.
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As Yugoslavia was transformed from democracy to autocracy, the nature of the national
discourse was equally mutated. Prior to and during the early years of unification, Serbs and
Croats were considered two tribes of the same nation (Djokic 2003; Dragnich 1983). This view
was also held by dissenters such as Radic (Djokic 2003), who argued for greater Croatian
autonomy within the Yugoslav state. During the democratic period national sub-divisions were
tolerated within government, with many of the political parties being drawn across ethnic lines
(Djokic 2003; Mojzes 1994). The new Kingdom of Yugoslavia,. however, would tolerate no such
divisions, and instead promoted a unitary Yugoslav identity that overrode previous Serb, Croat,
and Slovene identities (Wachtel 1998). In effect, Alexander attempted to abolish sub-national
identities,whichonlyresultedinfurtherentrenchingethnicpositionsandethnicmobilization
(Dragnich 1983; Djokic2003).
Despite the claims that national sub-identities no longer were a part of the Yugoslav
identity, many academics (e.g. Djokic 2003; Dragnich 1983; Isakovic 2000; Mojzes 1994) agree
that the Yugoslav vision presented by Alexander was decidedly Serbian in characte~8. State
historytextbooksemphasizedtheSerbianstruggleagainsttheOttoman's, particularly the 1389
battle of Kosovo Plain, as well as emphasizing the role of Serbia in the First World War (Troch
2010). Taken together with a Serbian monarch and the abolishment of national sub-identities,
the messages emanating from Belgrade reinforced the already sown seeds of mistrust of Serb
aspirations of domination. Distrust and fear of Serbian dominance became an entrenched,
hegemQnic ideal amongst the Croat populace. This elevated Croatian desires of nationhood and
independence to thatofa Sacred Cause.
28 According to Wachtel and Markovic (2008) there was limited success with new textbook editions that
grouped subjects thematically, rather than ethnically. However subjects such as history were still
constructed primarily of Serbian narratives.
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Despite the assassination of King Alexander in 1934 by Vlado Chernovemski, the
Yugoslav state continued with its Serbian-driven narrative undertheguiseofasupra-national
Yugoslav identity (Troch 2010). This new government continued to face stiff resistance in
Croatia, with minor armed skirmishes breaking out between dissenters and the central
government in Belgrade (Grandits and Promitizer 2000). It is difficult to predict the final
outcome of these minor skirmishes, as the invasion of Yugoslavia by the Axis powers in 1941
carved the region in to approximately ten political entities, and the Nazi puppet Independent
State of Croatia provided the first, ifsuperficial,opportunityforCroatian independence in
centuries.
Taken in the context of the continued drive in Croatia for more autonomy, followed by
independence, we may conclude that nation building efforts in the first Yugoslavia were a
failure. By concentrating power in Belgrade, along with establishing a Serbian monarch and
Serb-centered education curriculum, Alexander reinforced and entrenched fears of Serbian
dominance amongst the Croat community. This suspicion of Serbian dominance became
hegemonic29, with few viable alternatives challenging this mistrust. This in turn elevated Croat
nationalism to that of a Sacred Cause, allowing the Croat people to accept the massive violence
that would occur to the Serb population inthe Independent State of Croatia.
19 'n which the actions of the state (Serb-centric history, Serbian dictatorship) reinforced long-held
rumours of Serbia's ambition to dominate the region. In short, a harmonization of local and state
discourse.
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The Second World War: Chetniks, Ustasha, and Partisans
After briefly considering aligning with the Axis powers, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia
declared itself in favour of the Allies and was promptly invaded by German and Italian forces in
1941. The Italians and Germans divided Yugoslavia in to ten zones under their respective
spheres of influence, with an Independent State of Croatia established within the Italian sphere.
This state was ruled by a movement known as the Ustasha, a Croat fascist nationalist movement
under Ante Pavelic. Under Pavel ie, and with support from the Axis powers, the Independent
State of Croatia began a campaign of genocide against Serbs, Jews, Roma and other
'undesirables' (Grandits and Promitzer 2001). Working alongside the Ustasha were 55 divisions
recruited from amongst the Muslim communities, as they were seen as Croats by the Ustasha
(Grandits and Promitzer 2001). Numbers killed during the genocide in Croatia remain disputed,
with claims ranging from 60,000-800,00030 (Grandits and Promitizer 2000).
The axis invasion triggered a three sided civil war within Yugoslavia. The Chetniks (Serb
royalists), Partisans (multi-ethnic communists under Tito), and Ustasha combined to make the
former Yugoslavia perhaps the most brutal battleground of the war. Each side regularly
committed atrocities against the civilian populations, and each habitually made and broke
alliances with the others in attempt to gain supremacy in the conflict (Isakovic 2000). As Allied
forces pushed east, Tito was eventually successful in gaining control of all of Yugoslavia. A large
number of Ustasha surrendered to incoming Allied forces rather than confront the Partisans.
30 Oneofthe chief propaganda tools used by both Tudjman and MilosevicleadinguptoYugoslav
disintegration was to make claim and counterclaim to the number of deaths each nation group suffered
during the war. The concentration camp at Jasenovac was oneofthechiefgrievancesthatMiloseviclater
exploited to increase ethnic nationalism (Oberschall 2000).
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The Allies turned them over to Tito, who had them massacred and their bodies thrown in ditches
(lsakovic 2000; Grandits and Promitzer 2001).
With this cycle of atrocity in the background Tito began to transform Yugoslaviaintoa
communist society. Along with attempting to create a classless society, Tito attempted to
overcome the World War Two legacy of genocide. It is precisely this period of nation building
that is of particular importance, as there were both major changes to the global and domestic
political systems, as well as periods of massive ethnically-based violence that had to be
overcome. This created what Moshman (2007) has referred to as an identity moratorium, in
which old identities have the potential to be broken down and new ones formed.
Tito and Nation Building: Brotherhood and Unity?
Despite (unacknowledged) massacres of the opposition, Tito found himself in a position
in which to unite Yugoslav society. The Partisan movement was multi-national, and while Serbs
were the majority, Tito himself was Croat.31 This national combination allowed for enhanced
legitimacy and reinforced the new political discourse of Brotherhood and Unity. The Yugoslav
communist party itself was unique in the sense that it was also decidedly nationalist in scope
(Jovic 2003), and those in Yugoslavia enjoyed (limitedly) more freedoms than those in the Soviet
Union. More importantly, unlike its Soviet counterpoint, Yugoslav communism did not seek to
outright abolish national or religious identities amongst the populace (Jovic 2003; Kechmanovic
2001).
31 While Tito was in fact half-Croat and half-Slovene, heisoftenreferredtoasaCroat. This is likely due to
thefactthatintheformerYugoslavia,ethnicitywasinheritedfrom the father (see Mojzes 1994; Nikolic-
Ristanovic2000)
so
Working within a discursive formation of a national hegemonic identity, whereas
hegemonyisachievedbyaharmonizationoflocalandelitenarratives, this refusal to outright
abandon or abolish old identities was crucial to the formation of a new Yugoslav identity. To put
this in more theoretical terms, this new Universal Yugoslavism was initially successful specifically
because its universality was constructed asan aggregateofparticu lars, rather than a monolithic
entity; its hegemonic potential existed precisely in itsencapsulation of possible sub-identities
within the context of a supra-national identity without disavowing the existence of the former.
In short, it allowed for Serb, Croat, Slovene, and (later) Macedonian, Montenegrin, and Muslim
(Bosniak) identities to exist within the largerframeworkofa Yugoslavidentity. While this
universality was eventually destroyed by its inability to successfully integrate the Second World
War experience in to national discourses, the initial desire by the population to 'move on' was
echoed by those in power, allowing Yugoslavism to reintegrate national groups without
threatening group identities (Oberschall 2007; Lilly 1997).
Many point to the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia as proof that the Yugoslav identity
wasa failure (Kaplan 1993). This is certainly an understandable position to take in light ofthe
intense identity defined violence during the state's dissolution, but it fails to consider that
relations between various ethnic groups within Yugoslavia just prior to the outbreak of violence
showed little tension, and were noticeably less than in many western European states (Gagnon
2004: 35-43). Even more telling are the responses of the Bosnian 1989 census, in which "81.6
percent agreed with the statement that 'I am Yugoslav and cannot give priority to feeling of
some other belonging.''' (Gagnon 2004: 41). The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to
explainingthedegreeofsuccessthattheideaofYugoslavismhad by examining education and
memorial practices. This section will also explain the inherent weaknesses of these programs
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that allowed national identities to quickly become the most salient during the wars of Yugoslav
disintegration. Eventuallynational(ist) narratives were able to challenge the hegemonyof
universal Yugoslavism and it is the nature of this challenge (and the failure of the existing
hegemonic order to incorporate it) that led to the violent destruction of the Other for the
(national) Sacred Cause.
Education in TitoistYugoslavia
In the initial aftermath of the Second World War common curricula were developed for
use in Yugoslav schools, though the teaching of history was left primarilyin the hands of the
various republics. "[T]here is good reason to suspect that children educated in various Yugoslav
republics would not have had an identical view of the vital question of what their country had
been like before the communist era." (Wachtel and Markovic 2008: 206). Views on the interwar
Yugoslav state would have differed greatly depending on one's bi rthplace, with what became
the Croatian republic having a generally negative experience during interwar Yugoslavia (Mojzes
1994). This lack of a unified conception of history certainly undermined any notion of Yugoslavs
being a nation in themselves, at least in the sense of an imagined community with a common
past moving forward through history, as both Anderson (1983) and Smith (2009) conceptualize
the nation. A unified history was also undermined by the banning of the majority of interwar
Yugoslavliterature,suchasthatproducedbyCrnjanski,Ujevic,Vinaver, and Ducic (Wachtel
1998:138).
Compounding the difficulty of using a school curriculum for nation building was the high
degree of censorship enforced by the Yugoslav Communist Party. The chief goal of the
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education system itself was to "[createjJoyoltyand identification through the idea of self-
managed socialism... in all textbooks from elementary language books up to high school history
texts" (Hopken 1997: 84, emphasis added). This concept of loyalty is extremely important in this
particular case, as loyalty to the regime was strongly linked to loyalty to Tito directly (Suppan
2003; Gow 1997). This would be a major factor in undermining the legitimacy of the communist
regime after the death of Tito in 1980. This crisis of legitimacy, made much more potent by the
collapse of the communist system within the greater framework of global politics, provided an
ideal backdrop for nationalist leaders to reshape the discourse of Yugoslav identity.32
Educating loyalty to the regime meant a dual indoctrination towards party loyalty and
loyalty to the system of state socialism writ large. This in turn meant that both had to be
perceived as natural and legitimate by the populace if communist Brotherhood and Unity was to
be an acceptable basis for hegemonic group identity (Staub 2008). Such a discourse would
naturally have to fit the past into its narrative, explaining previousethnic relations and coming to
terms with the identity based violence that was prominent during the Second World War. This
was not an easy task.
In the eyes of its members, the nation itself moves organically through time (Smith
2009)33. As such, a shared (or at least sufficiently narrow in scope) version of history needs to be
established within the eyes of members, and this history must resonate through both the private
and public spheres (lambert 2006: 21). Thus the state (public) discourses must reflect, to at
least some extent, the local (private) experience if the national idea isto become hegemonic.
32 This is what David Moshman refers to as a 'moratorium' in identity, in which old identifiers break down
and new ones are sought out (1999).
l3 ln bywhich each member of the nation in question believes to have both a shred historical experience,
aswellasa shared future going forwards.
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Brotherhood and Unity,atleastsuperficially,acknowledgedthatthevariousnationsof
the Balkans each hadtheirown unique historical legacy. This was an absolutely necessary
approach to nation building; different regions of the state hadtheirownarchitecturallegacies34,
artists, and local traditions. Such was the folly of Alexander and the first Yugoslavia. Each of the
various Yugoslav republics had a large role in creating their curriculums,providedtheyadhered
to the rules of the Communist Party on subjects and what (not) to include within the education
system (Hopken 1999; Jelavich 2003).
The most striking omission from Yugoslav history was any legacy of conflict between the
various Balkan nations (Hopken 1997). While there were certainly long periods of peaceful
coexistence, particularly mutual defence of the frontier regions against the Ottoman Empire, the
end of the First Yugoslavia was not without violence, and the Second World War saw appalling
violence,ethniccieansingandatrocitiesbetweengroupsintheBalkans. Many scholars (Gagnon
2004; Dragovic-Soso 2002; Hopken 1997) have blamed this historical legacy at least in part for
the wars of the 1990s.
According to the history curriculum, nationalist confrontations inthe past were depicted
as "bourgeois class conflicts" (Hopken 1997:91). The Yugoslav history curriculum labelled the
SecondWorldWarasa battle for national liberation, "presentingthePartisansas
'revolutionaries'and'liberators'andallotherforcesas'counterrevolutionaries'and'fascists'"
(Dragovic-Soso 2002: 100). The communist regime also "'de-ethnicised' the war, by blaming the
'bourgeoisies'ofaIlYugoslav nations for the crimes that had taken place and by dealing with
wartime inter-ethnic conflicts only in terms of superficial reciprocity" (Dragovic-Soso 2002: 100).
l4Serbian architecture is based on the style of the Byzantine Empire, while Croatia and Slovenia share
common styles with much of Western Europe. Bosnia-Herzegovina has a strong legacy of Ottoman
architecture (Ordev 2008).
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While this was certainly done to increase the perceived legitimacy of the Communist PartlS, it
did not include mention of any atrocities committed by the Partisans in the liberation of
Yugoslavia,36 nor did it detail the involvement of Croatian nationalists in the Ustasha regime, or
discuss the Bosnian Muslimssdivisionsthatcarriedoutethniccleansingonbehalfofthe
occupying powers (Jelavach 2003). The history curriculum itself varied across Yugoslavia. In
Croatia, for example, the history curriculum included:
Old Yugoslavia and its founding. Our peoples during the First World War, their
struggles for freedom from foreign yokes, their unification as the only path to
independence, and the construction ofa unified state; the dissasitisfactionofthe
masses with the monarchical and centralized state order (the Vidovdan
Constitution); the struggle of the Croatian and other oppressed peoples, the
excitation of national and religious hatred by the ruling classes; the murder in the
parliament [of stjepan Radic) and the institution of dictatorship (nastavni plan i
program za osnavne skole narodne republici Hrvatsko/7 1947: 35, cited in Wachtel
1998:136)
The above passage is a reasonably detailed description as to how the first Yugoslavia, and the
dissolution of parliament, would be taught to students when compared to other republic
curricula guidelines, such as that of Serbia. In the Serbian republic, teachers were instructed to
deal with "the founding of Yugoslavia [...) Yugoslavia from 1918-1941" (nastavni plan i program
za osnovne skole38 1947: 13, cited in Wachtel 1998: 136). The Bosnian curriculum was a
compromise between these two, though much like the others, its treatment of history ceased in
1941. It is also crucial here that when there was a discussion of inter-ethnic conflict, the blame
was placed solely on elites; failing to address the wider social causes. It should also be noted
3S It is worth reiterating here that this system itself was almost totally linked to Tito (Hopken 1997; Gow
1997).
36 Making this even more difficult, many of the hyper-nationalistSerb Chetniksjoined the Partisans. Many
of these fighters had committed acts of ethnic cleansing and exterminationagainstnon-serbsearlierin
the war (Isakovic 2000).
"Curriculum for Primary Schools, National Republic of Croatia
3. Curriculum for Primary Schools (Serbia)
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that in this curriculum, the only group that could have been oppressing the Croats and other
peopleswou!dhavebeentheserbs(reinforcingtheearlierrumours of Serbia's desire to
dominate the region).
It is common for states to prescribe themselves as moral agents, working on the "right"
side of history (Bishai 2004). This becomes problematic in states such as Yugoslavia in which
atrocities were committed by forces that must now take command of the state itself. If the state
cannot co-opt alternative discourses than it risks an alternative account of private narratives
challenging and overthrowing the current hegemon (Butler, laclau and Zizek 2000). Rather than
attempt to incorporate this narrative, the Tito regime dismissed national conflicts as products of
theoldorder,whiletheonlystatesponsorednarrativesoflocaI involvement in the Second
World War simply asserted that "all nations had traitors" (Hopken 1997: 92). This fails to co-opt
the obvious nationalist intent of the violence in Yugoslavia, particularly by the Independent State
of Croatia.· The lack of a nuanced discussion of the Second World War within the history
curriculum ensured that the state had no official rebuttal for the nationalistrhetoriccenteredon
this period that emerged prior to the dissolution of the Yugoslav state.
The debates as to what to include in the school curriculum took on new importance in
the early 1980s during the renewed academic debates of the national question. During this time
the Yugoslav system was in a state of shock. The death of Tito in May 1980 left the system
without its lynchpin, so much so that the Party did not initially admit his passing. While this was
occurring,therewerecallswithin(particularlytheserbian)intelligentsiacallingforare-
examination of the national question, along with disputed claims over the Second World War
experience (Dragovic-soso 2002). Such scholarship also raised questions as to what would now
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be included as part of school history curriculums (Wachtel and Markovic 2008). Despite
numerous amendments and five separate curriculum proposals the effort at education reform
ultimatelyfailed,largelyduetoethnocentricviewsofwhatshouldbetaught(Wachteland
Markovic 2008).
How then, should identity creation through education be assessed in the former
Yugoslavia? The system certainly created some sense of supra-national identity, as evidenced by
survey data from 1989 (Gagnon 2004: 35-43). The system did acknowledge difference between
the various Yugoslav nations, which paid lip service to the discoursesurroundingthememories
of the Second World War. This in turn made Brotherhood and Unity more palatable; it avoided
thesuperimposingofaYugoslavidentityovertheentirepopulace,aswasthecasewith
Alexander. This allowed for the exploration of alternative modes of identity, which allows for a
more fluid and healthy conception of self and group identity (Moshman 1999; 2007).
The weakness of this system, and its ultimate undoing, was that it was unable to co-opt
the ethno-nationalist challenge duringa period of national crisis and transition. Reducing inter-
ethnicviolenceasa product of Bourgeois capitalism did notreflectthelocalexperienceand
narratives; narratives that could ultimately be passed to subsequentgenerations. Furthermore,
framing the capitalism asthe external and threatening Other beeamedifficult,particularly
during a period of proposed economic reforms that were particularIy strong in Croatia and
Slovenia (Gagnon 2004). This desire for economic reform further undermined a system that was
in a state of crisis following the death of Tito. State discourse placed Tito as a lynchpin of state
legitimacy, and his death created avoid instatediscoursethatnationalistleaderswereableto
fill.
57
The events of the Second World War, particularly within the Independent State of
Croatia, were also instrumental to the failure of the Yugoslav project. The lack of an in depth
curriculum dealing with the legacy of this period made it easy to challengegovernment
narratives of past atrocities. The idea that "all nations had traitors" is certainly true, yet it does
notaddressthescaleoftheviolencetowardstargetedgroups,particularly Serbs at the hand of
the Ustasha and Bosniaks at the hands of Serbian Chetniks. The greatest contestation was over
the concentration camp of Jasenovac, with nationalist leaders and academics creating wildly
different images and statisticsasto the events and casualtiesthat occurred there. local
discourses, particularly those of Serbs who had been victimized, were more closely aligned with
the discourse of Milosevic and a newly emergent radical nationalist intelligentsia (Cohen 2001).
This allowed foran alternative discourse to successfullychallengethehegemonyofstate
narrative, effectively replacing a supra-national identity with an ethnocentric one. The discourse
surrounding Jasenovac highlights the importance of incorporat ing past events in to state
narratives, as "bits of the past will always live on and successful political projects are those that
manage to graft the new onto the old without serious discontinuities" (Schopflin 2006: 22).
Jasenovac"probablywouldnothavecontributedtotheclimateofhatred so strongly had the
topic been dealt with in a reasonable manner in schools during the Tito era" (Hopken 1997: 93).
The Mountain Wreath: A case study of national disagreement
While the state certainly did not officially address the nationalistquestion within the
school system directly, it at times emerged controversially within language studies. Of particular
note is the Njegos's masterpiece Gorski vijenac (Mountain Wreath), perhaps the most famous
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and influential piece of Montenegrin literature. It was first used as a pan-Yugoslav piece of
literature by King Alexander, despite the fact that it had been used "asa central building block of
exclusively Serbian nationalism in the nineteenth century." (Wachtel 1998: 101). In order to
circumnavigate this, textbooks only included passages of the poem,highlightingthosethat
presented a more pan-Yugoslavidentity.39 Textbooksalsohighlightedunderlyingthemesinthe
workofNjegos,ratherthanthefulitextitself,particularlyunifying factors of struggle against
tyranny (Wachtel 1998).40 While resistance to this sort of cultural assimilation was less overt
than that in the political arena, there were still fears that this teaching constituted an attempt to
Serbianize the other people of Yugoslavia (Wachtel 1998).
Interestingly, Tito and the Communist Party also celebrated Njegos as the great artist of
the Yugoslav peoples. This was reaffirmed and celebrated in 1947, in which state-wide
celebrations were held for the lOoth anniversary of the Mountain Wreath (Wachtel 2004). The
chief problem with this would be to break the legacy of Njegos away from the interwar period.
Under Tito, the fact that Njegos was Montenegrin was stressed heavily. It was thought
that "Since the main lines of cleavage in interwar Yugoslavia had been between Serbs and
Croats, it would have been unwise to promote a Serb or Croat as national writer." (Wachtel
2004: 141). Mountain Wreath was also a genuinely popular work, and was often referred to in
publications in postwar Yugoslavia (Brkljacic 2004). The Mountain Wreath deals primarily with
resistance to the Ottoman domination of the Balkan Peninsuladuringthe19th century. Like
Alexander, Tito proclaimed this resistance to authority to be the central trait of this. Unlike
39 Though it should be noted that the Mountoin Wreoth often preachesfratricidalbloodletting, particularly
against Muslims, who are seen as instruments of Ottoman domination.
40 It is somewhat ironic that Alexander promoted struggle againsttyrannyasaunifyingYugoslavtrait,yet
also dissolved the elected legislature in favour of royal dictatorship.
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Alexander however, Mountain Wreath was framed as a source of inspiration for the Partisans in
their own resistance to occupying (and collaborating) forces (Wachtel 1998, 2004). This firmly
linked the resistance movement to the struggle for freedom from Ottoman oppression. One
cannot help but observe that the Muslim community was the target of the most violence both in
what was the epic of Yugoslav literature and in the wars that would destroy Yugoslavia.
InitiallytheMountainWreathgeneratedlittledebateorcontroversy amongst Party
intellectuals and teachers. This is largely in part due to its wide circulation throughout
Yugoslavia, as well as a lack of coherent national curriculu'm (Wachtel 2004; Hopken 1997).
Mountain Wreath did, however, become a source of controversy in 1984 during a summit on
Yugoslav education. Several teachers raised complaints that Mountain Wreath presented a
hostile nationalist, rather than pan-Yugoslav,viewofthe Balkan Peninsula. They expressed that
their students had interpreted theworkassuch,andthat it undermined the principle of
Brotherhood and Unity (Wachtel 1998, 2004). In this way, the Mountain Wreath provided
another means of reinforcing narratives that dealt with exclusionaryethnic identities, and
moreover, promoted violence against members of out-groups in order to achieve national
liberation. This narrative strongly reinforces that of the Second World War,providingan
additional justification for highly salient ethnic identities despite the state's pan-Yugoslav
intentions. Rather than attempt to provide additional materials for the interpretation of Njegos,
or recommend alterations to the teaching of the subject, the Partysimplydeclared than ifany
students were to interpret the text as such it was due to incompetence on the part of educators
(Wachtel 2004).
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The Mountoin Wreoth was ultimately problematic due to various interpretations of the
text that were possible. As Moshman (1999) has argued, identity can only be fully realized
through the exploration of alternatives. UsingMountoinWreothasasignifierofidentityaliowed
both n·ational and pan-national interpretations. An individual's selection of these two competing
signifiersofnationalidentitythusbecomeshighlycontingentupon local narratives of the past
and the identify discourses that are reinforced through day to day activity. That students would
interpretwhatwaspresentedtothemasapan-nationalauthorasa source of hostile
nationalism certainly suggests that the former was not the dominant mode of socially reinforced
group identity at the time of the education summit. In short, interpretations of Mountain
Wreath would be contingent upon local experiences and interactions,notontheexplanations
provided by state discourses (through teachers and textbooks).
Post-Titoist Literature and the Re-emergence of Memory
While Mountoin Wreath is by far the most documented case of potentially dividing
literature, by the early 1980s, new books began to surface thatchallenged the assumptions that
the Partisans were both the only agents of national liberation, andthatthatinter-ethnic
violence during the Second World War equally shared across the Balkans. Of this body of
literature, Anatema, written by Vojislav Lubarda, is perhaps the most interesting.
Anatema isan autobiographical novel that was published in 1982, and documents the
persecution of the author after an exerpt of his unpublished novel Gordo posrtanje appeared in
a Sarajevo journal in 1969 (during which time accounts of the past were heavily censured,
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keeping with the theme of Brotherhood and Unity). The published excerpt detailed the
massacre of Serbs by a Muslim SS division during the Second World War in Eastern Bosnia. The
excerpt then describes a massacre committed by a Serbian unit of Partisans in retaliation
(Dragovic-Soso 2002: 104). Not only did Lubarda describe these massacres (which he personally
witnessed)ingreatdetail,healsoprovidedthenamesofseveralprominent Bosnians that took
part in the massacres, some of which had obtained a high rank in the post-war bureaucracy. He
also outlines the resistance by former Chetniks, who resented his portrayal of the movement as
a "vengeful horde" (Dragovic-Soso2002: 105).
The majority of Anatema deals with the author's experience after this excerpt was
published. It speaks to his 10 years of continued movement and harassment, and his near arrest
and imprisonment. He was also banned from publication for 10 years, as his work was against
the principles of Brotherhood and Unity (Dragovic-SoSo 2004: 105). Anatema thus not only
exposedthegap inthe historical narrative, highlighting the role of former perpetrators of
atrocity in what was contemporary Yugoslav society, but also drew attention to the Tito regime's
efforts to maintain that gap. While Anatema was amongst the first, and arguably most
important, works in exposing the gap inthe historical narrative andbringingthatknowledgetoa
wideaudience,authorssuchasRadulovicandDraskovicalsomadesignificant popular
contributions.
The discourse that emerged just prior to and during Yugoslav disintegration clearly
demonstrate how Yugoslavism did not adequately co-opt narratives from the Second World
War. Nationalist propaganda by Serbian President Siobodan Milosevic often referred to Croats
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as Ustasha (Milosevic 2000), bent on eradicating all Serbs to form a new, independent Croatia.41
Croatian President Tudjman, in a similar approach to nationalist discourse,labelledtheSerbsas
a "bearded Chetnik horde" (Milosevic 2000: 113). These terms, emerging from the Second
World War experience, should have been countered by a more inclusive Yugoslav-centered
narrative. Unfortunately, the Ustasha and Chetnik labels were far more aligned with the local
Second World War experience than with Yugoslavism.
Beyond the education system, the past can be taught through practices of remembrance
and memorialisation. Ideally these coincide with what is taught in schools, providing supporting
discourses and underlying the validity of each other. Monuments themselves are also physical.
reminders of a certain past, as are more mundane sites such as cemeteries and places of
worship. All of these contribute to creating a link between past and present.
Creating memory through Sites of Remembrance
Sites of remembrance are amongst the most powerful symbolic resources that can be
harnessed by a national group(s). Some of the most importance of these are museums and
memorials to the past, though local grave, battle, and religioussites certainly qualify as well.
These sites are "cache[s) of historical memory, evidence that a given community's presence
extends into the past and legitimizing it in the present and ontothe future" (Bevan 2006: 8).
Along with education and local practices of remembrance, these sites help to unify national
groups; forming them in to an organic collective moving forwards through history.
41 This propaganda was reinforced by that nationalist rhetoric of Tudjman, as well as the reinstatement of
state symbols from the Independent State of Croatia.
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There has been limited empirical research on the effects of national symbols on group
consciousness and national identity (Butz 2009). Those who are exposed to national symbols on
adailybasishaveamuchstrongernationalidentificationthanthose without such exposure
(Butz and Plant 2009). Thus symbols of national identity are one means in which a state can
create social cohesion in a divided society, though like other means of discourse, if it is to
become hegemonic, it must reflect local experiences as well as supra-national ones. This section
seeks to address what sort of symbolic resources were deployed by Tito's communists, and how
these symbolic resources reflected the local experience.
In addition to the use of Mountain Wreath, the tomb of Njegos was used in an attempt
to create a monument of Yugoslav cultural unity. Design began in the 1950s under Ivan
Mestrovich, possibly the closest thing Yugoslavia had to a "national artist" (Wachtel 2004: 143).
Completed in 1971, the tomb ofNjegos was an ideal symbol of south Slav unity. Designed using
architectural components of Byzantine, Ottoman, and West European heritage, with each
component facing the region in which the respective styles were present, the tomb of Njegos
wasa perfectly designed Universal of Particulars. Rather than attempting to either superimpose
a national image upon the past or reinterpret existing styles, this tomb was built as a monument
to all major national groups. Despite the fact that Njegos was Montenegrin, and that his writings
were often divisive, this physical symbol of what was presented as a national figure reflected the
diversity of Yugoslavia without favouring one interpretation. Unfortunately, this was one of the
few monuments that could be said to adequately reflect local realities as well as Brotherhood
and Unity.
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Virtually all states build memorials to past military action, be they success or failures,
Yugoslavia being no exception. These monuments, erected to show the triumph of the Partisans
over the Axis powers and local collaborators, were to provide additional legitimacy to
communist rule. The scale of this undertaking was particularly impressive, with "barely a village
in the former Yugoslavia that did not have its local war memorial, either in the form of the
favourite figurative soldier with a weapon in his hand, a more artistic abstract solution or at least
small commemorative plaques." (Karge 2009: 51). The difficulty of such monuments was the
commemoration ofthe dead that were not aligned with the Partisan movement. A common
means of achieving this was to have commemorations honouring the local dead in the war;
making them more sombre, as opposed to sanguine and liberating as the Party initially intended
(Karge2009). This reinforced a strong local connection to the Second World War, rather than
the pan-Yugoslav narrative favoured by the Party in both state memorialcelebrationsandinthe
education system (Hopken 1999).
Much like within the history curriculum, the concentration camp at Jasenovac was a
difficult site to commemorate while maintaining an ethnically neutral discourse of internal
collaborators during the War; if Ustasha atrocities were mentioned, Chetnik ones would be as
well (Karge2009). There was no Serbian 'equivalent' of Jasenovac.42 Rather than address the
extent of Ustasha activity at Jasenovac, state remembrance ceremonies the perpetrators "were
overwhelminglygiventhelabelsof'aggressor','occupyingforce'and 'degenerate individuals'or
even the completely abstract term, 'enemy'." (Karge 2009: 55).
42 While there was concentration camps in other areas of Yugoslavia during the Second World War,
Jasenovac was the only one in which mass killings were done without the supervision of Nazi Germany.
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While the state promoted a strategy of silence towards Jasenovac, by the early 1950s
there was a steady stream of mourners visiting the village at Jasenovac, and the local branch of
the Communist Party lobbied for a memorial to be built (Karge 2009). These efforts were
initially met with silence from Belgrade, with later state discourses proclaiming that any
memorial would have to be a federal initiative (Karge 2009). This initiative never meaningfully
took place under the centralized nation-building efforts of the Titoist period, leaving the
memorialisation of Jasenovac outside the public discourse of the state. This did not, however,
prevent local practices and ceremonies of remembrance from occurring at Jasenovac. Initially
organized by survivors of Jasenovac, the anniversary of Yugoslav liberation saw over 10,000
people come to Jasenovac to commemorate those killed in the camp (Karge 2009). This is
perhaps the most obvious disconnect between public and privated iscourse instate memorials in
communist Yugoslavia. The large number of individuals visiting Jasenovac clearly demonstrates
thattherewasastronglocal,privatenarrativedealingwiththe events of Jasenovac specifically,
and the Second World War period more generally. The numbers visiting Jasenovac also indicate
that state narratives of the Second World War, in which all nationa litiessuffered(and
collaborated) equally could not reach the level of hegemony neededto create a supra-national
identity.
Yugoslav Nation Building
Despite two different attempts at nation building in the former Yugoslavia, a pan-
Yugoslavidentityneverbecameahegemonicexpressionofgroupidentity. There are several
reasonsforthis,butanoverarchingtrendisadisconnectbetween local and federal narratives of
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group identity, particularly as it pertains to a shared historicaI experience. It is precisely this
dissonance of narrative that prevented a supra-nationalYugoslavidentityfrombecoming
hegemonic,asstatediscourse must co-opt local narratives to havea stable hegemony (Butler,
Laclau, and Zizek2000).
Under Alexander, state discourse was overly Serb oriented. Interpretations of local
history overly favoured Serb mythsoforigin,drawingparticularfocustoeventssuchasthe
battle for Kosovo Plain. The predominance of what were seen as Serbian narratives reinforced
myths of Serbian aspirations for dominance of the region that had been circulated during
Hapsburg rule of northern Yugoslavia. This narrative was further reinforced by the dissolution of
parliament and the declaration of royal dictatorship under Alexander. Rather than promoting a
pan-Yugoslav culture, the appearance that Alexander was attem ptingto'Serbianize'the
population provoked nationalistbacklash,particularlywithinCroatia. Rather than attempt to
co-opt this Croat nationalism, Alexander (and his successors) attempted to effectively abolish it,
in the process making it stronger, elevating itto a Sacred Cause that allowed provided
justification for acts of genocide that would later be committed in the independent State of
Croatia.
These atrocities had to later be reconciled with the narrative of Brotherhood and Unity
under Tito after the Second World War. While attempts were made to form a common history,
as per the theories of nationalism advanced by Anderson (1983) and Smith (2009), they were
never able to fully co-opt narratives of the Second World War while maintaining the semblance
of equal guilt and suffering across all national groups. This absence of history is noticeable
within the education curriculum, despite that each constituent state had a great deal of freedom
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over textbook curricula. The same can be said of national monuments to the Second World War,
which were not able to satisfactorily address the issue of local collaborators. This is especially
evident at the former concentration camp at Jasenovac, in which thousands of people regularly
went to mourn the loss of family, yet no state memorial was built until after over a decade of
lobbying by the local population. This demonstrated a clear disconnect between private and
public narratives, and inevitably contributed to the powerthatJasenovacwouldlaterhave
amongst nationalist leaders in both Serbia and Croatia.
Despite these obvious failures, there were also some very real successes in nation
building in Tito·sYugoslavia. The decentralized nature of the education system allowed for the
exploration of local histories and narratives, though they did not touch on the contentious
Second World War or national question. This in turn allowed for a state discourse that better
reflected the local historical experience, while simultaneousIy providing a greater Yugoslav
context. The same could be said of the tomb of Njegos, which was perhaps the most obvious
purely Yugoslav monument constructed under Tito. It's incorporation of different architectural
elements ideally reflected the difference in Yugoslav society. Unfortunately the same could not
be said of the work of Njegos, which could be easily interpreted as a work of exclusionary
nationalism despite state insistence that it was pro-Yugoslav.
One of the greatest weaknesses of this system was the way in which it relied upon Tito
asa Iynchpinofnational unity. While instilling loyalty to the regime was certainly a necessity in
the post Second World Warperiod,the focus on the leadership ereatedacrisisoflegitimacyat
the time of his death; a legitimacy that was later filled by hostile nationalism. Despite all of this,
the81%ofpeoplethatidentifiedthemselvesforemostasYugoslav suggests a fairly high level of
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successful state identity creation. It was not able to fully co-opt nationalist sentiment, largely
duetoa crisis of legitimacy upon the death of Tito and a failure to address the legacy of the
Second World War.
The Yugoslav case offers an intriguing comparative case for what is currently happening
in terms of identity construction in post-genocide Rwanda. The most important element to be
noted isa historical 'gap'thatfailstoaddressthe most contentiousissuesofconflictinthe
region's history; namely the intense inter-ethnic violence that immediately proceeded the
unifying regime (Tito and communism in this case). It is this very gap in history that was later
exploited by nationalist figures in order to maintain their own legitimacy,creatingethnicsecurity
dilemmas in the process. It is also important to note the degree to which the system itself was
linked to a charismatic figure, the removal of whom set the stage for the aforementioned
exploitation of history. These themes will again emerge in the following two chapters. Chapter
four will provide a brief history of Rwanda, and review identity creation through justice
proceedings and memorialisation, while chapter five will examine identity and education in post-
genocide Rwanda.
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Chapter Four: History, Identity, Genocide, and Justice in Rwanda
Much like the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, the 1994 Rwandan genocide has
been the subject of intense scholarly interest. Much of this research has focused on the causes
and dynamics of the civil war and corresponding genocide (see Des Forges 1999; Fujii 2009),
though there are also significant studies of Rwanda's post-conflictreconstruction, particularly
the implementation of the locally led gacaea court system (Burnet 2009; Cobban 2007). Implicit
in this body of literature isthe need to establish a universaltruth framework through which the
events of the genocide can be understood and ideally agreed upon by the Rwandan populace.
This chapter will expand the research on creating a universal truth framework for the purposes
of forming a hegemonic Rwandan civic identity by examining how this truth narrative is taught
to Rwandans through both gaeaea trials and memorialisation practices. In doing so, this chapter
will demonstrate that there isa dissonance between the governmentsponsoredtruthnarrative
and the local perception of both history and the genocide that will inturnpreventthe
establishmentofahegemonicRwandancivicidentity.
This chapter will be divided in to three sections. The first section briefly examines
Rwandan identity ina historical perspective, arguing that pre-colonial ethnic identitiesofHutu,
Tutsi, and Twa were more fluid conceptions of identity than most scholarship suggests. The
second section provides a brief examination of the colonial and immediate post-colonial period
that led to the civil war and eventual genocide of 1994. The third section will examine the
construction of a civic identity in post-genocide Rwanda through memorialisation and gacaca
CQurts, as these are crucial tools of the state for disseminating theirversionofthepastamongst
Rwandans.
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Pre-Colonial Identity in Rwanda
To date there is little consensus on the origin of Rwanda's three ethnic groups: Hutu,
Tutsi, and Twa (Semujanga 2003; Newbury 2009). Conceptions of Rwandan identity in a
historical perspective tend to focus on either a static conception of group belonging, in which
Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa migrated to Rwanda in different time periods, bringing with them their
traditional modes of cultivation;43 or assume a more fluidic set of identities in which there was a
high degree of cross-cutting between ethnic, clan, and regional identities. There is also a third
view, encouraged by the current Rwandan administration, that Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa were
colonial inventions to divide Rwandan society. As will be discussed later, the migratory
explanation for Rwanda's three ethnic groups was accepted by European powers and later
institutionalized under colonial rule.
The so called Hamitic Hypothesis advanced by European colonizers (first Germany,
followed by Belgium after the First World War) held that Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa arrived separately
in Rwanda in different migratory waves. The Hutu were believed to originate from sub-Saharan
Africa, sharing common ancestry with other Negroid races of the continent (Mamdani 2001).
The Tutsi were believed to have originated in Ethiopia; the so-called lost children of Ham44, who
were related to the Caucasian European colonizers. Combined with the scientific racism of the
colonial period, this led to Tutsi being considered 'more' European; closer to the master race and
thus genetically superior than the Hutu (Mamdani 2001). The fact that those in administrative
43Hutuaretypicallyseenasfarmers,whileTutsisarenormallyseenasraisersofcattle. TheTwa
(numbering approximately 1% of Rwanda's population) are normally viewed as excluded from mainstream
society, and survive mainly through hunting.
44 The eldest of the three sons of Noah
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positions were often considered Tutsi further reinforced this supposed superiority of Tutsi, as it
was believed they were better suited to rule (Mamdani 2001).
More recent scholarship on pre-colonial Rwanda has focused on the complexity of group
membership prior to the arrival and institutionalization ofethnicidentities. Refuting the Hamitic
hypothesis, African historians (most notably David Newbury) suggests that the key evidence
usedbyEuropeanstosupportstaticethnicidentities(c1ans)historicallyincludemembersof
multiple ethnic groups (2009). As clans are typically extended kinship groups, the presence of
both Hutu and Tutsi within a single kinship group contradicts the notion that they are fully
separate ethnicities. Making matters more complicated is that historically speaking each 'ethnic'
category contained members from virtually all the clans in pre-colonial Rwanda (Newbury 2009).
Newbury theorizes that identity in pre-colonial Rwanda,totheextentthat it can still be seen
today, is based on the degree to which the highly centralized Rwandan royal court had
penetrated the region (2009). The ethnic categories of Hutu and Tutsi still existed, but more was
more similar to a caste system, albeit one with increased social mobility. More interestingly,
there are regions of Rwanda, particularly in the west near lake Kivu, which had no record of
separate Hutu or Tutsi. At the same time, it is essential to note that in most regions Hutu and
Tutsi were at the least semi-meaningful categories, particularly amongst the ruling elites, which
consisted primarily of Tutsi (Semujanga 2003).
A third view, and one that is encouraged by the Kagame regime, is that Hutu and Tutsi
referred nottoethnicity, buttoprofession(similartothecasteargument). This posits that Hutu
and Tutsi lived together in harmony, and were/are the same people with a unified language, set
of traditions, and culture (Buckley-Zistel 2009). Due to these commonalities, the government
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promotes the idea that the ethnic categories of Hutu and Tutsi were inventions of European
colonizers in an effort to divide and rule Rwandan society. To date, the terms Hutu and Tutsi do
not appear in the national museum, thus delegitimizing these terms when conceptualizing
Rwandan history (Buckley-Zistel 2009).
This section demonstrates that the historical origins ethnicity is still strongly debated
within Rwanda. It is important to grasp this complexity and disagreement, as it is this pre-
colonial period that the current government uses to justify its program of pan-Rwandanism.
Ethnicitychanged significantly with the arrival of Europeans, part icularlytheBelgiansfoliowing
the First World War. This would have disastrous consequences when Rwanda was finally
decolonized.
Colonialism, Tutsi Rule, and the Institutionalization of Identity
While the full history of Rwanda under colonialism is far beyond the scope of this work,
there are a few points that must be made in order to properly contextualize the Rwandan
Patriotic Front (RPF) invasion and subsequent genocide. By the time Rwanda began to be
colonized by Germany at the turn of the century, Rwanda already had a large and complex
centralized state structure. The Germans were followed shortly thereafter, assuming power
after Germany's defeat at the end of the First World War. Both sought to rule Rwanda with "the
least cost and most profit" (Des Forges 1999: 34). Belgium in particular began dismantling some
of the more complex pre-colonial state structures, re-dividingthecountryintochiefdomsand
sub-chiefdoms of similar size. Most importantly, Belgium implemented a divide and rule
strategy in which Tutsi would hold top government and administrative positions, sacking Hutu
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leaders and banning Hutu children from higher education (Des Forges 1999). This education
discrimination in particular ensured that only Tutsi could reach the highest positions of influence
within the state system. One of the most enduring legacies, and one that would have disastrous
effects during 1994, was the issue of ethnic identity cards in 1931. These would be used more
than 60 years later to identify and murder ethnic Tutsi at roadblocks across the country.
Belgian occupation of Rwanda was brutal,even by colonial standards. The centralization
of power eliminated any leverage of the peasantry, the vast majority of which were Hutu
(Mamdani 2001). This allowed for local and regional chiefs to brutally exploit the peasantry
through forced labour, whipping those that did not comply. While a judiciary was in place, this
tended to overwhelmingly support the elites, rather than the peasants, who suffered terribly as
a result (Des Forges 1999). In addition, throughout both German and Belgian administration
famine devastated large swathes of the Rwandan population, forcing many to flee to Uganda
and the Congo (Mamdani 2001).
During the 1940s, King Rudahigwa began instituting land reforms in Rwanda. While the
majority of power and wealth remained in the hands of Tutsi elites, Hutu were granted more
political and economic freedom in Rwandan society. This would eventually lead to increased
demands by emerging Hutu elites for control over Rwandan society. These demands cumulated
in the Rwandan revolution of 1959.
Hutu Power, Civil War, Genocide
The 1959 revolution was fought as a dual emancipation from both 'Hamitic' invaders
(Tutsi elites) and the Belgian colonizers. Interestingly, Belgium supported the Hutumajority
during the revolution, making for a relatively easy victory for the Hutu revolutionaries (Des
Forges 1999). The following year, Rwanda -Urundi was officially split into the modern states of
Rwanda and Burundi, with the former voting overwhelmingly to become a republic (Mamdani
2001). At least 150 000 Tutsi were exiled into neighbouring countries. These exiles would stage
frequent raids on Rwanda in the coming years, many of which were met by anti-Tutsi violence in
Rwanda in which sometimes thousands were killed, though this was not nearly as widespread or
coordinated as the 1994 genocide (Des Forges 1999). The descendents of these exiles would
later form a large part of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).
The Rwandan republic essentially reversed ethnic discrimination in Rwanda. Tutsi were
denied access to power through state institutions, as well astoeducation. Moreover, the
education system itself portrayed Tutsi as foreign invaders (as per the Hamitic hypothesis), who
had in the recent past subjugated the Hutu majority. This led to a prevalent anti-Tutsi sentiment
in Rwanda that would continue upto and during the civil warand subsequent genocide (Des
Forges 1999).
An ongoing problem for the Hutu-Ied republic was the presence of a massive number of
predominantly Tutsi refugees in neighbouring Uganda and the Congo. As an already densely
populated,geographicallysmallstate,therewasareluctanceto allow for the return of refugees
and expatriates back into Rwandan society. In 1973 Juvenal Habyarimana launched a successful
military coup, partially in response to genocide of Hutu in neighbouring Burundi in 1972 (Des
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Forges 1999)4S. Habyarimana installed his own PERMEHUTU party to power, where it would
remain until his assassination and the following victory of the RPF. Initially this regime was
highlysuccessful,and Rwanda boasted one of the strongereconomiesincentralAfrica
(Mamdani 2001). This began to unravel in the late 1980s, as global coffee prices plummeted, a
structural adjustment program was imposed by the IMF, and the RPF invaded in 1990.
On October 11990 the RPF launched an invasion of Rwanda from neighbouring Uganda,
and received material support from the Ugandan state (Mamdani 2001). This initial attack
allowed the Habyarimana regime to portray itself as the partyofnational defense, strengthening
its grip on the country. By the end of November of the same year, the RPF was scattered and
disorganized, having been pushed back by the Rwandan army. At around the same time, Paul
Kagame halted his military training in the United States and returned to assume control of the
RPF(Magdami2001).
The effect this war would have in fueling the 1994genocidecannotbeunderestimated.
It caused widespread food shortages due to destruction ofinfrastructure, and displaced one in
seven Rwandan nationals (Mamdani 2001). This further fueled anti-Tutsi sentiment in Rwanda,
which was also being promoted by the national radio station RTLM.46 In August of 1993 both
parties signed the Arusha Accord to implement a unity government, though fighting continued
after the agreement was signed (Des Forges 1999).
While there was anti-Tutsi violence during the civil war, it escalated dramatically
following the assassination of President Habyarimana 'on April 6, 1994. To date it is unclear who
4SThisgenocidestokedveryrealfearsofatrocitiesthatwouidpotentiallybecommitted by the RPFduring
the civil war, which further fueled anti-Tutsi propaganda.
46 This station continued to broadcast hate propaganda throughout the civil warand genocide, calling for
an extermination of inkenzi (cockroaches-a derogative slang for Tutsi).
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fired the rocket that downed the President's plane; atthetime boththeRPFandthe
PERMEHUTU party blamed each other for the event (Melvern 2006). Immediately after the
downing of the President's plane, the genocide started in earnest, with government troops
corralling Tutsi and Hutu moderates to be killed by militias associated with the main political
parties in Rwanda (of which the interhamwe was both the most infamous and numerous). This
genocide was clearly not the result of random acts of a rogue militia; roadblocks were organized
strategically throughout the country, and those with Tutsi identity cards were murdered, often
with low-tech equipment such as machetes. This continued until the fall of Kigali to the RPF on
July 4 of the same year. It is estimated that between 800 000 and 1000000 Rwandans were
killed as a direct result of the genocide (Melvern 2006), most of which was during a 100 day
period.
The fall of Kigali led to a massive displacement of Rwandan Hutu, many of whom feared
reprisal from the RPF. Thousands fled to neighbouring Zaire, and were pursued in the coming
years by the RPF. It is estimated that 200 000 Hutu disappeared in 1996 in Zaire due to Rwandan
army (the former RPF) massacres (Cobban 2007). There were also large numbers of both
revenge killings and summaryexecutionsofaccusedgenocidaires, with single accusations often
proving sufficient grounds for extrajudicial justice (Melvern 2006). In addition, over halfofall
Rwandan children became orphans as a result of the civil war, genocide, and subsequent
consolidation of Rwanda by the RPF (Field 2007). In an effort to reconcile Rwandans following
the genocide, Kagame is attempted to forge a new Rwandan identity to overwrite the previously
divisive ethnic identities ofHutu and Tutsi.
Kagame and Rwandanism
The idea that history is written by the victors has been used to the point of cliche,
though it remains a valuable reference point, particularly in discussionsofethnic or national
belonging. Indeed, "if nations are 'imagined communities' (Anderson 1983), then historical
narratives are key to shaping how communities understand themselves" (Freedman et al 2011:
298). This subsection will briefly outline the official version of Rwandan history as espoused by
the Kagame regime.
According to the current regime, pre-colonial Rwanda witnessed harmony between
Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa with the actual division of the three groups being based upon wealth.
Indeed, the only inequality in Rwanda acknowledged by the Kagame regime prior to colonialism
was that between peasants and the royal courts (Buckly-Zistel 2009: 34). This dichotomy, in
which Hutuand Tutsiare both equally subjugated bya royal court (ratherthan alternatively
subjugating each other), is crucial to current efforts at creating a civic identity. It is thus this pre-
colonial period that is seen asthe "golden age of civilization" (Lambert 2006: 24) by the Kagame
regime; a reference point in which Tutsi and Hutu were not markers for identity based violence
and discrimination.
This "golden age" is contrasted with both the colonial legacy, in which first the Germans,
then Belgians, institutionalized identity to rule Rwandan society. According to the official
account, it is the Europeans who are responsible for the former state of ethnicity within Rwanda.
Whatisstrikinginthisaccountisthelackofemphasisplacedonboth HutuandTutsi individuals
for the racial politics of the past century, thus absolving members of both groups from
responsibility (Buckley-Zistel 2009: 36). Such a framework positions both Hutu and Tutsias
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being equally victimized by Europeans, thus creating a common framework of suffering intended
to unite, rather than divide, Rwandans.
In terms of the 1990 civil war and genocide in 1994, the official narrative places the
blame squarely with the Habyarimana regime, focusing on the continuation of racial politics and
the denial of refugees' rights to return to their homeland (Buckley-Zistel 2009). This is not a
surprising strategy, given that the new regime must create a historicalnarrativethatprovides
itself with legitimacy, but it should be mentioned that it is highly unlikely that Rwandans have
forgotten that it was Kagame who invaded Rwanda with a refugee army prior to the
commencement of the genocide.
The most controversial aspect of this official narrative, particularly in practice, is the
current role of ethnicity within Rwandan public discourse. Currently, the terms Hutu and Tutsi
are stronglydiscouraged,often with the threat of persecution for propagating "genocide
ideology" (Cobban 2007). References to Hutu and Tutsi do not appear in national museums or
publicaddresses(Buckley-ZisteI2009),noraretheymentionedatallwithinhistoryorsocial
science curriculums. Even as it pertains to the genocide, the government focuses on a
victim/perpetrator dichotomy, rather than an ethnicone.47
The following subsections will review the implementation of this official truth narrative,
including gacaca, ingando, memorialisation of the genocide, and the new education system.
The establishment of this truth framework, dubbed the "RPF healing truth" by Susanne Buckley-
Zistel (2006a, 2006b), is to form the basis of a civic Rwandan identity that can ideally overwrite
the exclusionary ethnic identities that allowed the genocide totakeplace.
47 While this may seem, at face value, to acknowledge the suffering by both groups during the civil war,
many scholars (see Cobban 2007) have concluded that it isonlyTutsi who fall under this 'victim' label.
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Gacaca
The aftermath of the 1994 genocide left Rwanda to face an unprecedented task of
peacebuilding and reconciliation. The RPF, now in power, was left with a state severely lacking
inbasicservices,inciudingadepletedjusticedepartmentwherethevast majority of judges had
either fled, been killed, or were implicated in the genocide (Waugh 2004). In addition, there was
such wide-spread participation in the genocide that imprisoning 0 rapprehendingall
perpetrators was logistically impossible. Rwandan prisons were unable to cope with the massive
amount of accused, and the decimation of the judiciary had many inmates waiting years in
unsafely crowded prisons without trial (Cobban 2007). While there are no statistics currently
available, it is estimated that a large number of Rwandans died in prison, further complicating
the reconciliation process (Cobban 2007). The UN established the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) for trying the architects of genocide, but this did little to alleviate the
strain on the justice system, as it focused only on the highest Ievels of leadership that were
responsible for the genocide. In addition, there was reluctance on the part of the Kagame
regime to fully cooperate with the ICC; in order to maintain perceived legitimacy only 'Hutu
crimes'wereseenasacceptabletoprosecute(ApteI2011: 158).
In order to address the massive amount of perpetrators, as well as to provide a
framework for truth-telling similar to that in the Truth and Reconciliation commissions
implemented in other societies, the Kagame regime instituted a system of local gacaca court
trials to hear local experiences and punish low-Ievelperpetratorsofgenocide,aswellasto
attempt to reintegrate former perpetrators and victims into the same society. Like many new
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practices pursued by the Kagame regime, gacaca can trace its origins back to village-level justice
in pre-colonial time, in which grievances are moderated by a selection of village elders. Current
gacacajudgesaregiven brief training and are tasked with prosecutingand sentencing the lower
level offenders that comprise the bulk of the crimes related to genocide. Top perpetrators,
thosewhowereresponsiblefororganizingthegenocide,aretried separately by the state
(Waughh2004), which is the only body capable of death sentencing. The utility of gacaca both
asa means of truth telling and asa means of reconciliation has beenthesubjectofintense
debate amongst peacebuilding scholars, though it provides (in addition to ingando) a space in
which ethnicity is discussed, though not always openly (Eltringham 2011).
To briefly summarize, participation in gacaca is encouraged amongst all Rwandans, and
in the case of many participants, a condition of release if they were previously arrested on
crimes related to the genocide (Waugh 2004). A typical gacaca proceeding involves testimony
from both the accused as well as victims in a public forum, in which as many people as possible
are encouraged to attend. This is ostensibly done to promote community-level healing and
understanding. Restitution is typically financial or labour related,as in manycasesjailtimehas
already been served prior to gacaca (Waugh 2004).
The gacaca program has been criticized for how it deals with identity and truth
frameworks, particularly among victims. In terms of identity, gacaca risks reinforcing, rather
thanreducing,exc!usionaryethnicidentities. As ethnic identity was the most salient group
identifier during the genocide, accounts from this period are conductedin'ethnicterms'
(Eltringham 2011). Much like Arendt's observation that "if one is attacked as a Jew, one must
defend oneself as a Jew" (2003: 12),victimsofidentitybasedviolence must define said violence
81
in identity-based (ethnic) terms. Thus gacaca, one of the few forums where ethnic identity can
be discussed, can only consider identity within the specific timeframe and events of the civil war
and corresponding genocide (rather than the decades and events leading to it). This helps to
ensure that ethnic affiliations remainexciusionary; contradictingthepublicnarrativeofpan-
Rwandanism.
In addition to reinforcing past ethnic divisions by only discussing ethnicity in the context
of recent violence, there have been severe criticisms as to what isconsideredacceptable
accounts of the past (Burnet 2009; Cobban 2007). Those who testify of suffering caused by the
RPF, both during and after the war, risk persecution, often on the charge of 'inciting genocide
ideology'(Buckley-ZisteI2006a,2006b). Moreover,thelabelof'victim'isunderstoodtoapply
only to Tutsi victims of violence, leaving no room for the experience of both 'moderate' Hutu
who were murdered during the genocide, as well as those who had been victimized by the RPF
during or after the war (Burnet 2009).
Finally, there utility ofgacaca to foster reconciliation at the local level has been heavily
criticized (Field 2007; Burnet 2009). In addition to the aforementioned bias of what crimes are
'fit'forgacaca,thosewhotestifyareoftensubjecttobothretraumatizationandpotentially
continued persecution within the community. As discussed in chapter two, there is little
consensus on the impact of truth telling itself on reconciliation and trauma reduction. Inthe
Rwandan case this debate also must consider the context in which the truth is told. In Rwanda
both victims and perpetrators must live together at the local level, and as Tutsi remain an ethnic
minority, victims are often outnumbered by their former tormentors. Testifying against often
prominent members of the community can lead to increased threats and isolation from
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community life, increasing feelings of victimization. Thus gacaca can, in many cases, further
entrench divisions between Hutu and Tutsi, as Tutsi who continue to make up a minority can be
further ostracized, and Hutu often do not have a forum to share their experiences. Gacaca thus
works against the government's stated goals of national unity, and reinforces ethnic division ism,
rather than pan-Rwandanism. This furthers the divide between the public narratives of
Rwandanism, as Hutu concerns and grievances are relegatedtothe private sphere.
Memorials and Memory Spaces in Rwanda
As discussed in the previous two chapters, memorialisation provides a key link to past
events. Moreover,'official'monumentsthatareconstructedbystatesaredonesotoreflectthe
official version of history; one that can often conflict with local memories of the past. This
subsection will review memorialisation of the 1994 genocide and civil war, and will discuss both
'official' centralized monuments, and those erected by the local population. This section will
demonstrate that the current administration is only willing to accommodate memorialisation
that fits the official truth framework of the Kagame regime, and that these official monuments
aremeanttostifle,ratherthanencourage,debatesaboutthepast.
There are six official genocide memorials within Rwanda, located at Bisesero, Kigali,
Murambi, Ntarama, Nyamata, and Nyarabuye. Though these make up a small fraction of the
memorial sites scattered across the country, it is these thatarethe 'main'sites,and the ones
that are maintained by state authorities. Assuch,itisinthesesiteswheretheofficialversionof
history is the most evident. The most obvious aspect of these memorialisation sites, particularly
when compared to other memorials for mass atrocity, is the macabre manner in which the sites
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are presented. Human remains are commonly displayed, either laid out and preserved, or left
where they fell amongst church pews (Meirhenrich 2011). The purpose of such a visceral display
seems to be to overwhelm any possible discussion of past events. As Andrew Blum wrote in
1995 for the New York Times "The odor exempted us from the need for imagination. It relieved
us of the need for understanding" (quoted in Meirhenrich 2011: 288).
Ithas been argued that memorialisation in Rwandaisa means to an end,particularlyby
some segments of formerly exiled Tutsi elites, as it provides justification for government action
to the international community (Meirhenrich 2011). Legitimacy is maintained in this sense by
enforcing a continued comparison to the Habyarimana regime that preceded it. This presents a
clear dichotomy between past and present, with the former being linked to genocide. "By
remembering the past in a very particular, macabre manner, these memories facilitate a
forgetting of the present" (Meirhenrich2011: 289).
Much like in Titoist Yugoslavia following the Second World War, the aftermath of the
Rwandan genocide saw a proliferation of small, locally-produced memorials that fell outside
government control. There are estimated to be thousands of such sites around Rwanda
(Meirhenrich2011),andthesegenerallydifferfromthe'official'sites in that there is typically far
less display of human remains; even those that feature remains tend to present them far less
conspicuously. This is likely due to the Rwandan preference for home burial (Burnet 2009). The
denial of proper burial for those killed at major memorial sites isa cause of tension between the
government and survivor groups, as it prevents a sense of closure, andkeepsthewoundsofthe
genocide fresh for those who lost family members.
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In March of 2007, the Rwandan government established the National Commission for
the Fight Against Genocide. One of the goals of this commission is to "plan and coordinate all
activities aimed at memorializing the 1994 genocide" (Article 4[4], Organic law No. 09/2007).
This has placed an emphasis on 'official' sites, often leaving local monuments and sites of
memory in a state of disrepair. As these unofficial monuments begin to disappear, the only
memorials to the genocide that will remain in Rwanda are the ones that propagate the 'official'
truth of the genocide. This has led to criticisms that memorial sites in Rwanda are for Tutsis only
(Field 2007). Many places in Rwanda have also been subject to renaming, in an effort to
"protect survivors from remembering where their relatives died" (Thomson 2011: 333). This is
another example of how the official truth narrative fails to identify and co-opt local memories
and narratives of the past. Ifthe Rwandan official truth cannot successfully co-opt these
localized narratives of the past, establishing a hegemonic identity centered on pan-Rwandanism
will be impossible to achieve.
Private Narratives of the Past in Rwanda
The previous sections have shown government strategies for propagating the 'official'
truth about Rwanda's past and the 1994 genocide. This section will examine research that has
focused on narratives of the civil war, genocide, and currentadministration that fall outside of
this official truth. Unless these differences are addressed, it will be impossible to form a national
imagined community (as per Anderson 1983); and the establishment of a hegemonic Rwandan
identity will prove impossible.
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The bulk of research conducted on local narratives of the past in Rwanda has focused on
open ended interviews with victims, perpetrators, and bystanders(seeBuckley-ZisteI2006a,
2006b; Thomson 2011; Fujii 2009; Field 2007). What is immediately evident across these various
research undertakings is the variety of means in which Rwandans remember the past,
particularly the civil warand subsequent genocide.
Fujii (2009) demonstrates that most Rwandans do not fall neatly into categories of
'victim', 'perpetrator', and 'bystander' throughout the genocide. Indeed, most fall into multiple
categories depending on circumstances surrounding their involvement (factors such as intra-
group pressure and the threat of violence against them played a la rge role in popular
participation during the genocide). This undermines the current administration's dichotomy of
victim/perpetrator, which is understood amongst Rwandans tobe code for Tutsi/Hutu,
respectively (Burnet 2009: 89). This in turn denies Hutu victims, of both the Hutu Power
movement and of the RPF,a space in which their accounts of the pastcanbeshared. In effect,
this forces a silence upon Hutu victims, a silence which is often interpretedbyTutsisurvivorsas
threatening (Field 2006). In this sense, the insistence on viewing the genocide through the
dichotomous lens of victim/perpetrator prevents the formation of a hegemonic Rwandanism by
denying a place for Hutu-driven narratives inthemeta-narrative of the state. Such a problem
also exists for Tutsi who grew up outside of Rwanda and have now returned, as they do not fall
neatly into the category of'victim48,.
It has also been noted that Hutu and Tutsi identities still have "considerable force in the
discursive terrain of popular perceptions, interactions, and memory" (Field 2006: 212). The
48 The fact that 'victim' has become synonymous with 'Tutsi' has led to accusations of ethnic favouritism,
as benefits for victims often extend to Tutsi who were not in Rwanda during the genocide (Burnet 2009).
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difference isthatthese terms have now been pushed into solelytheprivatesphereofdiscourse
within Rwanda. In informal settings, such as a village bar, there are now code words for when
someone of a minority ethnicity (usually Tutsi) enters the bar, which is now a sign to stop
speakingpubliclyofethnicity(Fujii2009). Ethnicityis now usually now discussed only in the
presence of one's own ethnic group for fear of persecution (Thomson 2011). as even mention of
Hutu and Tutsi provides possible ground for charges of "divisiveness" of "promoting genocide
ideology" (Buckley-ZisteI2009). It is also interesting to note that the language used to describe
the past has a tendency to vary across ethnic groups. Hutu often speak of 'the war', while Tutsi
tend to favour 'the genocide' (Fujii 2009).
The overwhelming consensus amongst those who have conducted interviews in Rwanda .
is that the terms Hutu and Tutsi still have tremendous resonance amongst the population.
Whilethisishardlysurprising,giventhevastlyincreasedsalienceofethnicity during the civil war
andgenocide,itsignificantlyunderminesthecurrentregimesefforts at forging a hegemonic
Rwandan identity. Unless the Kagame administration can find a way in which to co-opt local
narrativesofethnicityandthepast,thecreationofacivicRwandanism that overrides previoLis
ethnic divisions will be impossible.
Identity in Rwanda
Hutu and Tutsi originated as fluid expressionsofbelongingthat cross cut other modes of
identity, such as region and clan, and were not the primary group identityinpre-colonial
Rwanda. Indeed,itisdoubtfulthatthesetermsoriginally referred to 'ethnicity'atall,atleastas
we define it today. The arrival of European colonizers, who did not fully grasp the complexity of
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pre-colonial Rwanda's state structures or modes of belonging entrenched ethnicity as the key
divider of Rwandan society, empowering Tutsi rule by proxy at the expense of the Hutu majority.
This was justified by a combination of biblical myths of Ham and the scientific racism prevalent
in Europe at the time that constructed Tutsi as a superior race that migrated to Rwanda from
Ethiopia. Tutsi were, according to Europeans, the natural rulers of Rwanda. This myth was
propagated throughout the Rwandan state, with widespread discriminationpreventingHutu
from influencing state processes.
During the period of African de-colonization, the Hutu majority successfully overthrew
the Tutsi dominated state. Thousands of Tutsi fled to neighbouring Uganda and the Congo,
forming large refugee communities. The system of discrimination in Rwanda was then
effectively inverted under Hutu majority rule, with Tutsi being largely denied access to state
powers. The education system in this period constructed Tutsi as foreign invaders that had
oppressed the Hutu; a view that was supported by memories of the colonial period.
The invasion by the RPF, a military group consisting primarily of Tutsi who grew up in the
refugee camps, further entrenched the notion that Tutsi were foreign invaders who sought to
dominate the Hutu. This, increasing food scarcity, population displacement, inciting
propaganda,andtheassassinationofPresidentHabyarimana,paved the way an orchestrated
campaign of genocide that is estimated to have killed 800000 Rwandans, the majority of whom
were Tutsi. There were also widespread reports of revenge killings and, massacres by the RPF,
though many of these massacres occurred within Zaire, rather than Rwanda itself.
After assuming power, Kagame and the RPF have been attempting to forge a new civic
Rwandan identity to override the previous divisions of Hutu and Tutsi. To this end, the terms
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Hutu and Tutsi no longer appear in public discourse, including the school system and memorial
sites. The only places that these terms are allowed is within either gocaca courts or ingondo
camps, with the latter being established explicitly to remove this dichotomous thinking from
former perpetrators. Rather than remove the labels of Tutsi and Hutu from the Rwandan
consciousness, these reforms have effectively transferred anydiscussion of history and ethnicity
to the private sphere; public discussion of these issues can lead to persecution for propagating
genocide ideology. The increased emphasis on control of the historical narrative by the Kagame
administration, particularly in recent years, has denied the opportunitytoco-optlocalnarratives
ofhistoryandethnicity,effectivelydenyinganychanceofapan-Rwandanidentityfrom
becoming a hegemonic expression of group belonging in Rwanda.
In addition to justice mechanisms and memorialisation practices, the Kagame
administration has created a new school curriculum to disseminate its version of history to
Rwandan youth. This curriculum, along with government ingondo (re)education camps, provide
the two pillars of history indoctrination to the next generation 0 fRwandans;thegenerationthat
will be integral to a future free of identity based violence and conflict. The following chapter will
provide an in-depth examination of the Rwandan education system, as well as a review of the
secondary literature on ingondo.
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Chapter Five: Teaching History and Identity in Post-Genocide Rwanda
The previous chapter examined both the history of Rwanda and the official truth
narrative of the Kagame regime for promoting reconciliation. This chapter will examine how this
truth narrative is presented to Rwandanyouth,through boththesocial studies curriculum and
inganda re-education camps.. In reviewing primary school textbooks, as well as secondary
literature on ingando, this chapter will argue that the education system does not construct a
viewofethnicityorthe past that will be able to co-optethnocentric narratives of history and
ethnicity.
Oh, the Humanities!: History and Social Studies Education in Rwanda
Following the victory of Kagame and the RPF, a moratorium was placed on history
teaching in the aftermath of the genocide. Atthetimethiswasessential,aspre-genocide
Rwandan history enforced strict ethnic divisions and propagated the belief that Tutsis were
foreigners from Ethiopia who had ruled and exploited the Hutu majority (Mamdani 2001). There
was also (and continues to be) a severe shortage of qualified educators, as many were either
banned from teaching for espousing what was termed "genocide ideology", or fled following the
genocide (Freedman et al. 2011). Education in the years following the genocide was fragmented
at best, with a national education strategy not established until 2003 (MINEDUC 2012). While
the moratorium on history teaching has been officiallylifted,to datethereare no standard texts
that have been approved for use by the Rwandan government, making any consistent analysis of
history teaching across different schools and districts beyond thescopeofthisstudy.
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In order to analyse how history is disseminated to Rwandan youth I will examine the first
sixyearsofsocialstudiestextsthathavebeenapprovedforteachingbytheRwandanMinistryof
Education (MINEDUC). While obviously not addressing the full range of material that an actual
historyclasswouldoffer,socialstudiestextsincludehistoricalmaterial,suchasRwandan
government prior to and during colonialism. Unlike many other education systems, there is no
single set of official curricular textbooks in circulation. Rather than rely on a single publisher, the
Rwandanschoolsystemreliesuponthreeseparatepublishersforeachleveltext.49 Each text
published must be approved by MINEDUC before it enters circulation. Despite the difference in
publishing houses, the actual contents of the texts are near-identical,reflectingthestandard
education curriculum of Rwanda.50 While Rwanda offers nine years of free education (6 primary,
3 secondary), the primary years have a higher enrolment, with official government enrolment at
97 percent for boys and 98 percent for girls (MINEDUC 2012). As such, these years see the most
widespread propagation of the official government truth narrative through the education
system. In reviewing these texts, I look specifically at how the past is transmitted to a new
generation of Rwandans, particularly as it pertains to identity, the civil war and genocide, and
issues of ethnicity in Rwanda's past. I will also examine how the curriculum deals with unity
amongst Rwandans, as this is an ongoing theme throughout the elementary curriculum texts.
This analysis will demonstrate that the curriculum, as currently constructed,doeslittleto
address the issue of identity; leaving open the possibility for local,alternativeaccountsofthe
past to challenge the narrative presented through the government's socialstudiescurriculum.
The curricular texts will be reviewed chronologically, as this provides a better framework for
49 Levels 1-3 use texts published by Macmillan, Pearson, and Longhorn. Levels 4-6 use texts published my
Macmillan,Longhorn,andINR-Pitambra.
so The texts published bylNR-Pitamba were unavailableatthetimeofthisstudy,andassuch,arenot
factored into this analysis.
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how concepts such as identity, peace, and unity are taught overtimeasastudentadvances
through the education system.
The early years of primary education (grades 1-3) contain virtuallynoreference
whatsoever to the genocide or identity (see appendix 1forafull ra ngeofschoolresourcesused
in this section). This is not particularly surprising, given the age of the pupils; though it should be
noted that in each year there are units dedicated to such subjects as "keeping the peace",
"factors of disharmony in the sector", and "harmony in the family and in class". The terms
'unity'and'harmony'inparticularappearregularly,bothinthe earlier grades, as well as the
later e.lementary levels that will be examined below. An interesting feature in the discussions of
such topics of unity, harmony, and peace isthe role of leaders in maintainingtheseideals.
Each school text has at least one unit dedicated to leadership, and leadership itself is
often the first attribute mentioned when promoting factors that lead to harmony. From an early
age students are taught that "leaders are people who show others whattodo"(Pupils'bookfor
grade 1: 83),andthat"wedowhatthey [leaders] tell us to do" (Pupils'bookforgrade2:S8).
This continues in units such as "Promoting Unity, Cooperation and Development" in which the
first factor mentioned is that "leaders should solve conflicts fairly" (Pupils' book for grade 3:
162). While this obviously does not relate to the formation ofidentityperse,itisinterestingin
the sense that the genocide has often been blamed on poor leadership and undue deference to
authority (Buckley-ZisteI2009). It would seem that the current curriculum encourages a similar
obedience and deference to leadership, rather than its stated goals of providing a more
democratic classroom experience (as per Freedman et al. 2011).
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While the first three grades do not address Rwanda's history, a number of images depict
events that seem to be quite similar to the sort of violence seen during the civil war. As early as
the first grade, social studies texts contain images such as armed men with machetes looting
property(Pupils'bookforgrade1:34). An even stronger image linkto the civil war appears in
the second grade, with a mob of armed men burning a village (Pupils' book for grade 2: 74). The
only caption given to understand this image is: "Some people in the community fight with
dangerous weapons. They hurt each other. Others destroy people's property. This causes other
peopletosuffer"(Pupils'bookforgrade2:74). It is this lack of framework for understanding
that is particularly troubling in the elementary curriculum. By not providing an adequate
framework within the text itself, the burden of explanation must fall to either the educator
(which, as will be discussed in the following subsection, is at best problematic), or to the private
sphere. Both of these have the potential of providing knowledge frameworks that exist outside
the official truth narrative that is supposed to be advanced throughtheeducationcurriculum.
This would in turn undermine the narrative of genocide when itiseventuallytaught(briefly) in
the sixth grade. While these first three years do not deal with history, this changesinthefourth
grade.
What is perhaps most striking inthe approved social studies texts,startinginthefourth
grade, isa seeming gap in the historical timeline that omits muchofthecolonialperiod,the
post-colonial Hutu power years, and the genocide itself. This is most glaring during the fourth
level of primary, in which there is a unit dedicated to "Things everyone can do to maintain peace
in the district" (Primary Social Studies 4: Unit 14). This unit outlines peace as "progress towards
justice and mutual respect among the people of our district [...J people must keep the peace by
doing the right things and by helping others to resolve their conflicts" (Primary Social Studies 4:
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61). The unit goes on to outline that often the most appropriate means of helping others is to
appealtotheauthorities,particularlycommunityleadersandcouncils. It should be noted that
this very deference to authority is seen asoneofthe primary reasonsforthegenocide,and isa
tendency that peace workers in Rwanda are currently trying to break (see Staub 2011).
This unit is followed by a discussion of "factors of harmony and disharmony in the
district" (Primary Social Studies 4: Unit 15). Across both units 14 and 15 there is no mention of
genocide or stereotyping whatsoever. This certainly seems a bizarre omission when it comes to
factors of disharmony in particular. Perhapsthemosttroublingaspectofthesetwounitsisthe
way in which discussions of the genocide are passed from the school system to the community.
Unit 14 closes with: "ask your family if they know of any quarrels between communities. Try to
find out how they were solved" (Primary Social Studies 4: 64). Suchan assignment encourages
for narratives about the genocide to be disseminated outside of the government's own truth
narrative. At the same time, if this locally produced account of community conflict (possibly
includinggenocidej,differsfromthegovernment'sowntruthnarrative,itisdiscouragedoreven
prosecuted asan act of division if espoused in the public sphere (Buckley-Zistel 2009). This trend
continues across MINEDUC approved curricular texts.
The term genocide appears far more prominently in the fifth grade, though at no point is
there an explanation of the genocide itself (Comprehensive Socia I Studies 5). Genocide is
typically mentioned in terms of genocide memorials, which are community assets that allow
students to learn from the past. In addition, genocide appears once inthe unit "gender in our
province", wherein "The genocide led to the death of many people. Many women were left as
single parents. They had to take up responsibility over their families" (ComprehensiveSocial
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Studies 5: 144). Much like the aforementioned violent images, there is very little in terms of
frameworks for understanding. Again, this passes discussion of the genocide to the private
sphere, in which narratives have the potential to greatly differ from the official truth framework.
Much like the preceding grades, there isa large number of violentimages, many
reflecting events that occurred during the genocide, that lackmorethan a sentence of
explanation or context. This includes images of both child rape and torture, both of which
occurred with relative frequency during the genocide (Des Forges1999). Once again, the
curriculum speaks of issues that were prevalent during the genocide, but does not provide a
framework for contextualizing and understanding these concepts and images. In terms of
history, the fifth grade focuses on traditional (pre-colonial)beliefsandgovernmentstructures,
particularly the King (Mwami). This part of history is romanticized, and is presented as all people
living in harmony. It does not mention the terms Hutu or Tutsi, nor does it extend to the colonial
period (Comprehensive Social Studies 5).
The final year of primary schooling, grade six, hasa much largerfocusonhistorythan
the preceding grades. In addition to an extended focus on pre-colonial Rwanda, it introduces a
more detailed examination of colonialism, and more importantly, has a unit dedicated to the
Rwandan genocide. According to the curriculum, in "about lOOOAD, the Bahutu and Batutsi
joined the pygmies. The Bahutu were cultivators and the Batutsiwerecattle keepers. Both
were Bantu groups that migrated from Central Africa" (Comprehensive Social Studies 6: 44).
This is the first mention in the curriculum of the origins of both Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda. This is
an obvious refutation of the (now disproven) Hamitic hypothesis regarding the origins of
Rwandans. It is also interesting to note thatthe above quote is the only instanceinwhichHutu
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and Tutsi are mentioned in pre-colonial history. They are both presented as identical, other than
their economic activity, ostensibly giving both equal claim to present day Rwanda. There is no
mention whatsoever of conflict in pre-colonial Rwanda, nor is there mention of ethnic identity
and administration (the Mwami being Tutsi, for example). Taken together, it is obvious that this
period in time is being used as a "golden age of civilization" (Lambert 2006: 24); a reference
point in which Hutu and Tutsi peacefully coexisted without foreign influence or dominance.
According to the texts, "The Belgians created division between the people of Rwanda.
They introduced an identity card which had the person's tribe on it. People were then
categorized as Hutu, Tutsi and Twa" (Comprehensive Social Studies 6: 67). It is also telling that
the section entitled "Colonisation of Rwanda" begins with a definition of the term conflict.
Again, it would appear that the goal of the curriculum is to place the blame for division ism solely
on colonial powers. In fact, the only mention of Hutu exploitation is that "The two
[administrative) systems were used by the Tutsi to exploit the Hutu. This was unfair yet all
people should be treated fairly" (ComprehensiveSocialStudies6:76). Even the aftermath of
colonialism, in which independent Rwanda emerges, glosses over issues of race, saying only that
"many Tutsi were killed" (Comprehensive Social Studies 6: 80-1). It should also be noted here
the language used to describe the suffering of Hutu and Tutsi across colonialism. It is the Hutu
that were exploited "unfairly", whereas Tutsi were outright "killed". This reinforces the post-
genocide narrative that the Tutsi are the true victims of Rwandan history.
In total there is one unit that deals exclusively with genocide, "Topic 9: Genocide in
Rwanda" (Comprehensive Social Studies 6: 82-9). What is immediately apparent in this section is
a general lack of information or discussion. A total of five pages is dedicated to the Rwandan
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genocide (compared to the 10+ pages each dedicated to pre-colonial Rwanda and colonialism),
only two of which deal with causes of the genocide itself. The causes of the genocide are listed
as: historical hatred, colonialism, Christianity, bad governance, death of President Habyarimana,
the press, failure of UN peacekeepers, and outside forces (Comprehensive Social Studies6:83-
4). What is interesting to note here isthe relative lackofresponsibilityplaced on Rwandans
themselves for carrying out the genocide. There is also no mention of the RPF invasion occurring
prior to the genocide. According to the social studies curriculum, the genocide "came to an end
after the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) defeated the Forces Armies Rwandaises (FAR). The RPF
established a government of national unity. The new government was able to stop the killings"
(Comprehensive Social Studies 6: 85). In this sense itisthe RPF, and by extension Kagame, that
'saved' Rwanda from the genocide. Unsurprisingly, there is no mention of wrongdoing on the
part of the RPF. After the genocide the "government discourages the use of tribe (Hutu, Tutsi,
Twa) as political identities" (Comprehensive Social Studies 6: 86). Perhaps more telling, is the
lack of review questions dedicated to the genocide itself. The only questions that are asked of
students is "what is genocide?" and "apart from the Rwanda genocide, name two other
genocide that have taken place in the world" (Comprehensive Social Studies 6: 129). This
demonstrates the lack of discussion of genocide that still prevails in present day Rwanda.
While the lack of reference to race, at least until the 6'hgrade, has obviously been
implemented so as to eliminate a racially dichotomous view of Rwandan society, the
curriculum's deferral of major problems of divisiveness in the community to the private sphere
provides an opportunity for community conflicts to be framed in these very terms outside the
classroom. This has the potential to create two competing truth narratives in the minds of
Rwandan youth, with local accounts of racial distinction likely forming a more compelling
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account of the origins of tensions and discord within a given community. While the government
eventually tackles this history directly (through ingando), there is little account of race orgroup
belonging in the most important years of adolescent identity formation (as per Moshman 1999).
Untilthesixthgrade,theonlymentionsofthegenocidelackanysort of framework for
actual understanding. It is mentioned onlyasa reason why there are so many orphans in
Rwanda, and also that it has increased the role of women as "so many men were killed in the
genocide" (Primary Social Studies 4: 103). It is striking how little attention is paid to the
genocide in this respect, with teachers or parents having to fill the gaps inthisknowledge if
asked. This is in itself highly problematic, as there have been repeated instances of teachers
explaining the genocide essentially through Hutu power propaganda (Freedman et al. 2011), as
well as many teachers being afraid of broaching the subject at all due to strict censorship and
the fear of termination and/or prosecution (Freedman et al. 2011). Such a limited mention of
thegenocidealsofailstoacknowledgeanysufferingbeyondthemenkilled,suchasthepractice
of mass rape, that has been detailed earlier in this chapter. This leaves large gaps in the
historical consciousness that can only be filled by local practices of remembering, which many
have noted is outside the scope of the official truth narrative (see Buckley-ZisteI2006a, 2006b;
Burnet 2009). The main instance in which the government's take on the origins of genocide
appearsinthesocialstudiesistheassertionthat"badleadershipandfeelingsofinequalitycan
lead to discontent and violence" (Primary Social Studies 4: 104).
While this lack of meaningful detail appears to be a transparent attempt by the Kagame
administration to prevent nuanced discussion of the geriocide withinthe Rwandan school
system, it is important to consider the development stages of chiIdren asit pertains to political
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socialization. As was noted by Piaget and Weil (1951) in their study of Swiss children's attitudes
totheirhomeland,youngchildren(betweenfourandseven)havedifficulty conceptualizing
themselvesashavingmultiple,overiappingidentities.S1 This is largely dues to young children's
inability to grasp abstract concepts such as "society" or "government" beyond their immediate
surroundings (Piaget and Wei11951; Patrick 1977: 200). The inability of young children to
simultaneously hold multiple levels of identity makes the absence of ethnic identity concepts
such as Hutu and Tutsi far less conspicuous in the-early years of the Rwandan education system.
Generally speaking, the attention paid to ethnic identitycorresponds well with the
development level of the children to whom the material is being presented. The early grades (1-
4) focus on harmony and the importance of peace at the more localized village and district level,
emphasising the reason for quarrels between individuals. This reflects the inability of young
children to think abstractly of society beyond theirimmediatesurroundings. The introduction to
the concept of genocide through the school system also emphasises this local connection, with
the curriculum initially focusing on genocide. memorials. In doing so, this stresses that the
genocide was also a local event (though the teaching of what, specifically, occurred at any given
locale would still occur inthe private sphere largelyindependentofstatecontrol). Children at
this age largely conform to their environment (Piaget and Wei11951: 564-6), which would
undermine any simple (due to age level), comprehensive account 0 fthegenocide.
The shift in ability for children to conceptualize politics beyond the local level greatly
accelerates around ages 10-11,with children now able to recognizethecollectiveidealsthat
underpin the nation(PiagetandWeil 1951). In addition, by theageofthirteen, children begin to
51 In the case of this Swiss study, the two identities wereterritorially bound; children had a difficult time
conceptualizing themselves as both Swiss and Genovese (Piaget andWeiI1951:564).
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gain the ability to "perform complex mental operations about political phenomenon" (Patrick
1977: 200). The corresponding grade levels on Rwandan Lower Primary (grades five and six)
. reflect this change in cognitive ability, particularly in the sixthgrade. As was discussed earlier,
thesixthgradeprovidesa(brief)descriptionofthegenocide,making note of wider contributing
factorssuchastheeffectsofcolonialism. Itisthislevelthatcould begin to foster a nuanced
narrative of the genocide in the classroom, though aswas noted earlier, a mere five pages is
dedicated to this subject. Itislikelythatthiswouldbeaddressedwhenthehistorycurriculumis
finally implemented, though as of this writing this is simply speculation. Taken together, it is
difficult to makea definitive claim on the teaching of history through the social sciences
curriculum. Theabsenceofnuancedinformationreflectsthecognitiveabilityofyoungchildren
and isin itself not a cause of concern. While the absence ofa nuanced description of both racial
identity, history, and the genocide is somewhat conspicuous in the sixth grade, this is not
markedlydifferentthaninWesternsocieties.lndeed,thepreviouslydiscussedlackof
accountability prescribed to Rwandansthemselvesisfairlytypical of both societies in general
and public education systems more specifically.
[...) a residue of opinion and interpretation flattering to that nation, and less so to
othersinvolved,islikelytopersistfordecades,ifnotcenturies. Some self-criticism
may arise, but it is likely to be overshadowed and outlived by rationalizations [...) of
the host population. Perhaps nowhere is this tendency more evident than in a
nation'seducationsystem,whereinstructionandmaterialscriticizing [...) are
routinely outnumbered by those portraying a more noble past (Hoskin 1991: 200).
Thus, while there are certainly appeals to a more "noble" past (pre-colonial Rwanda),
this is not markedly different from other cases.52 It is still, however, somewhat troubling that
Rwandan history and the identity question remain so undeveloped in the later primary years of
52 The 1991 Hoskin study cited above focuses on perceptionsofimmigrants in Western democracies.
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the education curriculum, given how often the teaching of history is cited asoneofthe major
contributing factors to the 1994 genocide (Des Forges 1999; Mamdani 2001).
History Teaching and the development of History Teachers
As mentioned previously, the moratorium on the teaching of history in Rwanda has
recentlybeenlifted,andthoughtherearecurrentlynostandardized texts in circulation,
teachers are expected to teach ~hesubjectto Rwanda's youth, particularly in the secondary
curriculum (MINEDUC 2012). In order to both examine and assist in the creation of this new
history curriculum and teaching resources (yet to be released), a study was conducted by the
Human Rights Center at University of California, Berkeley between 2001·2003 (Freedman et al
2004, 2011). This study was conducted through workshops including educational stakeholders,
such as government officials, teachers, and students.
What emerges as a striking, and indeed disturbing trend for the purposeofconstructing
a pan-Rwandan civic identity, istheextent to which the 'officialtruthnarrative'isdisputed
amongst educators. According to this study "46 percent of the interviewed education
stakeholders expressed beliefs about the originofethnicity in Rwanda that was inconsistent
with the official narrative" (Freedman et al. 2011). This in turn leads many teachers to avoid
teaching about history and ethnicitywithin theclassroom,thusrelegating the dissemination of
history to the private, rather than public, sphere.
Perhaps even more disconcerting is the number of teachers who believe that ethnicity
should not be discussed at all within the classroom. 67 percent of teachers believed that
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ethnicity should be ignored in schools (Freedman et al. 2011). This would include discussions of
thecolonialperiodandtheinstitutionalizationofethnicity,thus ignoring a critical framework for
understanding the 1994 civil warand genocide. According to this study:
Fear of discussing ethnicity in the classroom derived from at least two concerns.
First, some teachers accepted the idea promoted by the government that
continuing to focus on ethnicity could reignite violent, destructive conflict in
Rwanda. This concern remains one of the formidable barriers to restoring the
teaching of history. Second,ourintervieweesandparticipantswerewaryof
possible negative consequences that might accompany speaking freely about
ethnicity. Even in our 2001-3 interviews and focus groups, people said that they
talked about ethnicity only when they were with members of their own ethnic
groups whom they felt they could trust (Freedman etal. 2011:307).
The second response here is particularly ominous for the creating of hegemonic identity. It
shows a clear divide between the 'official' history and the 'Iiving'historythatisdiscussed
privately.
One of the goals of the Berkeley study (and indeed one of the stated goals of the
Rwandan government for education) was the development of more inclusive, "democratic"
teaching methods, in which discussion and debate - framing history as a collection of choices
and perspectives rather than a strict timeline of events. This would ostensibly imply a free
discussion ofethnicityas it pertains to both history and self-identification.lfpracticedthis
would allow for a stronger civic Rwandan identity, as it would allow for the negotiation of
ethnicity, rather than a divide between ethnicityin public and in private. Unfortunately
"...emphasison openness and individual choice, democratic ciassrooms, and primary source
review, may have become unpalatable for a government increasingly focused on control"
(Freedmanetal. 2011: 309).
Ingando
In addition to the official education curriculum, Rwanda also makes use of ingando
campstoreintegrateandindoctrinatesegmentsofthepopulation. Ingandoare at least
superficially based on a tribal gathering of the same name, convened to discuss mutual problems
and their solutions between Rwandan villages and clans in pre-colonial Rwanda (Mgbako 2005).
Ingando serves two purposes for the Kagame regime: indoctrinating Rwandan elites (such as
gacaca judges and students) and reintegrating former combatants (as well as prostitutes and
orphans) back into the community (Thomson 2011). Each of these goals is done in separate
ingando camps, the former consisting primarily of university graduates, grooming them to
occupy high level positions; while the latter consists of Hutu ex-combatants. As ingando remains
a severely understudied aspect of reconciliation in Rwanda (Thomson 2011),there is little
material available for review. As such, this subsection will focus solely on the reintegration of
ex-combatantsthroughingando.
Typically lasting for approximately 12 weeks, ingando reintegration camps focus on truth
telling and re-teaching history to former combatants, orphans, and prostitutes (Thomson 2011).
These camps are under constant armed military guard, and participants are forced to remain
attentive and subdued (Thomson 2011). The lessons combine the official view of history, as
alreadydiscussed,withlessonspromotingthevalueoftruthtelling,essentiallypreparingex-
combatants for gacaca. Susan Thomson, who was forced to attend ingando while pursuing her
doctoral fieldwork notes that:
In romanticizing the historical past and presuming that all Hutuneedtobere-
educated, the policy produces two broad simplifications: all Tutsi (whether they
were in Rwanda during the genocide or not) are innocent victims 0 r"survivors" and
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all Hutu (whether they participated in the genocide or not) are guilty perpetrators
(2011: 333)
Also explicit in the re-education process is that the hatred Hutu feel towards Tutsi is the "root of
the Rwandan disease" that led to the genocide.
This process, in which all Hutuare deemed to be responsible, further entrenches ethnic
division ism, as it discounts any narrative of Hutu suffering thatdoesnotfittheofficialtruth
framework. Moreover, the assumption of Hutu guilt also serves to remove Hutu from wielding
power, as crimes of genocide can be used to revoke the right to vote (Thomson 2011). The
overwhelming impression of Thomson is that ingando is used to promote silence on behalf of
the Hutu population. An ingando participant is noted to have remarked to Thomson "alert the
outside world about how being Hutu is a crime in the new Rwanda" (2011: 336). Ingando serves
to aid in effectively moving Hutu experiences away from the public sphere, as they can only be
perpetrators, rather than victims. In relegating Hutuexperience to the private sphere, the
Kagame regime prevents the potential of pan-Rwandanism from becoming the hegemonic
expression of group identity.
Teaching Identity
Despite the lifted moratorium on history, the actual study of the pastinRwandaisstili
quite thin. There is little attention paid to history throughout the social stud iescurriculum,the
government instead choosing to focus on broad concepts such as unity, harmony, and
cooperation. Teachings of the past tend to focus on a romanticized pre-colonial legacy in which
Rwandans lived in harmony. While this mayor may not be accurate, it does not reflect the more
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recent history of ethnic domination and subjugation, both in colonialandpost-coloniaIRwanda.
There is little nuanced discussion of either ethnicity or the civil war and corresponding genocide,
with a mere five pages being dedicated tothe genocide itself. Sucha lack of discussion inthe
classroom, combined with an unwillingness on the part of educators toteach about the past,
risks shifting the discussion of history outside the public sphere and into that of the private. This
has the potential to allow conflicting views of the pasttoovercometheofficialnarrativeofthe
Kagame regime, making it unlikely that the regime will succeed in creating a new, hegemonic
Rwandan identity.
Ingando camps also fail to take into account local perspectives on the genocide, instead
focusing on promoting silence amongst Hutu ex-combatants and promoting loyalty to the
current regime. For inganda participants, particularly ex-combatants, this disavows their
experience from the official narrative, further relegating anydiscussionofthe past to the private
sphere. Much like the structure of the education system, this relegationofthepasttothe
private sphere makesthe creation ofa hegemony, in which the publie narrative can co-opt the
private,impossible.
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Chapter Six: Comparisons and Conclusions
The previous three chapters have examined the construction ofsupra-ethnic identities in both
the former Yugoslavia and present day Rwanda. Using the Yugoslav case as a framework for
analysing present day Rwanda, this chapter will assess the potential of Kagame's Rwandanism of
becoming a hegemonic expression of group identity, and the viabi1ityofthisprogramin
preventing future inter-ethnic conflict. This chapter will first review the concept of hegemonic
identity, followed by a brief overview of identity construction in both Yugoslavia and Rwanda. In
assessing the construction of identity in Rwanda, this chapter will argue that Rwandanism is
unlikely to become a hegemonic expression of group identity,andas such,isnotaneffective
tool for post-conflict reconciliation in Rwanda.
Hegemonic Identity
As was discussed in chapter two, in many ways, ethnic conflict is a battle over identity
itself (Moshman 2007). Despite the prominence of literature dealing with ethnic identity in
conflict (of which Horowitz (1985) remains the paradigmatic work), the role of identity in
peacebuildinghas not been readily explored. Akeyreasonforthisunder-theorization isthe
tendency,especiallyinpoliticalscience,toconceptualizeidentities as static and primordial-
equating ethnicity with a territorial-bound identity (Lijphart (1977), for example). Such a static
conception of identity ignores a wealth of research done by both social psychologists and critical
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theorists,whoarguethatidentityisafluidandsociallycontingentconstruct,andassuch,can
changeovertime. S3
Key to this social construction of identity is the role of history, both locally produced and
created by the dominant power structure. These in themselves are products of socio-historical
conditions, with the individual being "derived from conditions of power that precede it, [...)
thoughnotmechanicallyorpredictably,frompriorsocialoperations"(Butler1997:21). Despite
the prominence of theories emphasizing the socially contingent aspectsofgroup identity, there
isscarceworkontheroleofthestateinconstructingidentitiesthroughitsroleindefiningsocial
interactions. The concept of hegemony provides a theoretical framework that can be used to
assess the role of the state in helping to shape and form the identities of its citizens.
Initially coined by Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, hegemony refers to the process in
which dominant groups elicit "the consent of dominated groups byarticulatingapoliticalvision,
an ideology, which claimed to speak for all and which resonated with beliefs widely held in
popular political culture" (Rupert 2009:177). Such an interpretation of hegemony is also held by
some of the most prominent contemporary critical theorists, such as Butler, Laclau, and Zizek,
who argue that a stable hegemony is only possible if the dominant group manages to co-opt
counter-narratives to the hegemonic narrative of power (2000). Thus, a stable hegemony can
only be achieved if the public sphere ifableto successfully incorporatethenarrativesofthe
private. Using Benedict Anderson's conception of the nation as an 'imagined community'
(1983), in which the nation is constructed by articulating a shared history and collection of
experiences inthe minds of group members, a stable hegemony (as itpertainstoanationalor
S3 In psychology, see Owenset al (2010); while in critical theoryseeButler(1997);Althusser(1971).
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ethnicidentity),requiresarticulationsofthe past in the public sphere (standard education,
memorialisation etc.) to be able to incorporate local, living memory, if it is to become the most
salient aspect of group identity.
Identity Construction in Yugoslavia
The construction of a pan-national Yugoslav identity can be broken into two phases. The
first, from 1919-1939, occurred primarily under Serbian autocracy, though there was an early
period of (relatively) democratic rule. During this period, the national identities of Croats,
Siovenes,andtoa lesser extent Serbs, were discouraged by the new Yugoslav state (Dragnich
1983). These identities were relegated to tribal affiliation, which provokedbacklashacrossthe
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (and later Yugoslavia).
Yugoslavism, in the first Yugoslav state, was driven primarily from Serbian myths of
nationalorigin,such asthebattleforKosovo Plain. The Serbian character of the state was also
reinforcedatthehighestadministrativelevels,bothbytheappointmentoftheSerbianradical
Stojan Protic as Prime Minister, against the recommendation of the elected assembly, and later
by the declaration of autocracy by Serbian King Alexander in 1929. Rather than creating a
Yugoslavia that was constructed asan aggregate of the constituentnations,thefirstYugoslavia
reinforcedlong-heldfearsofSerbianaspirationsfordominance dating back to Hapsburg control
over northern Yugoslavia (Djokic 2003). This fear of Serbian dominance, originating at the local
level and reinforced byaSerb-centric public narrative, increased the salience of exclusionary
nationalist identities atthe expense ofa greater, supra-national, Yugoslav identity. It is this very
fear of Serb dominance that enabled the hyper-nationalist Croat Ustasha government to pursue
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a program of genocide during the Second World Warinthe Axis puppetlndependentStateof
Croatia.
While the Ustasha carried out a deliberate genocide against Serbs, Jews, homosexuals,
and Roma, the former Kingdom of Yugoslavia disintegrated into a three sided civil war between
the Ustasha, Serb royalist Chetniks, and the multi-ethnic communist Partisans under Tito. Each
side committed atrocities against one another, with the Partisans emerging victorious. Much
like Alexander, Tito and the Communist Party pursued a program of Yugoslav nation building,
this time under the slogan of 'Brotherhood and Unity'.
Tito's nation building efforts were far more extensive than those of King Alexander.
Rather than attempting to reduce previousethnicaffiliationtosimpletribaldivisions,
'Brotherhood and Unity' aimed at creating a Yugoslavism that was constructed of all Yugoslav
national groups (originally Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes-though this later was expanded to
Montenegrins, Macedonians, and Bosnians). This allowance of national differences is most
evident in monuments such as the tomb of Njegos, which contained different traditional
architecturalstyles54, each facing a constituent republic (WachteI1998). This emphasis on a
Yugoslav identity constructed of constituent nations is also evident inthe school curriculum, in
which students of all national groups would be taught some of the more prominent works from
other Yugoslav nations. Efforts at creating a Yugoslavism based on constituent nations was also
evident in war memorials, as the tendency was to commemorate all those who died in the
liberation of Yugoslavia (Karge2009). It was, however, this particular narrative of the past (all
54 As mentioned in chapter two, Serb architecture is primarilyByzantineinorigin. Croat and Slovene
architecture is based upon that of Western Europe, while Bosnia hasa strong Ottoman legacy.
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sides suffered equally at the hands of foreign invaders) that would become an insurmountable
obstacle in the years leading up to Yugoslav disintegration.
As discussed previously, nations are "imagined communities" bound together by a
shared understanding of the past and their own origins (Anderson1983). It is this shared history
that was problematic for the Yugoslav regime, as it had to account for differences in myths of
national origin (such asthe aforementioned BattleofKosovoPlain),asweliasdifferent
experiences both during the first Yugoslavia and the Second World War. This was partially
resolved by the aforementioned inclusion of prominent works acrossYugoslavnations, but these
effortscompletelyfailedtoaddressaYugoslavorigin,particulariyonethatwouldinclude
interwar Yugoslavia. Yugoslav national origin was taught as a communist class struggle against
foreign occupation and the bourgeois social order (Hopken 1999). In order to further this
narrative, the bulk of interwar Yugoslav literature was banned, preventing any sense of
continuity in a Yugoslav nation, while also disavowingalternative accounts of the origin of the
Yugoslav state.
Of even greater importance, particularly concerning the later violent dissolution of
Yugoslavia, was the way in which the Communist Party dealt with the Second World War
experience. As mentioned earlier, crimes committed during the war were treated with
equivalency, inthe sense that "all nations had traitors" (Hopken 1997: 92). In addition, by
framingtheconflictasa struggle for national liberation, pitting the partisans against
'counterrevolutionaries', the state failed to address the ethnicized nature of violence. This is
particularly evident in the treatment of the Ustashawho portrayedbothasforeigninvaders,
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thus absolving the complacency of the Croat population. This official version of history clashed
with local memories of the Second World War.
As was discussed in chapter three, this difference in public and privatenarrativesis
especially obvious in the case of the Jasenovac camp in the former Independent State of Croatia.
The concentration camp, which saw the extermination of an unknown number of Serbs
(estimates range from 100000 -1000000) became a powerful symbol for both Croat and Serb
nationalists as Yugoslavia began to break apart. During the Titoist era, there was no memorial
commissioned for the site, despite the obvious significance ofthecampforthemanysurvivors
and their families. The memorial was only constructed after power had been de-centralized to
the constituent republics. The only effort at commemoration was done locally, and informal
vigils were held atthe site each year (Karge 2009). Despite the obvious want and need of the
public for this memory space, no effort was made by the centralized state apparatus to provide
one. This shows a very clear disconnect between the public memory discourses with that of the
private. Itisthisdisconnectthatpreventedtheestablishmentofasupra-national imagined
community that could promote Yugoslavism as a hegemonic mode of group belonging.
Finally, this lack of account for the past prevented the greater Yugoslav narrative from
being able to co-opt the rise of nationalism following the death of Tito in 1980. Crucial to the
nationalist questions being asked within each republic was the extent of suffering each nation
endured during the Second World War; the genocide of Serbs in the Independent State of
Croatia was particularly contentious (Mojzes 1994). This fixture on the past was also evident in
the nationalist propaganda used by leaders such as Milosevic and Tudjman. Upon the
reintroduction of symbols closely resembling those in the Independent State of Croatia, the state
controlled media within Serbia labelled Croats as Ustasha, while the Croat media portrayed
Serbs as a "bearded Chetnik horde" (Milosevic 2000). There was no pan-Yugoslav narrative that
provided a satisfactory explanation of the Second World War, which allowed these exclusionary
nationalist discourses to better reflect and co-opt local narratives, providing an ideal setting for
the ethnic cleansing that would occurduringYugoslavdisintegrat ion.
Identity Construction in Rwanda
Identity in Rwanda has been constructed differently than inYugoslavia. Theoretically at
least, it should be easier to construct a universal identity in Rwanda, as both HutuandTutsi
share a similar history, territory, language, and customs. Indeed,aswasdiscussedinchapter
four,historicallyspeakingitwaseconomicactivity,not'ethnicity', that marked the difference of
Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa in pre-colonial Rwanda. The arrival of Europeans, most notably the
Belgians following the First World War, formally institutionalized identity, marking Tutsis as the
natural rulers of Rwanda.
This 'naturalization' ofTutsi dominance in Rwanda was based on a combination of
scientific racism and biblical adherence known as the Hamitic hypothesis. According to this
hypothesis the Hutu were descendents of South and West African Negroids, who arrived in
Rwanda prior to the Tutsi. The Tutsi, according to this myth, arrived later from Ethiopia, and
were members of the Hamites - a racial group more closely linked to the Europeans. This, in the
minds of the colonialists, made Tutsi the genetically superior race and the obvious rulers of
Rwanda. The Hamitic hypothesis became part of the Rwandan education system, and Hutu were
barred from high level administrative positions. Thus, in Rwanda youth were taught that the
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Tutsi were a superior race that had essentially taken Rwanda from the Hutu. This was further
reinforced at the administrative level, which was dominated by Tutsi, while Hutu faced a low
ceiling for upward mobility.
Rwandan independence in 1962 reversed the ethnic discrimination in Rwanda, with
Tutsi now barred from higher education and administrative positions. Many Tutsi also fled to
neighbouring countries such as Uganda, where they wouldremain until the RPF invasion in 1990.
The Hamitic hypothesis still dominated discourses of identity in post-colonial Rwanda, with Tutsi
again being constructed as foreign invaders that had oppressed the Hutu majority. Such a view
had a wide resonance amongst the population, as Tutsi dominance was a hallmark of the
colonial period. There was also sporadic violence against Tutsi during this period,thoughitwas
noton the scale, both in terms of the violence itself and the organizationoftheviolence,as
during the 1994 genocide (Des Forges 1999).
The RPF invasion triggered an increase in anti-Tutsisentimentacross Rwanda,
culminating in the 1994 genocide. There are a few factors here that are important to note.
First, the RPFinvasionitselfreinforced thepreviouslydiscussed Hamitic hypothesis; Tutsi in this
case were a literal invading force seeking to gain control of the Hutu dominated Rwandan state.
It has been documented (see Des Forges 1999) that popular participation in the genocide
increased in areas being approached by the RPF. Second,despitethefactthatHutuPower
militias focused primarily on Tutsis, many Hutu who opposed the regime or supported the
ArushaAccordwerealsotargeted. Finally, and crucial to later reconciliation, the RPFaiso
carried out smaller number of revenge killings, and also pursued and massacred a significant
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numberss of Hutu in the Democratic Republic of Congo following the conclusion of the Rwandan
civil war (Cobban 2007). Following the conclusion of the civil war, the now victorious RPF, and
its leader Paul Kagame, embarked on a new nation building effort in Rwanda, attempting to
create a civic Rwandan identity to replace the old labels of Hutu and Tutsi.
In order to construct this new identity, and to disseminate a new version of history, the
Kagame regime has relied upon gaeaea courts, memorials dedicated to the genocide, ingando
camps, and a new education system. Both gacaea and genocide memorials deal exclusively with
the events of the civil war, with the greatest emphasis on the genocide of 1994. Gacaea should,
theoreticallyatleast,providethemostidealforuminwhichtodebateissuesofhistoryand
ethnicityin Rwanda, though the actual practice of this debate has received significant criticism
(see Cobban 2007; Buckley-Zistel 2006a, 2006b). Central to this criticism is the belief, amongst
both participating Rwandans and many in the academic community, that gacaca is designed only
to persecute 'Hutucrimes'. Grievances against the RPFare either ignored or strictly
discouraged,with said victims being subject to furtherpersecution dueto "promoting genocide
ideology" (Buckley-ZisteI2009).
Asthe only public forum inwhichethnicitycan be discussed (and eventhen,notfreely),
gacaca hasa tendency to promote, rather than discourage, exciusionary ethnic identities, The
trialsaretemporal,focusingonlyon the genocide itself,and assuchforceparticipantstoexpress
grievances,relateevents,anddefendthemselvesthroughethnocentric discourse. To
paraphrase Hannah Arendt (2003), if one is attacked as a Tutsi, one must defend oneself as a
Tutsi. In the same sense, Hutu accused of crimes, or expressing grievances, must also define
55 Some estimate this to beas many as 200000 (Cobban 2007).
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their defense or grievance using these ethnic terms. This ensures that the only discussion of
ethnicityis not only done in exciusionaryterms, but also in hierarchal ones, as Hutu grievances
are not considered to beas important as those of TutsLs6 This has effectively shifted discussions
ofethnicityfromthe public sphere to that of the private, as there isno public space in which
ethnicitycanbefreelydebated. This has promoted a silence of ethnic debates, particularly
amongst Hutu, which in turn has fueled distrust and fear, a silence that is sometimes viewed as
threatening to survivors of the genocide (Field 2007). The memorialisation of the genocide has
also been accused of discouraging nuanced discussion of the eventsofthegenocide,withan
emphasis on the macabre, literally shocking audiences to the extent that debate of the events
and issues surrounding the genocide is unthinkable (Meirhenrich 2011).
Rather than addressing the 1990-94 period, both ingando and the social studies
curriculum take a more long term view of Rwanda's past and origins of ethnic identity. While it
is currently difficult, if not impossible, to comprehensively review ingando within this work, the
limited amount of current scholarship (see Thomson 2011; Mgbako 2005) certainly suggests that
the main purpose of the program is to silence opposition and instill loyalty to the RPF, and by
extension, President Paul Kagame. This is a hardly surprising phenomenon. The current
literature only focuses on re-integration ingando camps that are used to integrate past
combatants into Rwandan society (Thomson 2011). As such, it is hardly surprising that the chief
purpose is not history education (though ethnicity is still presented asa colonial fabrication).
The second type of ingando, which appears to be used to indoctrinate future Rwandan elites has
not received adequate scholarship, though the contents of such camps, especiallyastheyrelate
56 Recall that in order for reconciliation there must bean "acknowledgement of suffering by both sides,
even when substantially unequal" (Staub 2008:399).
to both historyandethnicity, is of crucial importance to those interestedintheteachingof
history and ethnicity in Rwanda.
While the moratorium on history teaching in Rwanda has recently been lifted, there is
no definitive curriculum orcurricularresourcesavailableonthe subject as of this writing. Those
attempting to study or influence the current teaching of history in Rwanda have typically done
so through workshops with Rwandan teachers (Freedman et al. 2011), or through interviews
with Rwandan adults (Buckley-Zistel 2009; Fujii 2009) or youth (Hilker 2011). In order to provide
a more comprehensive view of how history is currently being taught in Rwandan schools, this
work has focused on the contents of the social studies curriculum forthefirstsixyearsof
primary education in Rwanda. The social studies are the only standardized format in which
history and the question ofethnicityistaughtto the nextgeneration of Rwandans, and as such,
providetheclosestthingtoafullydevelopedhistorycurriculumforthoseresearchingthe
teaching of history in Rwanda.
As was discussed in greater detail in chapter five, there isa stunninglackofaframework
for understanding the genocide in Rwanda, as well asthe issueofethnicitymoregenerally.
Indeed,muchliketheaforementionedgacacatrials,thesocialstudies curriculum effectively
shifts the debate ofethnicityto the private sphere, undermining any sort of coherent vision
about Rwanda's past. Violent images in texts, eerily reminiscent of 1994, persist from the
earliest grade levels, with little to no framework for understanding why these events exist and
have existed. Even when the genocide is referenced (usually in the contextofthenumberof
orphans/disabled, though also in regard to genocide memorials) there is no mention whatsoever
of the civil war and genocide itself. The only time in which the genocide is dealt with directly is
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at the sixth level,and even then there is only five pagesdedicated to the civil warandgenocide.
The RPF is portrayed as the saviours of Rwanda, and it is implied that they overthrew the
previous regime primarily to stop the genocide (Comprehensive Social Studies 6). Such an
account obviously differs greatly from the living memory of Rwandans who experienced the
genocide,asthemajorityofthe killings occurred years after the RPFfirstinvaded. In addition,
killings had a tendency to escalate in areas where there was high RPFactivity(DesForges1999).
The combination of a lack of information about the civil war and genocide, combined with the
differences in the public/private discourses of remembrance, seriouslyunderminesthecurrent
government's attempts to create a universal framework for understanding the history of
Rwanda as it relates to the genocide. Without this shared understanding of history, it is
impossible to create a new identity construct that encompasses the'old'identitiesofHutuand
Tutsi (as per Anderson 1983).
Drawing Comparisons
While there are some obvious major differences between Yugoslavia and Rwanda, there
aresomesignificantparallelsintheirapproachestocreatinganewidentityasameansof
peacebuildingaftersevereinter-ethnicconflict. This subsection will be further divided into two
major themes. The first will examine the role of leadership in promoting new identities,
comparing the roles of both Tito and Kagame in this respect. The second theme to be examined
will be the use of history to create a new imagined community, as per Anderson (1983). This
subsection will also examine the omissions from the curriculum, and how these omissions effect
the construction of new identities. After reviewing these two themes, this subsection will assess
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the likelihood of Rwandanism becoming a hegemonic expression of group identity that can
further peacebuilding in Rwanda, as well as offering some concluding remarks.
leaderorlynchpin?
Common in nation-building efforts in both Yugoslavia and Rwanda is the extent to which
popular revolutionary leaders dominated state level discourse. Thisisperhapsunsurprising,
given that both were military leaders that came to power after winning a prolonged civil war.
Both Tito and Kagame also ended periodsofextremeviolenceintheirsocieties(thoughboth
were obviously also a part of that violence). It is this link of leadership to national unity,and
new pan-national identity, that has the potential to be problematic once there isa change in
leadership.
looking at the case of Yugoslavia, many scholars have noted that the federal state
system was strongly linked to Tito himself (Gow 1997). In the first few decades Tito served as
the literal dictator, forming an almost Stalin-like cult of personality, while in the later years,
though he was stripped of much of his formal powers, he was still the formal guarantor of
Yugoslav peace and security (Gow 1997). Tito was deemed so important to the functioning of
the state that his death was suppressed by members of the Communist Party immediately after
he died (Gagnon 2002). While ethnic nationalism certainly existed before Tito's death (the
devolution of power to the constituent republics, for example), it was only after his death that
leaders such as Tudjman and Milosevic resorted to nationalist security dilemmas to maintain
their grip on their respective republics. The death of Tito increased calls for reforms within the
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state-including increased citizen control and democratic reform, threatening the power base of
'old guard' leaders such as Milosevic (see Gagnon 2002).
Despite formally being considered a democracy, Rwandanism, and Rwandan leadership
ingeneral,isstronglylinkedtoPauIKagame. As discussed in chapter four, Kagamehas
effectively controlled the Rwandan presidency since 1995,winningre-electionwith such unlikely
vote tallies as 95 percent (Longman and Rutagengwa 2004)57. As noted earlier, Kagame also
presents his Presidency as one of reconciliation, with opposing parties and leaders often being
charged with divisionism, or promoting genocide ideology (Buckley-ZisteI2009). In presenting
his leadership in this manner, Kagamerisksframing'ethnicpolitics',broadlyspeaking,asthe
natural alternative to his administration. This risks a scenario similarto that of Yugoslavia,
where the death of the figurehead of 'Brotherhood and Unity' resulted in the death of this ideal,
andareassertionofexclusionarynationalistpolitics.
Kagame's removal from power, be it through death, election, or other means, risks
arguably more than that of Tito in Yugoslavia. Tito, despite being half-Slovene and half-Croat,
presented himself both during and after the Second World War, as a Yugoslav. This was
consistent with the ideology of the Partisans who were a multi-ethnic force and later
incorporated elements of the Serbian resistance as well. This allowed for 'Brotherhood and
Unity' to be well represented at the highest level of administration, rather than being viewed as
a Croat controlling the various national republics. Kagame,bycontrast, is unlikely to be able to
foster a similar image. Despite titles such as the "father of orphans", it is difficult to view the
RPF as anything other than a Tutsi army. While the goal of the Kagame administration is to
57 This vote tally was from the 2003 Rwandanelections,heldonAugust25,2003.
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introduce a new Rwandan identity, one cannot help but notethatsuchaprocesswouldtake
several generations, and by linking this new identity so strongly with one particular individual
there runs substantive risk of it collapsing once Kagameisremoved from power. It should also
be noted that it was a leadership void (the assassination of Habyarimana), that directly preceded
the genocide. In order for Rwandanism to be an effective means of coping with conflictinthe
future, it needs to be reflected inthe private sphere, aswellasthrough the public sphere
dominated by Kagame. The following two subsections will review why the Rwandanism being
taught is unlikely to be able to co-opt these private discourses.
Minding the Gap: Identity, History, and Collective Amnesia
Much like the approach to leadership, the education systemsofbothYugoslaviaand
Rwanda are strikingly similar in their approaches to teaching a new form of collective identity.
Both have, either implicitly or explicitly, linkedtheirrevolutionarystruggJesto removing bad
leadership and foreign influence. This has allowed both to frame their new identity constructs
as being part ofa golden age of their civilizations; an integral aspecttocreatingauniversal
conception of an imagined community. Of ar greater importance, especially as it pertains to
creating a hegemonic expression of identity, both Yugoslavia and Rwanda have omitted large
parts of the historical record, particularly those periods that have seen large scale inter-ethnic
violence. Significantlyinbothcases,thisviolencewasarecentoccurrence that exists in living
memory, rather than an element of the distant past, which is often the case in terms of a
civilization golden age. Also, in both cases the period omitted was the same period that gave
rise to, and ostensibly legitimizes, the post-conflict regime .
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In Titoist Yugoslavia, the so-called golden age ofcivilizationwasimpiicit, in the sense
that it was an undefined past in which (initially) Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes lived peacefully in
the region free from foreign occupation. The Titoist regime was in a sense a rediscovery of this
golden age, with Yugosiavia being a state won through revolutionary struggle. It was also this
foreign occupation and influence that was the root of ethnic violence in the past, with this
violence beingconstructedasa by-product of bourgeois leaders and fascist invaders (Dragovic-
Soso 2002). Unsurprisingly, the nature of the Yugoslav struggle was reduced to one of class,
rather than one of identity or territory. This is particularly significant, as underthe framework of
Brotherhood and unity, the constituent nations were allowed toexist,albeitsubordinatedtothe
greater Yugoslav framework.
In teaching this golden age, the Communist Party devolved much of the curriculum to
the constituent republics. This led to a somewhat fragmented account for the past, and it has
been observed that "[... ] children educated in various Yugoslav republicswouldnothavehadan
identical view of the vital question of what their country had been like before the communist
era" (Wachtel and Markovic 2008: 206). The Second World War struggle for "national
liberation"wasnotdiscussedindetail,particularlyinter-ethnicviolenceandgenocideinthe
Independent State of Croatia. EveninterwarYugosiavliteraturewasbanned,preventingany
sense of continuity of a Yugoslav nation.S8 This was not initially problematic, as there was a
genuine desire in behalf of Yugoslav society to 'move on' following the Second World War
(OberschaIl2007;lilly1997).
5BRecalithatthenation,accordingtoAnderson(1983),movesasa unit through time. This break in
history prevents such a perception.
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This gap however, encompassing both interwar and Second World War Yugoslavia, was
instrumental in the proliferation of ethnic nationalism and victim mentality after the death of
Tito. This process began in Slovenia, with the Writer's Association calling for even greater
national control over the school curriculum, while Serbia began to demand increased control
over the autonomous region of Kosovo, citing the need to protect the Serbian minority
(Dragovic-SoSo 2003). As this so called 'national question' began to dominate the intelligentsia,
it was picked up by nationalist leaders such as Tudjman and Milosevic, who invoked ethnic
security dilemmas centered on the Second World War experience to demobilize the population
and maintain their grip on their respective republics (see Gagnon2002).
As was discussed in greater detail in chapter three, itwasprecisely this gap in history
that was the source of the most inflammatory rhetoric from Belgrade and Zagreb. Serb-
controlled media labelled Croats as Ustasha, while Croat media responded by labelling Serbs as
chetniks. The label of Ustasha was also reinforced at the local level in Croatia, as symbols used
in the Independent State of Croatia began to reappear. Debate also centered on the Jasenovac
camp, with both Serbs and Croats creating exaggerated figures to advance their own
exclusionary nationalist agendas (Cohen 2001). The massacre of Croats by the Partisan provided
yet more opportunity for disagreements over past ethnic conflict to dominate the Yugoslav
consciousness. Both sides constructed themselves as victims of a monstrous Other, and the very
period used to position their victimhood was the same that had been omitted from state-
sanctioned discourse. In this sense, the gap in history that could not be accounted forunderthe
framework of Yugoslavism was filled by exclusionarf nationalist narratives. This successfully
challenged the hegemony of the Yugoslav narrative, fueling inter-ethnicsecuritydilemmasinthe
process.
Rwanda has embarked ona similar approach to establishing a so-ca lied golden age of
civilization. While Yugoslavia framed the civil war itself as a war of liberation, Rwanda has also
uses liberation asa theme, though in this sense from a divisive coloniallegacy. Throughout both
ceremonies (gaeaea, ingando) and the school curriculum, present day Rwanda is more strongly
linked to the pre-colonial period than to thecolonial/independenceperiods. Within the school
curriculum there is an emphasis on pre-colonial life and state structures, while colonialism and
independent Rwanda receive scarce attention (only appearing in any detail in the sixth grade).
This period is portrayed as one of harmony. Much like in Titoist Yugoslavia, this golden age is
potentially problematic as it is greatly removed from the living memory of Rwanda. This makes
it difficult to accept such a narrative, and even this idea ofa peaceful pre-colonial record is
disputed by historians (see Newbury 2009). This is a prime example ofhow the government's
narrative of the past does not reflect the reality faced byeverydayRwandans.
Much like Yugoslavia before it, Kagame's Rwanda runs a serious risk of being unable to
account for competing narratives of the civil war, genocide, and consolidation of the country. As
was discussed in detail in the previous two chapters, there remains scarce education on the civil
warandgenocide in Rwanda (5 pages in the current social studiescurriculum), and there is no
mention of the role of the RPF in these events other than as the group that halted thegenocide
(Comprehensive Social Studies 6). Moreover, the discouragement of ethnic labels such as Tutsi
and Hutuserveto prevent a discussion of these identities in the public sphere, relegating them
to the private. This is also consistent with national memorials and museums, which focus on the
macabre, without an interpretive framework for understanding (Meirhenrich 2011). The only
public venues in which the past can be discussed is through the heaviIycontrolledforumsof
gacaea and ingando. Gacaea has been widely criticized for only focusing on "Hutu Crimes"
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(Cobban 2007), while ingando has been criticized for promoting silence and loyalty to the
regime,ratherthanare-teachingofthepastandreconciliation(Thomson 2011).
Moreover, the focus of gacaca trials on the genocide itself reinforces thinking of identity
in the recent, living, pastas ethnically dichotomous, as opposed to the new, official Rwandan
identity. This is because, as was noted earlier, when dealing with identity-based violence,
victims (and perpetrators) are prone to describe this violence inidentity-basedterms. Rather
than encouraging citizens to think of themselves as Rwandan, thesetrialsreinforcetheold
HutufTutsi dichotomy. Combined with the tendency to focus on Hutu crimes, this process
ignores the narratives of the Hutu majority population, and any security dilemmas (caused by
the RPF invasion, amongst others) that had factored into the genocide.
Taken together, Rwanda has the very real risk oftransferringall discussion ofethnicity
to the private sphere (especially considering that Gacaca trials arewindingdownand will end in
the reasonably near future). Thisverylackofa public forum forethnicity is the greatest
challenge to the government's current attempts at creating a hegemonic Rwandan identity.
Unless the state can alter its narrative of the past, and ethnicity more generally, it will be unable
to co-opt local narratives to secure the salience of Rwandanism amongst the population. This
risks a return to an ethnically dichotomous society, particularly if there is a shock to the current
system (as occurred with the assassination of Habyarimana).
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Rethinking Rwandanism
While identity is seen as an integral aspect of ethnic conflict (see Moshman 1999), it is a
vastlyunexploredconceptintermsofpeacebuildingandreconciliation. In order to theorize how
identity shapes peacebuilding and reconciliation, this work has used a framework of hegemony
advanced by Butler, Laclau, and Zizek (2000) to understand the negotiation of identity between
publicallyand privately driven narratives of the past (in the tradition of Benedict Anderson's
imagined communities (1983)). Using the case ofTitoist Yugoslavia as a baseline, this thesis has
explored the potential for Rwandanism to become a hegemonic identity in post-genocide
Rwanda.
Thisthesishasattemptedtoaddressthequestion:lsthecreationofanew,civic
Rwandan identity, a viable means of post-conflict reconciliation in present day Rwanda? In
order to answer this question, the program of 'Brotherhood and Unity' pursued in the former
Yugoslavia by the communist regime under Tito has been used as a comparison. Conceptualizing
group identity as an operation of hegemony, chapter two argued that in order to create a new
supra-national group identity, said identity would have to be constructed from an aggregate of
·the previously exclusionary ethnic identities. Using Benedict Anderson's theory of the nation
being an "imagined community" (1983), in which national groups are brought into being by a
common conception of their own origins(history),thisthesis hasarguedthatasupra-national
identitymustbeabletointegratecompetingnarrativesofthepastintoacohesivewhole. In
effective terms, this means the state must be able to create an 'official'accountofhistorythat
can successfully co-opt alternative accounts present in the livingmemoryofthoseatthelocal
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level,which in turn are reproduced outside of state control (unl ike,forexample,
memorialisation and standardized education).
In Yugoslavia, as was demonstrated in chapter three, attempts at creating a new,
Yugoslav, identity under the framework of "Brotherhood and Unity" were ultimately
unsuccessful. Despite attempts at integrating different accounts of history in t he education
system, as well as by creating supra-national monuments (such as the tomb of Njegos) the
Yugoslav project ultimately failed due to the gap in official memory that encompassed severe
inter-ethnic violence during the Second World War. After a shock to the system (the death of
Tito and increased demands for reform), nationalist leaders used narratives centered on the past
to demonize other ethnic groups and create ethnic security dilemmas that culminated in the
bloody dissolution of the Yugoslav state. Despite standardized education and memorials, there
was never an official account that could challenge or co-opt the narratives of ethnic divisionism,
particularly surrounding the genocide in the Independent State of Croatia at the Jasenovac
camp.
In the case of Rwanda, this thesis has argued that the program of Rwandanism being
pursuedbytheKagameadministrationisunlikelytobecomeahegemonic expression of group
identity. 'Official'accountsofhistoryand ethnicity, disseminated in the public sphere through
means of genocide memorialisation, gacaca courts, ingando camps and a new education
curriculum have portrayed ethnicityasa colonial construction designedtodividetheRwandan
people. The reduction of ethnic affiliation to a divisive coloniallegacymaybe"true" ina broad
sense, but this does not reduce the salience of ethnic identityin Rwanda,anunsurprising
phenomenon considering the long promotion of ethnic divisionism under first the Belgians, and
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later in independent Rwanda. The genocide itself only further entrenched the salience of ethnic
identity, though it remains conspicuously absent from public discourse. The only public forums
in which identity can be discussed (gacacain particular) is in direct referencetothegenocide,
ensuring the divisiveness of ethnic identities in Rwanda. Moreover, there is a general lack of
education about history, identity, and the genocide incontemporaryRwanda. Despite the lifting
on the history moratorium, there remain no standard texts in Rwanda after over a decade of
reconstruction. In addition, teachers have been reluctant to teach history or identity in Rwanda,
foreitherfearofcreatinghostility,orofpersecutionbytheKagameadministration. Inorderto
overcome this lack of available history teaching materials, this work has made the primary social
studies textbooks a principle point of examination, providing additional insights into the
teaching of history to Rwandan youth.
In reviewing the current social studies curriculum (asthisistheciosestsubjectto
history), itis immediately apparent that there is not sufficient attention paid to the past,
particularly the extremely contentious recent past of the civil wa rand corresponding genocide.
Manyofthequestions relating to conflict and conflict resolution are effectively passed to the
private sphere, denying students a standardized framework for viewing the past (an essential
part of Anderson's imagined community). The origins of Hutu and Tutsi scarcely appear at all,
and not until the sixth grade is identity or genocide given any significant attention. The primary
historical focus is evidently the pre-colonial period; a time in which Hutu, Tutsi, and twa lived
harmoniously in Rwanda. While this ostensibly done to promote reconciliation amongst
Rwandan's, this idealized pre-colonial past is far removed from the living history experienced by
Rwandans,andassuch,lackstheabilitytoco-optthedivisivehistoryandperceivedoriginsof
ethnicityinstilled in the past hundred years; a conception of history (based on the Hamitic
hypothesis discussed in chapter four), that has only been reinforced by the RPFinvasion in 1991.
Given the emphasis that the Kagame administration has placed on creating this new Rwandan
identity based on an alternative view the historical origins of Hutu and Tutsi, is striking how
seldom ethnicity appears within Rwandan schools. As was established through the examination
of primary social studies texts in chapter five, scant attention is focused on the teaching of the
genocide in Rwanda, with a mere five pages dedicated to this topicover the first six years of
schooling. Ethnicityis passed off as a vestigial trait of the Belgian colonizers, ignoring the
importance of ethnicity in the lives of contemporary Rwandans. Much like gocaca trials,
genocide memorials, and ingondo camps, the Rwandan education system has served to shift the
discussionofethnicityfromthepublicspheretothatoftheprivate,increasingtheriskthatthere
will be a proliferation of historical narratives that will fall outside of the "official" version of
history advanced by Kagame and the RPF. If these privately reproduced accounts of history
cannot be integrated into this official narrative, any hegemonic projectcenteredonauniversal
civic Rwandanism will be unsuccessful.
Much like what occurred in Yugoslavia following the death of Tito, Rwanda risks a return
of exclusionary ethnic narratives after the Iynchpin figure (Kagame) is eventually removed from
power. The lack of government narrative explaining the RPF's role in violence both during and
after the genocide provides an important historical gap that could be readily filled by ethnic
nationalism once there isa loosening of state control. Given Rwanda's divisive past, it is unlikely
that a new, hegemonic identity will be established before Kagame is removed from power.
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Concluding Remarks
In many ways, ethnic conflict is a conflict over identity itself (Moshman 2007). As such,
reconciling these conflicting identities is crucial to any attempt at peacebuilding in divided
societies. In order to accomplish this goal, both Titoist Yugoslavia and present day Rwanda have
embarkedona program of national identityconstruction,attemptingto merge previously
conflicting identities into multi-ethnic Yugoslav and Rwandan identities, respectively. Assuming
that the nation itself is an imagined community based upon the perception of a shared history
(as per Anderson 1983),the critical theoretical concept of hegemonyprovidesan ideal lens in
which to evaluate the potential of such a supra-national identityconstructionproject. In order
to maintain its dominant status, the hegemonic narrative of society must be able to co-opt
dissenting narratives, preventing them from supplanting the hegemon as the "common sense"
account of society and societal relations (Butler, Ladau, and Zizek2000). In cases of national
identity, this means that the hegemonic narrative, that which is often promoted by the state
through use of the ideological stateapparatus(education,memorialisation etc.) must be able to
reflect the locally produced "living" memories and perceptions of history that are reproduced
independently of state control ifitto have any success at supplantingthe exdusionary identities
that were previously in conflict. While other works have highlighted the importance of coming
to a shared view of the past (see Staub 2008; Field 2007), this work is the first to do so using a
framework that can assess the potential of that shared viewofthepastsupplantingprevious
historical narratives of division.
Using Tito's program of 'Brotherhood and Unity' as a comparative case to assess if the
creationofa new, civic Rwandan identity, isaviablemeansofpost-conflictreconciliationin
129
present day Rwanda, this thesis has argued that the current program of Rwandanism is unlikely
to replace the old labels of Hutu and Tutsi asthe dominant expression of group identityin
Rwanda. Much like Yugoslavia before it, the lack of official framework for understanding past
violence is likely to shift debates of history and ethnicitysolely to the private sphere, where it is
impossibleforthemtobeincorporatedintotheofficialtruthnarrativeoftheRPFregime,thus
preventing the establishment of a hegemonic form of group identity. This shifting of the
discussion ofethnicityto the private sphere has already been noted inthe literature focused on
gacaca, memorialisation, and ingando (see chapters four and fi~e). This work has established
that this trend also exists within the Rwandan education system,asthesocial studies (the only
medium through which Rwandan history is currently being taught) also lacks any sort of nuanced
discussion ofethnicity or the genocide. Indeed, the only aspect of the past approached in detail
is that of pre-colonial Rwanda, a past that exists so far from the living memory of Rwandans that
it is unlikely to form the basisofa new shared civic identity.
This work is important to those interested inthestudyofpost-conflictreconciliationfor
several reasons. In terms of Rwanda specifically, and inthe absenceofa developed history
curriculum, this work is the first to examine social studies curricular materials as a means of
teaching history to Rwandan youth. This is of crucial importance to those studying the politics of
memory, history, and identity in Rwanda, and fills this important gap inthestudyofhistory
education. This work is also useful inthe sense that it provides the first rea I comparative case
for using supra-national identityconstructionasa means of reconciliation. Current comparative
works have largely focused on one aspect of the reconciliation process (see chapter two), while
this work brings together truth telling, memorialisation, and educationincomparative
perspective.
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While the focus of this particular work is on communist Yugoslavia and contemporary
Rwanda, the general framework of analysis (hegemony and the re-articulation of private
narratives into that of the public) could be applied to other casesaswell. Obviously each case is
unique, with different historically contingent circumstances affectingindividuals'conceptionof
the past. Atthesametime,theidentificationofgapsinthe'official'historyevents that can later
be exploited to fuel ethnic security dilemmas is important to the understanding of propaganda
and its effects on inciting violence. Interestingly enough, the notion of using a wider, more
nuanced account of history to promote reconciliation has been sought by disadvantaged groups
in other, non-ethnic conflict situations, such as recent requests for an in-depth examination of
aboriginal residential schools within various provincial history curriculums in Canada (CBC Feb
23,2012). Indeed, usinghistoryasa means of understanding and reconciliation applies to far
more than just cases of serious inter-ethnic conflict.
Theexaminationofthesocialstudiescurriculumhasexpandedthecurrentliteratureon
history teaching in Rwanda, though there are still several limits to this research that need to be
addressed. Most importantly, this work was done without conducting interviews within Rwanda
itself. In order to fully develop how Rwandan youth view history, history teaching, and ethnicity
(both currently and historically),this work would have greatly benefitted from extended
interviews with Rwandan youth, ideally across multiple provinces, as well as with educational
shareholders. In addition, textbooks from the publisher INR-Pitambra were unavailable for this
project, though judging by the consistencyamongstothertextbooks from multiple publishers at
thesamegradelevel,thisisunlikelytobeamajorshortcoming.
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There are still many issues of Kagame's Rwandanism project that need additional
scholarly attention. Foremostoftheseisthe need for an in-depth study of the history
curriculum itself, once it has been fully established and made available. Also important to the
study of reconciliation efforts in Rwanda is the role of ingando camps. There is currently a large
gap on this particular topic, with much of the research being limitedtopersonalexperience(see
Thomson 2011). In particular, the ingando camps that appear to be used to indoctrinate the
next generation of Rwandan elites need further scholarly attention,asitistheattendeesof
these camps that will playa large role in the future direction·ofRwanda. Despite the scholarly
interest that Rwanda has generated since the 1994genocide,there remains significant streams
of research that remain understudied,a fact that needs to be remediedifwearetounderstand
both the process of reconciliation in divided societies, as well asthe deliberate construction of
new national identities.
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